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Abstract 
The wide commercial success of certain mobile phones, such as Apple‘s 
iPhone and RIM‘s Blackberry, was the motivation behind this study to examine 
empirically what drives the demand for mobile service bundles. If casual observation 
is an accurate indicator, consumers make their mobile purchasing decisions based 
solely on the type of mobile phone that mobile service providers are offering at the 
time as part of a bundle of services. This, in turn, raises the question of whether 
service bundle components, other than the mobile phone, matter to consumers. In 
light of increased competition and saturation in the U.S. mobile sector, gaining a 
deeper understanding of consumer choice is critical not only for the development of 
effective market strategies but also for policymaking. As governmental agencies take 
a closer look at competition and the need or lack thereof of regulation in the mobile 
sector, it is crucial to understand how consumers purchase mobile service as this may 
very well form the basis of new regulations and public policies. Surprisingly, 
although there is a large literature addressing various aspects of mobile demand, no 
prior study has examined this topic from a mobile service bundle perspective. 
The present study uses data from an online stated-preference survey with a 
conjoint analysis component. The design for the conjoint analyses incorporates 
efficient survey design, which promises most accurate parameter estimates. It is the 
first application of efficient survey design theory to telecommunication services. It is 
also one of the first practical applications of this innovative concept. In these trade-
off exercises, 503 survey respondents ranked three mobile service plan alternatives, 
each described via 10 service attributes. Survey respondents completed six such 
exercises. A thorough quality review of the survey results revealed 14 invalid survey 
responses and survey respondent fatigue in the last two choice situations. After 
eliminating the 14 invalid responses, the resulting data were fit to several versions of 
the multinomial exploded logit model. Using likelihood ratio indices and hypotheses 
tests, such as the likelihood-ratio test, the Wald test, and the Hausman test, to 
determine the best model for this study, the final model selected was a multinomial 
mixed exploded logit model with 10 lognormal distributed and two fixed parameters. 
This model provides direct insight into the demand determinants for mobile service 
bundles. It reveals demand elasticities and calculates the consumers‘ maximum 
willingness to pay for specific bundle components. 
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The fitted model reveals several interesting econometric, competitive, and 
public policy findings. First, applying D-efficient survey design requires a priori 
information on the final model‘s specification and the signs and sizes of its 
coefficients. Data from a pilot survey fitted to a multinomial logit model generate the 
necessary a priori proxies. The design matrix is D-optimized relative to this a priori 
model. Any deviation from the pilot model‘s specifications and its coefficient priors 
jeopardizes the optimality of the design matrix. A test was derived to measure 
whether the optimized design matrix retained its optimality when evaluated under the 
final model instead of the pilot model. In the present study, the final model 
specifications and coefficients deviate sufficiently from the a priori proxy to render 
the optimized design matrix no more or less efficient than a design matrix randomly 
created. Hence, no benefits from D-optimization carried through to the final model. 
With perfect foresight, however, D-optimality could have decreased the design 
matrix‘s D-error by 83%, thereby significantly increasing the model‘s accuracy. This 
practical application of D-efficient survey design illustrates that further research in 
efficient design needs to address how the benefits from D-optimization can be 
retained. 
In terms of competition, the fitted model explores several competitive 
strategies, simulating market share gains and losses from changes in attribute levels 
and calculating demand elasticities for specific bundle components. This analysis 
reveals that only certain pricing strategies are effective. It also demonstrates that a 
combinatorial strategy might be most effective. Specifically, decreasing mobile 
phone prices, increasing term lengths, and increasing the monthly recurring charge 
increases subscriber revenue in addition to gaining market share. 
In terms of public policy, the study finds that regulators must examine market 
behavior and alleged market failures in terms of service bundles. Considering 
individual bundle attributes on a standalone basis, which is currently the common 
practice, yields incorrect results. Finally, the fitted model highlights the importance 
of making additional radio spectrum available to mobile service providers.
6 
 
Acknowledgements 
I completed this dissertation while employed at NERA Economic Consulting 
(NERA), an international economic consulting firm. I am grateful to NERA for the 
financial support and for offering me a highly academic working environment and 
experiences, which enabled me to conduct this study. 
I am deeply indebted to the great number of people who helped me to make 
this achievement possible. First, I would like to thank Professor Gary Madden of the 
School of Economics and Finance at Curtin University for being my dissertation 
supervisor and for coaching and encouraging me throughout the process. 
I am also deeply indebted to Professor Kenneth Train of the Department of 
Economics at the University of California Berkeley. He spent many hours with me 
patiently working through theoretical arguments and mathematical applications. I 
want to thank Professor Jerry Hausman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and an anonymous reviewer who served as thesis examiners and provided me with 
valuable comments and feedback. Associate Professor Ruhul Salim of the School of 
Economics and Finance at Curtin University graciously acted as chairperson of my 
dissertation committee. 
I also would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Aniruddha Banerjee at 
Centris Market Intelligence for the many valuable discussions we had, Ms. Patricia 
Cunkelman at NERA for her editorial comments and knowledge of APA style 
guidelines, and Mr. Warren Kimble at Curtin University for helping me to keep the 
administrative side of my dissertation work in order. Dr. John Rose, Senior Lecturer 
at the Institute of Transportation and Logistics Studies at the University of Sydney 
provided valuable insights into efficient survey design. Mr. Andrew Collins at 
ChoiceMetrics helped me to resolve questions in applying Ngene, the software that 
applies efficient survey design, to my work. Ms. Sarah Butler at NERA kindly 
offered me her thoughts on the survey questions. I am also indebted to Professor 
Gregory Duncan at the Department of Economics at the University of California 
Berkeley who hired me to work for NERA some 15 years ago. 
7 
 
Last, but certainly not least, my sincerest thanks to my wonderful wife for her 
moral support and encouragement not only in this work but also in all my endeavors. 
Behind every successful man is a more successful and strong woman—nothing could 
be more true for me. 
 
San Francisco, October 2011 
 
Christian Dippon 
 
8 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction and Overview ................................................................................... 12 
Literature Review of Consumer Demand for Mobile Services ................................ 16 
Theoretical Model ................................................................................................ 27 
Measuring Mobile Service Plan Demand ................................................... 27 
Discrete Choice Models............................................................................. 31 
Econometric Modeling of Discrete Choice ................................................. 34 
Exploded Logit Modeling .......................................................................... 43 
Mixed Logit Modeling .............................................................................. 45 
Mixed Exploded Logit Modeling ............................................................... 46 
Model Specification .................................................................................. 46 
Experimental Survey Design................................................................................. 52 
Orthogonal Design .................................................................................... 57 
Efficient Design ........................................................................................ 62 
Implementing Efficient Design .................................................................. 67 
Survey Administration............................................................................... 73 
Survey Results Analysis ....................................................................................... 77 
Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................. 77 
Model Fitting ............................................................................................ 88 
Results Interpretation .............................................................................. 110 
Strategy Implications ............................................................................... 117 
Policy Implications.................................................................................. 125 
Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 127 
References ......................................................................................................... 133 
Appendix A FMS and Mobile Diffusion Literature Summary .............................. 143 
Appendix B Study Design Matrix ....................................................................... 146 
Appendix C Orthogonal Design Example ............................................................ 148 
Appendix D Design Matrix Optimization Code (Ngene) ...................................... 153 
Appendix E Design Matrix MNL Choice Probabilities (Ngene) ........................... 154 
Appendix F Consumer Survey Mobile Research .................................................. 155 
Appendix G Survey Responses ........................................................................... 165 
Appendix H Model 5-1 Variance-Covariance Matrix ........................................... 167 
 9 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Cumulative Logit Distribution ................................................................ 37 
Figure 2. Log-likelihood Function ......................................................................... 41 
Figure 3. Asymptotic Standard Error ..................................................................... 60 
Figure 4. Mobile Phone Amortization Period by Age and Gender ........................ 114 
Figure 5. Logit Probability—Provider 1 .............................................................. 120 
 
 
 10 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Relevant Mobile Demand Literature ......................................................... 26 
Table 2 Model Notations....................................................................................... 33 
Table 3 Illustrative Choice Set .............................................................................. 51 
Table 4 Design Matrix Attribute Levels ................................................................. 55 
Table 5 Exploded Logit Model for Pilot Data ........................................................ 71 
Table 6 Ngene Optimization Results ...................................................................... 72 
Table 7 Response Distribution by Survey .............................................................. 76 
Table 8 Sample Descriptive Statistics .................................................................... 78 
Table 9 Annual Household Income Comparison .................................................... 80 
Table 10 Choice Alternative Order Regression Results—All Choice Situations ....... 86 
Table 11 Survey Completion Times in Minutes ...................................................... 87 
Table 12 Choice Order Regression Results—Choice Situations 5 and 6 ................. 88 
Table 13 Model 1: Exploded Logit ........................................................................ 91 
Table 14 Model 2: Exploded Logit ........................................................................ 94 
Table 15 Model 3: Mixed Exploded Logit—Normal ............................................... 95 
Table 16 Wald Statistics—Standard Deviation Coefficients.................................... 97 
Table 17 Model 3-1: Mixed Exploded Logit Model—Normal ................................. 97 
Table 18 Model 4: Mixed Exploded Logit—Parameter Estimates ......................... 100 
Table 19 Model 4-1: Mixed Exploded Logit—Parameter Estimates ...................... 101 
Table 20 Model 4-1: Mixed Exploded Logit—Lognormal..................................... 101 
Table 21 Model 4-2: Mixed Exploded Logit—Parameter Estimates ...................... 102 
Table 22 Model 4-2: Mixed Exploded Logit—Lognormal..................................... 103 
Table 23 Model 5: Mixed Exploded Logit—Parameter Estimates ......................... 105 
Table 24 Model 5: Mixed Exploded Logit—Lognormal ........................................ 105 
Table 25 Model 5-1: Mixed Exploded Logit—Parameter Estimates ...................... 106 
Table 26 Model 5-1: Mixed Exploded Logit—Lognormal..................................... 106 
 11 
 
Table 27 D-Optimality Comparisons ................................................................... 109 
Table 28 Ngene Optimization Results with Perfect Foresight ............................... 110 
Table 29 Relative Coefficient Interpretation Model 5-1........................................ 112 
Table 30 Default Scenarios and Market Shares ................................................... 119 
Table 31 Price Elasticity of Demand: Provider 1 Mobile Phone Prices ................ 121 
Table 32 Price Elasticity of Demand: Provider 1 MRC ........................................ 122 
Table 33 Price Elasticity of Demand: Provider 1 Term Reduction........................ 123 
Table 34 Price Elasticity of Demand: Provider 1 SMS Price Reduction ............... 124 
Table 35 Combinational Competitive Strategy—Average Male Subscriber ........... 125 
 
Appendix A 
Table A1 FMS Literature Summary Overview ..................................................... 143 
Table A2 Mobile Diffusion Literature Summary .................................................. 144 
 
Appendix C 
Table C1 Full Factorial Design Matrix ............................................................... 148 
Table C2 Full Factorial Effect Matrix ................................................................. 150 
Table C3 Fractional Factorial Matrix ................................................................. 150 
Table C4 Fractional Factorial Matrix ................................................................. 151 
Table C5 Orthogonal Fractional Factorial Matrix .............................................. 152 
Table C6 Nonorthogonal Fractional Factorial Matrix ......................................... 152 
 
 
 12 
 
Introduction and Overview 
In the United States, mobile service providers introduced first generation 
(1G) mobile phone services in the 1980s. High prices, limited network coverage, 
relatively poor quality of service, and large and heavy mobile phones limited the 
initial adoption of mobile telephony, which remained a luxury throughout the 1980s 
and well into the 1990s. In November 1992, The New York Times reported, ―Cellular 
phone users are finding that the price of making wireless phone calls has remained 
high—in some cases, as much as 80 times the price of a conventional call‖ (as cited 
in Parker & Röller, 1997, p. 304). The literature on mobile market development 
seems to confirm that when first introduced mobile telephony was more a status 
symbol than a commodity (see, e.g., Katz & Sugiyama, 2005; Lemish & Cohen, 
2005; Ozcan & Kocak, 2003; Turel, Serenko, & Bontis, 2007). 
The introduction of digital mobile telephony,1 or second generation (2G), 
fundamentally altered the demand, supply, and overall perception of mobile phone 
service. This change led to substantial growth in terms of subscribership, usage, and 
revenue. From a global perspective, the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) reported 4.6 billion mobile cellular subscriptions at the end of 2009 and 
expected this to reach 5 billion in 2010, whereas the world population in April 2010 
was 6.8 billion (ITU, 2010). Specific to the United States, there were 33.8 million 
subscribers in December 1995 compared to 286.6 million in December 2009 (CTIA, 
2010). In many countries, the mobile market is growing at rates comparable to or 
even higher than in the United States and, at times, has exceeded the 100% 
penetration level because individual subscribers have more than one subscription to 
accommodate their multiple mobile devices. For instance, as of March 2010, 72 of 
170 countries had mobile penetration rates in excess of 100% (TeleGeography, 
2011). 
Steep declines in prices paid by subscribers for mobile service plans were 
responsible, in part, for the rapid growth of the mobile services sector. Facilitating 
the steep decline in mobile prices has been: (a) dramatic reductions in the costs that 
mobile service providers incur to provide services, (b) competition among mobile 
service providers, (c) intermodal competition with alternatives like fixed-line and 
                                              
1
 Analog and digital cell phones both use the same radio spectrum but in a different way. Digital 
phones compress voice into a binary format (i.e., ones and zeroes), thus making it possible to send 
between three to 10 calls using the same space as one analog call. 
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Internet-based communications providers, (d) procompetitive regulatory change, and 
(e) rapidly increasing consumer acceptance of the mobility, coverage, and flexibility 
offered by mobile telephony. In contrast, because of the inroads from mobile and 
other emerging technologies, fixed-line demand and revenue have been declining, a 
trend that is likely to continue. 
Despite the tremendous growth of mobile telephone services, there is limited 
knowledge about how consumers select mobile phone service bundles. For instance, 
although it is a common practice in the United States to offer new subscribers a term 
contract with a subsidized mobile phone, it is unclear how sensitive consumers are to 
such offerings: Do consumers prefer the subsidy to the associated term contract if the 
subsidy exceeds a certain threshold? Similarly, how do consumers react to a change 
in the monthly recurring charge (MRC)?2 If a mobile service provider changes the 
price components of its service plan bundle, how much market share does it stand to 
lose or gain? It is also unclear how consumers view mobile data services relative to 
mobile voice services. Could a mobile service provider decrease SMS rates and 
compensate for this decrease with a decrease in the monthly voice allowance? 
The objective of this study is to identify the demand drivers of mobile 
demand when service elements are bundled and to estimate demand elasticities and 
the consumers‘ maximum willingness to pay for specific bundle components. In 
particular, it considers consumers‘ choice behavior in an experiment where mobile 
service plans are comprised of service bundle elements. No prior study has analyzed 
mobile demand when offered as a service bundle. Attributes associated with each 
separate element of the plan jointly form the mobile service plan‘s attributes. 
Mobile service plans are complex because they are composed of multipart 
prices that typically consist of: (a) a one-time upfront fee that includes the price of 
the mobile phone and a registration fee; (b) a monthly charge that entitles the 
subscriber to a certain amount of voice minutes; (c) monthly charge options for items 
like data, SMS, and MMS, as well as family plans; and (d) a usage sensitive portion 
that comes into play only if the subscriber exceeds the allotment contained in the 
monthly plan. The monthly charge consists of the charge for voice minutes and 
charges for any plan options in addition to any overage charges incurred in that 
particular month. Many plans also require a commitment of a minimum term 
                                              
2
 The MRC is the monthly price for the mobile service plan. 
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length—typically 24 months. Service providers frequently charge subscribers who 
wish to terminate their term contracts an early termination fee (ETF). 
This study hypothesizes that consumers consider multiple mobile service plan 
attributes when selecting a plan. The modeling of this selection process is 
challenging because it involves the modeling of a nonlinear pricing structure. The 
relevant literature has ignored these complexities and focused on individual services 
or service pairs when studying mobile demand. As such, the present study is a first of 
its kind. 
This study also offers an innovative approach to qualitative choice analysis 
by applying efficient design methodology to conjoint analysis. It is the first 
application of efficient survey design to telecommunications services and one of the 
first practical applications of this method. Conjoint analysis asks decision makers to 
trade-off mobile plan attributes thereby revealing how they make their decisions. It 
forms part of the consumer survey. The study develops a test that assesses the 
practical value of efficient design relative to more traditional conjoint design 
methods. 
The results of this study put forth some important implications for mobile 
service providers, policy makers, and regulators. For the service providers, it reveals 
which plan attributes are important to subscribers and which attributes subscribers 
commonly ignore. More important, the resulting demand elasticities demonstrate the 
market shares that service providers potentially could gain by introducing mobile 
service plans with certain desirable combinations or the effect that the change of one 
plan attribute could have on the attractiveness of the overall plan to subscribers. For 
regulators and competition authorities, the study identifies the interaction of specific 
demand determinants that are currently subject to policy debates. These factors 
include the imposition of term contracts, the demand elasticities of voice and SMS 
services, the impact of mobile broadband on mobile demand, and the competitive 
effects of flat-fee pricing. 
The study begins with a review of the relevant literature, examining three 
different yet related streams: fixed-to-mobile substitution, mobile diffusion, and 
mobile demand determinants. Next is a discussion on the development of the 
theoretical model for measuring mobile demand followed by a discussion on the 
derivation of the efficient design survey. Finally, the model results are presented 
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along with a discussion of the practical, strategic, and policy implications derived 
from this study. 
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Literature Review of Consumer Demand for Mobile Services 
The interest in mobile telephony increased post-2000 with the introduction of 
free long distance and decreasing mobile phone service prices. It was during this 
time that mobile subscribers started to outnumber fixed-line subscribers. A review of 
the literature on mobile demand reveals three time appropriate epochs. 
In the first epoch, research focused on the substitution effects of mobile 
phone service and attempted to determine if mobile telephony was eroding the 
demand for plain-old-telephone-service (POTS) and other services. One of the first 
studies in this field was Hausman and Ruud (1987) who used rank-ordered data to 
examine the trade-off effects between cellular radio (car phones) and mobile phones. 
In later years, analysts in many different countries studied the impact of fixed-to-
mobile substitution (FMS). Parker and Röller (1997) performed one of the first FMS 
studies, finding indirect evidence of FMS in the United States. In contrast, in 2001, 
Barros and Cadima found no significant impact of FMS in Portugal. However, after 
some time had passed, the results began to show a definite trend toward FMS. 
Rodini, Ward, and Woroch (2003) and later Ward and Woroch (2004) arrived at a 
similar conclusion as Parker and Röller for the United States. Sung, Kim, and Lee 
(2000), Sung and Lee (2002), and Ahn, Lee, and Kim (2004) found evidence of FMS 
in Korea, whereas Madden and Coble-Neal‘s (2004) study showed the first evidence 
of FMS in Australia. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states, Vagliasindi, 
Guney, and Taubman (2006) examined competition between fixed and mobile 
technologies and found some evidence of FMS. Vogelsang (2010) offers a 
comprehensive literature review focusing mostly on this first epoch of the mobile 
demand literature. He concluded that emerging mobile networks tended to act as 
complements to fixed-line networks, whereas mature networks were substitutes. 
Table A1 in Appendix A provides an overview of this epoch of the mobile demand 
literature. 
In the second epoch, researchers concentrated on mobile subscriber growth, 
specifically on how and why mobile telephony would diffuse on a national level. The 
mobile diffusion literature frequently uses S-curve type models that categorize 
mobile subscribers based on the timing of adoption into early adopters, early 
majority, late majority, and laggards (Kauffman & Techatassanasoontorn, 2005). 
Analysts used various diffusion curves to determine the demand driver of national 
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mobile demand and to forecast a country‘s saturation point. Gruber and Verboven 
(2001a, 2001b) were among the first to apply diffusion curves to model mobile 
diffusion rates. Their study revealed that the technological transition from 1G to 2G 
in addition to increased competition were the major drivers of mobile penetration. In 
addition to technological advances as a driver of change, Massini (2002) found that 
declining phone prices and lower MRCs had a significant impact on mobile 
diffusion. Banerjee and Ros (2004) added teledensity to the list of national demand 
drivers with lower teledensity exhibiting higher mobile penetration. Vagliasindi et al. 
(2006) and Vogelsang (2010) confirmed this finding. Koski and Kretschmer (2005) 
found technology standardization, technological advances, and competition in the 
fixed-line market to be significant accelerators to 2G adoption. Kauffman and 
Techatassanasoontorn (2005) found that technology standards, retail price levels, and 
analog diffusion as opposed to competition were the drivers of mobile diffusion, 
which was counter to the previous literature. However, Rouvinen (2006) found that 
standardization as well as market competition did act as accelerators to mobile 
diffusion. Analyzing the effect of technology, Dippon (2010) examined the diffusion 
of 3G mobile technologies. His study revealed that the key driver of 3G demand was 
time. The results of his study also showed a positive correlation between population 
density and 3G adoption, although there was negative correlation for mobile 
penetration. Dippon found negative correlation between 3G diffusion and 
penetration. Table A2 in Appendix A provides a summary overview of this epoch of 
the mobile demand literature. 
The third epoch examines the individual demand components or the 
relationship between a pair of such components (e.g., voice and SMS). As many 
countries have reached or are reaching mobile saturation, research focuses less on 
mobile adoption and more on gaining an understanding of how consumers make their 
related purchase decisions. Fierce competition in the mobile sectors of many nations 
seems to be the main driver behind this research as subscriber growth is now limited 
to competitive gains. This switch from ―organic‖ growth to ―competitive‖ growth 
requires a deep understanding of the factors that drive mobile demand. Among these 
factors are retail prices and various service attributes, including mobile phone 
subsidies, MRCs, SMS fees, roaming charges, and other aspects of this multifaceted 
demand model. Relative to the FMS and the mobile diffusion literature, this strand is 
broader in terms of topics analyzed. Studies in this part of the mobile literature focus 
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predominately on customer preferences and cover areas such as subscriber retention, 
switching and switching barriers, and various own-price and cross-price elasticities. 
The distinguishing feature in this epoch is that bundle components are treated as if 
they can be purchased individually or in pairs. This, however, is not how mobile 
providers offer their services. Mobile services are typically provided in bundles, or 
plans, at some fixed monthly recurring charge. Beyond this price, certain 
components of the plans are usage sensitive, often after some monthly threshold or 
allowance. Accordingly, the intent of this third literature review is to identify the 
determinants, or independent variables that studies of bundled service provision 
should consider. Given the direct relevancy of this epoch, a comprehensive review of 
the existing literature follows. 
Hausman (1999) offered some of the first work in this stream of the literature, 
although the motivation for his studies differs from that of others that followed. 
Specifically, in 1999, Hausman examined the impact that the omission of mobile 
telephones from the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) had on the index. Relying on 
the prices of mobile service plans in the top 30 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
in the United States,3 Hausman modeled mobile demand as a function of a time series 
of prices and average annual household income per MSA. Based on this model, he 
found a demand elasticity of −0.51, which shows that changes in price have a 
relatively small effect on the quantity demanded. 
In contrast to Hausman‘s (1999) study, subsequent mobile demand studies 
were primarily motivated by an alleged market failure (and proposal to regulate the 
relevant market) and to obtain competitive insights. For instance, Dewenter and 
Haucap (2008) noted that national regulatory agencies (NRAs) in Europe started 
questioning whether mobile sectors were effectively competitive. Thus, Dewenter 
and Haucap examined the market‘s and the service providers‘ demand elasticity. 
Revenue and quantity (minutes-of-use) information from three Austrian service 
providers (which accounted for about 90% of the mobile market) from 1998 through 
2002 provided the source data for this study. Dewenter and Haucap distinguished 
                                              
3
 ―Metropolitan Statistical Area—―A Core Based Statistical Area associated with at least one 
urbanized area that has a population of at least 50,000. The Metropolitan Statistical Area comprises 
the central county or counties containing the core, plus adjacent outlying counties having a high 
degree of social and economic integration with the central county or counties as measured through 
commuting‖ 
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/fedreg_2010/06282010_metro_standards-
Complete.pdf). 
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between short- and long-run elasticities. A function of price, number of subscribers, 
and firm dummies modeled mobile demand. For short-term elasticities, the study 
found them to range between −0.7 and −0.44. Long-term elasticities were between 
−1.05 and −0.61. Contrasting these results to some of the earlier related economic 
literature, Dewenter and Haucap concluded that Austrian mobile demand was more 
elastic than that of other countries. Interestingly, their study also revealed negative 
network effects as it found that minutes-of-use decreased with the size of a service 
provider‘s subscriber base. 
Kim, Park, and Jeong (2004) analyzed the impact of customer satisfaction 
and switching barriers on consumer demand. Finding subscriber retention an 
essential component of a service provider‘s competitive strategy, Kim et al. 
conducted a survey of Korean mobile subscribers. The resulting survey data were 
analyzed using hypothesis testing on a structural equation model. Subscriber 
satisfaction, as defined by Kim et al., was comprised of a number of service quality 
metrics, such as call quality and subscriber support. Switching barriers measured the 
cost a subscriber incurred by switching from one service provider to another and 
included time, money, and psychological cost. The hypothesis that higher call quality 
leads to higher subscriber satisfaction was accepted. Similarly, the hypothesis that 
higher subscriber satisfaction leads to higher subscriber loyalty (and thus lower churn 
rates) also was accepted.4 Kim et al. concluded that relatively higher call quality, 
subscriber service, and the number of value-added services positively contributed to 
mobile demand. Conversely, higher switching costs were negatively associated with 
mobile demand. 
Ishii (2004) used consumer usage surveys to assess the demand determinants 
for a specific mobile bundle component—mobile phone Internet use. His focus was 
on the social and cultural factors that shape mobile Internet use in Japan. Rather than 
modeling a demand function, Ishii relied on descriptive survey response statistics to 
assess mobile Internet demand, differences in mobile Internet and personal computer 
(PC) Internet use, and factors affecting mobile phone Internet use in Japan. Ishii 
found that relative to PC Internet access mobile phone Internet adoption was 
relatively low because many subscribers did not enable this function on their mobile 
phones. Among the mobile phone Internet users, the average time spent on the 
                                              
4
 The word ―churn‖ means that a subscriber changes mobile service provider.  
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Internet was approximately one-third of the time spent by PC Internet users. In 
contrast to Wareham, Levy, and Shi (2004), Ishii found that age was an important 
determinant of mobile phone Internet demand. Contrary to media statements, Ishii 
found that commuting time was not. His study also revealed that mobile phone usage 
differs from PC usage in terms of content accessed. 
Iimi (2005) studied mobile demand determinants, product differentiation, 
network effects, and demand elasticities in the Japanese market for mobile telephone 
services. Similar to the present study, Iimi‘s objective was to examine empirically 
the demand structure of mobile phone service. Iimi used a discrete consumer choice 
(logit) model and fitted data derived from a revealed-preferences survey conducted 
by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. Relevant to the present study, Iimi 
found that an ideal data source for this type of study consisted of contract-based 
information that included information on the contract and billing structure offered by 
each service provider. Iimi modeled mobile demand as a function of the MRC, a set 
of observable product characteristics, and network size (to measure the network 
effects). Iimi concluded that network effects no longer determined mobile demand. 
In contrast, product differentiation (measured as the number of advanced value-
added features) was a significant demand determinant. Iimi measured the price 
elasticity at between −2.43 and −1.30, attributing the high elasticity to intense 
competition during the process of privatization and liberalization. 
Ahn, Han, and Lee (2006) assessed mobile demand determinants in the 
mobile sector in Korea through a study of mobile churn determinants. Random 
samples of subscriber accounts that churned from a leading Korean mobile service 
provider provided the data for this study. Ahn et al. supplemented these data with 
customer dissatisfaction data collected by the service provider. Ahn et al. fitted these 
data to a logistic regression model. Dropped call and failure rates, number of 
complaints, loyalty points, calling plan type, mobile phone capability, mobile phone 
manufacturer, payment method, and gender served as explanatory variables. The 
study revealed that mobile demand was positively correlated with call quality and the 
age of the mobile phone and negative correlated with call volume and participation in 
a membership loyalty program. 
Eshghi, Haughton, and Topi (2007) also approached mobile demand from the 
perspective of subscriber loyalty by analyzing U.S. subscribers‘ propensity to switch 
mobile service providers. Using data from a subscriber satisfaction survey, Eshghi et 
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al. used correlation and causation analysis to assess the impact that subscriber 
satisfaction had on mobile demand. The propensity to churn was modeled as a 
function of age, education, income, years connected to the Internet, number of cell 
phones, propensity to add cell phones, total mobile spending, propensity to replace 
fixed-line phone service with mobile service only, and customer satisfaction. The 
study found a negative correlation between customer satisfaction and the propensity 
to switch service providers and a positive correlation between ―wireless orientation‖ 
(i.e., propensity to add cell phones and propensity to replace fixed-line service with 
mobile service only) and the propensity to switch. Interestingly, age, income, and 
education had only an indirect effect on the propensity to switch in that they 
influenced variables that directly or indirectly influenced the propensity to switch. 
The study also examined the effectiveness of switching barriers and found them to be 
ineffective relative to the quality of service. Eshghi et al. concluded that a service 
provider‘s competitive strategy should focus on improving its quality of service 
instead of erecting barriers to prevent switching service providers. 
Noting that both fixed and mobile telecommunications markets around the 
world had been privatized and largely liberalized, Garbacz and Thompson (2007) 
researched the factors that determine the demand for fixed and mobile services in 
developing nations. Using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model with fixed effects, 
Garbacz and Thompson modeled mobile demand as a function of a privatization 
dummy, several variables measuring market regulation and competition, total 
revenue per subscriber, teledensity, gross domestic product (GDP), pricing variables, 
population density, and educational level. The study revealed that mobile demand 
was determined by the price for fixed residential service, the price for mobile service, 
the activation charge for mobile service, income (GDP), and education. They found 
that own-price elasticity ranged between −1.27 and −0.20. 
Tallberg, Hammainen, Toyli, Kamppari, and Kivi (2007) investigated the 
impact of mobile phone bundling on mobile data usage in Finland. As such, the study 
examined whether the demand for the data components of a service bundle was a 
function of mobile phone bundles. Regulation in Finland at the time prohibited the 
bundling of mobile phones and mobile services. The objective of Tallberg et al.‘s 
study was to examine whether allowing the bundling of mobile phones and data 
services would positively affect the demand for mobile data services. The data 
consisted of interviews with industry experts, the results of which were analyzed 
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using descriptive statistics. Mobile service providers found bundling to be a critical 
determinant of mobile demand, an opinion confirmed by mobile subscribers. 
Regulators and mobile equipment manufacturers, however, did not find bundling 
desirable, but they agreed that short-term contracts and a focus on only advanced 
service bundles could improve their view on bundling. 
Grzybowski and Pereira (2008) investigated possible interdependencies 
between two mobile bundle components. Specifically, they analyzed 
complementarities between mobile voice calls and SMS in Portugal. Using 
consumer-level data from April 2003 and March 2004, Grzybowski and Pereira 
employed a tobit model with individual random effects.5 Counter to the present 
study, Grzybowski and Pereira assumed that mobile voice was a separate service 
from SMS and not offered in the same bundle. They modeled the demand for mobile 
voice services as a function of the price for voice calling, the price for SMS, age, and 
gender. Similarly, the prices for SMS and voice calling as well as age and gender 
determined the demand for SMS. The fitted model revealed that the prices of SMS 
and voice calling as well as age and gender were statistically significant determinants 
of SMS demand. For mobile voice demand, however, age and gender were 
statistically insignificant. The own-price elasticity of voice calling was −0.38, 
whereas the same measure for SMS was −0.28. They also found that mobile voice 
calls and SMS were complements with a cross-price elasticity of −0.06 (voice to 
SMS) and −0.28 (SMS to voice). 
Finding that retaining existing subscribers was cheaper than acquiring new 
subscribers, Seo, Ranganathan, and Babad (2008) studied mobile demand from the 
perspective of subscriber retention. Specifically, Seo et al. examined how switching 
costs, subscriber satisfaction, gender, and age affected a subscriber‘s propensity to 
churn. In their study, switching costs consisted of plan complexity, mobile phone 
sophistication, and length of time with the current service provider. Seo et al. also 
used the latter variable to assess customer satisfaction in addition to obtaining the 
                                              
5
 A tobit model estimates linear relationships between variables when there is either left or right 
censoring (or below and above censoring) in the dependent variable. When cases with a value at or 
above some threshold all take on the value of that threshold censoring from above occurs; therefore, 
the true value may be equal to the threshold or higher. With censoring from below, censoring affects 
values that fall at or below some threshold. The tobit model is also called a censored regression 
model. 
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statistics for dropped calls.6 Seo et al. used a binary logistic regression model. This 
model found a negative correlation between customer retention and the length of 
association, mobile phone sophistication, and service plan complexity. The fitted 
model revealed a positive correlation between the dependent variable and the 
dropped call ratio. Age and gender were not part of the fitted model, although Seo et 
al. concluded that different age and gender groups displayed different retention 
behavior. 
Tripathi and Siddiqui (2009) conducted an empirical investigation of 
subscriber preferences for mobile service attributes. Based on a conjoint analysis, 
Tripathi and Siddiqui examined how mobile subscribers in India made their purchase 
decisions and whether these decision factors differed among different demographic 
groups. Unlike some of the earlier literature, which largely focused on subscriber 
retention, the focus of this study was to obtain empirical insight on both retention and 
acquisition. Tripathi and Siddiqui conducted an opinion survey, which included a 
conjoint analysis, using personal interviews through shopping mall intercepts. The 
conjoint exercise asked respondents to rank 18 different mobile service packages 
based on a variety of features such as call quality (e.g., dropped call rate, coverage, 
congestion), features of mobile service tariffs (e.g., call rates, variety of the tariff 
plans), customer service (e.g., resolution of queries, complaint handling), value-
added services (e.g., ringtones, caller tunes, services like news updates), variety of 
the plans (e.g., postpaid, lifetime, prepaid), and the technology of the service 
provider. The survey also collected sociodemographic information including age, 
gender, monthly income, education, profession, and the type of current service 
account (i.e., government or private). Tripathi and Siddiqui fitted the resulting data 
using an OLS thus revealing that mobile demand in India was mainly a function of 
service quality, customer service, and price. Value-added services, such as ringtones 
and news flashes, were not significant. Similarly, Indian subscribers were indifferent 
about the technology used by the service provider. 
Kim, Telang, Vogt, and Krishnan (2010) analyzed the interaction between 
mobile voice and SMS by measuring the services‘ cross-price elasticities. Finding 
that the multifaceted pricing structure and myriad of plan choices posed a significant 
econometric challenge, Kim et al. constructed a two-stage choice model. In the first 
                                              
6
 A dropped call is a call that is terminated before the end of the call due to technical difficulties 
(including dead zones). 
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(discrete) stage, subscribers selected a mobile plan based on their past consumption 
behavior. In the second (continuous) stage, they chose quantities for mobile voice 
and SMS based on the fixed fees to enroll in the mobile plan, the marginal mobile 
voice price, past mobile voice consumption, the monthly voice allowance, SMS 
pricing, and the subscriber‘s income. The model was fitted using revealed-preference 
data from a mobile service provider in Asia. The study showed that mobile voice and 
SMS were weak substitutes with a cross-price elasticity of −0.8 (voice to SMS). The 
own-price elasticity of mobile voice was −0.1. Kim et al. also found differences in 
subscriber preferences based on age. Younger users showed lower mobile voice 
elasticity relative to older users. 
In contrast to the first two mobile demand literature epochs, the literature on 
mobile demand determinants is clearly a work in progress. With the exception of 
Hausman (1999), who focused on economic performance metrics, most of the work 
on mobile demand determinants appeared in the last six to seven years. The literature 
focuses primarily on gaining an understanding of the drivers of mobile demand and 
mobile churn. As summarized in Table 1, most of the empirical models assessing 
mobile demand determinants include provider-specific variables, in particular price 
variables. The exceptions are Ishii (2004) and Tallberg et al. (2007) who focused on 
the aggregate mobile market instead of individual service providers. 
There appears to be no consensus as to which respondent-specific variables 
should be included in a demand model, if any at all. Dewenter and Haucap (2008), 
Kim et al. (2004), Iimi (2005), and Tallberg et al. (2007) elected to include no such 
variables. Eshgi et al. (2007) found them to be statistically insignificant, whereas 
Grzybowski and Pereira (2008) confirmed their significance for SMS demand but 
rejected it for voice demand. Others, such as Ishii (2004), Tripathi and Siddiqui 
(2009), and Kim et al. (2010) did not test for the significance of the 
sociodemographic variables included in their models, but they displayed their results 
based on age and gender. Hausman (1999) found income a significant variable to 
explain aggregate mobile demand. Similarly, Garbacz and Thompson (2007) found 
income and education to be drivers of national mobile demand. Ahn et al. (2006) 
found gender to be statistically significant in explaining customer churn. Finally, 
market-specific variables were included only in multinational studies (e.g., Garbacz 
and Thompson, 2007). 
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Based on this latest epoch in the mobile demand literature, mobile demand 
seems to be a function of price and service attributes and possibly a set of socio-
demographic variables. Age and gender appear the most frequently used socio-
demographic variables (e.g., Ishii, 2004; Ahn et al., 2006; Eshghi et al., 2007; 
Grzybowski & Pereira, 2008; Seo et al., 2008; Tripathi & Siddiqui, 2009). Income 
also frequently appears (e.g., Hausman, 1999; Eshghi et al., 2007; Garbacz & 
Thompson, 2007; Tripathi & Siddiqui, 2009; Kim et al., 2010). Income, however, is 
primarily used in studies that examined aggregate demand (e.g., Hausman, 1999) and 
in cross-country studies (e.g., Garbacz & Thompson, 2007; Kim et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, Eshghi et al. (2007) and Tripathi & Siddiqui (2009) found income to 
have only an indirect impact. 
Elasticity of demand estimates for mobile voice services varied from −2.43 
(for Korea) to −0.1 (for an Asian country) with an average of −0.71. Cross-price 
elasticities for voice to SMS ranged between −0.08 and −0.06; SMS to voice was 
−0.28. Sufficient alternative observations for the elasticity estimates do not exist to 
form an opinion about trends or country differences. For the United States, Hausman 
(1999) appears to be the only study that measured mobile demand elasticity (i.e., 
−0.51). 
The review of the mobile demand literature reveals a number of areas where 
further research can significantly add to the current knowledge of how consumers 
select mobile phone services. As found by Kim et al. (2010), most of the existing 
literature focused on mobile voice demand only, leaving out other mobile service 
bundle components.7 Kim et al. added the SMS components to voice, thereby further 
expanding the literature. They also noted that the multifaceted pricing structure 
posed significant econometric challenges. The present study sets out to address some 
of these unexplored frontiers in assessing mobile demand. Specifically, it examines 
whether the pricing variables and the socio-demographic variables identified above 
flow through in a bundled service context. 
                                              
7
 Interestingly, in the field of fixed telecommunications, researchers have acknowledged that 
subscribers purchase services in bundles and have set out to explore its economic consequences (see, 
e.g., Pereira, Ribeiro, and Vareda (2011). 
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Table 1 
Relevant Mobile Demand Literature 
   Independent variables  
Author Year Dependent variable Provider specific Respondent specific Market specific 
Hausman  1999 mobile demand subscribers (time-series) household income (none) 
Dewenter & 
Haucap 
2008 mobile demand price, subscribers, firm 
dummies 
(none) (none) 
Kim, Park & 
Jeong 
2004 mobile customer 
churn 
service quality, switching 
barriers 
(none) (none) 
Ishii 2004 mobile Internet 
demand 
(none) age, gender, education, 
current consumption 
patterns 
(none) 
Iimi 2005 mobile demand mrc, service attributes, 
subscribers 
(none) (none) 
Ahn, Han & Lee 2006 mobile customer 
churn 
dropped calls, failure rates, 
customer complaints, loyalty 
points, mobile phone 
capability, plan type, mobile 
phone manufacturer, 
payment method 
gender (none) 
Eshghi, 
Haughton & Topi 
2007 propensity of mobile 
customer churn 
customer satisfaction age, education, income, 
years connected to 
Internet, number of 
mobile phones, 
propensity to add mobile 
phones, mobile 
spending, propensity to 
drop fixed-line 
(none) 
Garbacz & 
Thompson 
2007 mobile demand total revenue per subscriber, 
service prices 
income, education privatization 
dummy; market 
regulation, 
competition, 
teledensity, 
population 
density 
Tallberg, 
Hammainen, 
Toyli, Kamppari 
& Kivi 
2007 mobile data demand (none) (none) market 
regulation 
Grzybowski & 
Pereira 
2008 mobile voice 
demand, mobile 
SMS demand 
mobile voice prices, SMS 
prices 
age, gender (none) 
Seo, 
Ranganathan & 
Babad 
2008 mobile customer 
churn 
switching cost, subscriber 
satisfaction 
age, gender (none) 
Tripathi & 
Siddiqui 
2009 mobile demand call quality, mobile voice 
prices, value added services, 
plan variety, technology 
age, gender, income, 
education, profession, 
type of account 
(none) 
Kim, Telang, 
Vogt & Krishnan 
2010 mobile voice 
demand, mobile 
SMS demand 
fixed fee to enroll in plan, 
marginal mobile voice price, 
monthly voice allowance, 
SMS pricing 
mobile voice 
consumption, income 
(none) 
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Theoretical Model 
Measuring Mobile Service Plan Demand 
Success stories, such as Apple‘s iPhone or RIM‘s Blackberry, lead the casual 
observer to believe that consumers select mobile phone plans based on the 
attractiveness and functionality of the mobile phone with little regard for monthly 
prices, minutes and data allowances, and contract lengths. For instance, U.S. 
consumers filed several class action lawsuits against Apple‘s iPhone exclusive 
provider contract with mobile service provider AT&T that expired in January 2011. 
These lawsuits also received the attention of the U.S. Congress. At the center of the 
debate was whether AT&T had an unfair competitive advantage due to its exclusive 
offering of the iPhone. 
If one were to believe that the exclusive offering of a mobile phone provides 
a competitive advantage, consumers predominantly, or even exclusively, would 
choose a mobile service provider based on the attractiveness and functionality of its 
mobile phones. However, mobile phones generally are not sold separately but as part 
of a bundle of mobile services. Typically, a mobile service bundle includes, among 
other things, airtime allowances, overage charges, data download and upload speeds, 
data options, and SMS and MMS options. Contrasted against the apparent 
importance of the mobile phone, this raises the question of whether the components 
of the bundle, other than the mobile phone, actually play a role in a consumer‘s 
purchase decision. If they do, then to what extent does the mobile phone alone shape 
the demand for the overall service bundle? Are consumers willing to trade a less 
desirable mobile phone for a better service plan or are they willing to subscribe to a 
lesser plan in order to obtain a better mobile phone? 
Shedding light on these questions is critical for mobile service providers for 
several reasons. First, data from September 2010 indicates that 94.1% of the U.S. 
population had mobile phone service. This includes all U.S. citizens regardless of 
age. For mobile service providers, this high level of saturation means that subscriber 
growth mainly comes from subscribers switching from competitors and not from new 
subscribers entering the market. Second, as of January 2011, the Apple iPhone was 
not only available on the AT&T network but also on rival Verizon Wireless‘ 
network. This essentially marked the end of exclusive mobile phone contracts, 
although the iPhone is still not available on other networks, such as Sprint, T-Mobile, 
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and MetroPCS. This potentially further intensifies mobile competition if in fact 
mobile phone offerings are correlated with market share. Hence, understanding and 
measuring the demand for mobile service bundles and the underlying components of 
mobile demand is of critical strategic importance for mobile service providers. The 
specific elasticities provide service providers with an analytical tool to assess the 
competitive effects of a change in the structure of currently offered mobile bundles. 
Understanding consumer preferences for mobile phone service is also 
important to policy makers. For instance, legal actions in U.S. federal courts (see, 
e.g., Ayyad et al. v. Sprint Spectrum et al., 2008) and various complaints heard by the 
FCC (2009, 2010a) have questioned the competitive impact of term contracts. Most 
U.S. service providers offer postpaid services as part of a two-year contract with a 
liquidated damages clause that calls for the payment of an ETF should the subscriber 
terminate the contract prior to its expiration. Service providers justify term contracts 
stating that they are a recovery tool for subscriber acquisition fees and mobile phone 
discounts that subscribers receive at the beginning of a contract. However, consumer 
advocacy groups (e.g., Mierzwinski, Smith, & Cummings, 2005) argue that it 
increases switching barriers and thus reduces competition and consumer welfare. A 
study on consumer preferences for mobile service bundles can directly assess the 
impact that term contracts have on consumer demand. Specifically, measuring the 
correlation of the length of the term contracts and mobile phone prices sheds light on 
whether consumers prefer the upfront mobile phone discount in conjunction with a 
term contract or whether they prefer to pay for the mobile phone and not have a 
contract. 
Similarly, measuring the demand for mobile service plans and inferring 
consumer preferences can also resolve the U.S. Congress‘ investigation of SMS 
charges. On September 9, 2008, U.S. Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI), Chairman of the 
Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, sent a letter to the CEOs of Verizon Wireless, 
AT&T Mobility, Sprint Nextel, and T-Mobile (the four largest U.S. mobile carriers) 
demanding an explanation of recent price increases for text messaging (see Kohl, 
2008). Text messaging is a broad term that means sending messages from one device 
to another using a wireless technology. This includes services such as SMS, email, 
instant messaging, Internet access, voice SMS (where the text is converted to voice), 
text-to-fixed-line SMS (where the text is also converted to voice), and the sending of 
content (e.g., pictures and video messaging). Senator Kohl questioned only the price 
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of SMS, which is just one form of text messaging. This distinction is crucial as there 
is a significant difference in the use of SMS and other forms of messaging such as 
emails, Internet access, and voice SMS. Senator Kohl‘s letter asks the service 
providers to ―justify‖ what ―some industry experts contend‖ are price increases that 
―do not appear to be justified by any increases in the costs associated with text 
messaging services.‖ Specifically, Senator Kohl asked for: 
 An explanation of why text-messaging rates have dramatically increased in 
recent years. 
 Cost, technical, or other factors ―that justify a 100% increase in the cost of 
text messaging from 2005 to 2008.‖ 
 Data on the utilization of text messaging during this period. 
 Comparison of prices charged today as opposed to 2005 for text messaging as 
compared to other services offered by the service providers, such as: 
 Prices per minute for voice calling 
 Prices for sending emails 
 Prices for data services such as Internet access over mobile devices 
 Information on whether the pricing structure for text messaging differs in 
any significant respect from the pricing of competitors 
Only days after the release of Senator Kohl‘s letter, various jurisdictions 
began to receive consumer class action lawsuits. For instance, the U.S. District 
Court, Northern District of Ohio, Western Division received a class action complaint 
alleging an ―illegal scheme of price-fixing conspiracy.‖ The Northern District of 
Illinois, Eastern Division received a similar suit. There have been 20 related 
consumer class action lawsuits filed, all of which were consolidated in the Illinois 
Federal Court. A deeper understanding of how U.S. subscribers purchase mobile 
phone service can assess whether SMS charges are a statistically significant 
determinant of demand. Such an analysis must examine the price elasticity and the 
relationship between SMS charges and other price and non-price attributes of a 
service bundle. 
The saturated market faced by mobile service providers, the increasing 
availability of mobile phones, and the various regulatory and legal challenges 
involving mobile service offerings all require a detailed understanding of subscriber 
preferences in a bundled setting. Although there is a growing body of economic 
literature on mobile telephony, the focus of these studies is on isolated aspects of 
mobile demand and not on mobile demand when offered as a service bundle. The 
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latter type of study, however, is necessary to resolve the strategic, regulatory, and 
legal challenges that the mobile industry is raising. Vogelsang (2010) corroborates 
this assessment of the literature. He found that the current literature lacked studies 
that considered all price and non-price factors of mobile demand. Specifically, he 
found that four prices (mobile phone price, installation/setup fee, MRCs, and per-
minute calling charge) must be part of the consideration to avoid an omitted variable 
bias. He also found that studies must take into consideration non-price attributes, 
such as speed, functionality, presence/absence of a camera, and so on. Similarly, Kim 
et al. (2010) concluded that researchers know very little about how mobile 
subscribers make their purchase decisions and that the existing literature focused on 
mobile voice only. 
The present study attempts to address the requirements set forth by 
Vogelsang (2010), addresses the concerns raised by Kim et al. (2010), and fills an 
apparent gap in the literature. Specifically, it expands the literature in several 
respects. First, it seeks to update the demand elasticity estimates for the United States 
determined by Hausman (1999).8 Second, it expands on Kim et al.‘s study by 
considering all mobile service plan components, including voice, SMS/MMS, other 
data options, the mobile phone, and the term contract. It examines consumer demand 
in a postpaid-service bundle scenario where mobile phone features and prices are 
bundled with other service attributes such as the allowed monthly voice minutes and 
the price of excess data usage. Third, given the econometric challenges provided by 
this multidimensional pricing decision, the study employs advanced and flexible 
econometric tools, the mixed exploded logit model in particular. It expands on these 
tools by introducing a recent addition to the survey design literature called efficient 
design. Fourth, although most of the existing literature relies on aggregate demand 
data, no recent studies employ stated-preference surveys. 
This study includes price and other service attributes as independent 
variables. Given there are conflicting results in the literature on the significance of 
sociodemographic variables, the present study tests for them to avoid an omitted 
variable bias. The data from the consumer survey are analyzed using descriptive 
statistics and a discrete choice model. The descriptive statistics are used to compare 
the survey results to U.S. benchmarks. The choice model estimates the probability of 
                                              
8
 The nature of mobile service has dramatically changed since Hausman (1999). Thus, a direct 
comparison with Hausman‘s study is not meaningful. 
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a consumer selecting a plan given a set of attribute levels. The most common form of 
choice model is the logit model (Train, 1993). Depending on the choices faced by the 
decision maker, a logit model is either binomial or multinomial. In binomial logit 
models, the decision maker selects between two choice alternatives. In multinomial 
logit (MNL) models, the decision maker selects from three or more choice 
alternatives. For instance, Hausman and Ruud (1987) used a rank ordered logit 
model to explore mobile choice. An advanced version of the logit model is the mixed 
exploded logit model. This model introduces variation in the attribute levels through 
the ranking of choices and the repetition of trade-off exercises, essentially 
introducing a mixture of logit models (Train, 1993). In addition, rather than assuming 
fixed parameter estimates, it uses stochastic parameter estimates, thereby allowing 
for respondent-specific taste variations. The analysis focuses on statistically 
significant demand determinants and the interaction of the dependent variables (i.e., 
the probability that a particular mobile plan will be purchased) with the independent 
variables, such as choice and consumer attributes. Subgroups of the population are 
examined to determine whether behavioral differences exist among them. 
The following sections contain a discussion of the statistical foundation of 
discrete choice models, the modeling of discrete choice, and the mixed exploded 
logit model after which the specific model for this study is presented. 
Discrete Choice Models 
Unlike aggregate models that describe markets as a whole, discrete choice 
models are disaggregate models in that they examine individual decision making 
(Train, 1993). Using disaggregate models to draw conclusions about market behavior 
builds on the fact that demand and supply are simply the aggregate of economically 
relevant individual decision making. For instance, much of the literature on mobile 
demand (and particularly the literature on FMS and mobile diffusion) contains 
studies that start with total mobile subscriber numbers (i.e., aggregate demand), and 
the researcher performs a type of regression analysis to arrive at the demand drivers 
of mobile demand. Only the more recent work on mobile demand determinants 
contains studies that analyzed individual (disaggregate) purchase decisions. 
As Train (1993) points out, using standard regression techniques on 
disaggregate models is not appropriate if the values do not fall within a specified 
range; that is, they are not continuous. Total mobile subscriber numbers are 
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continuous in time and geography. However, individual purchasing decisions are not. 
An individual either purchases mobile phone service or not. A dummy variable of 
zero and one best describes this qualitative (noncontinuous) selection process. Under 
these circumstances, methods other than regression analyses are used.9 
One econometric technique for noncontinuous dependent variables is discrete 
choice analysis. As noted by Train (1993), discrete choice analysis applies to 
situations in which: (a) the number of choice alternatives is finite, (b) the choice 
alternatives are mutually exclusive, and (c) the set of alternatives is exhaustive. 
Choice alternatives are competing options. In the present study, the choice 
alternatives are the mobile service plans faced by the decision maker. These 
characteristics describe fairly well individual purchasing decisions for mobile phone 
services, particularly when examined in a survey where consumers make 
hypothetical (stated) purchase decisions. 
First, the number of mobile service plans in the United States is finite. 
Although this number may be too large for consumers to compare alternatives in a 
meaningful way, a consumer survey allows the researcher to limit the number of 
choice alternatives in an experimental setting. In the present survey, the number of 
choice alternatives was three. Furthermore, the survey respondents were informed 
that the alternatives offered in the survey were exhaustive and that they had to select 
one plan and one plan only as their most preferred plan. Hence, the choices offered in 
the present study were also mutually exclusive, and the set of alternatives was 
exhaustive. Based on these considerations, a discrete choice model is well suited for 
this study. Due to the large number of notations in this section, Table 2 serves as a 
reference of the notations used in the remainder of this chapter. 
                                              
9
 It is worthwhile noting that not all disaggregate models have noncontinuous dependent variables 
and therefore require econometric techniques other than regression analyses. For instance, Tripathi 
and Siddiqui (2009) conducted a consumer survey of individual purchase decisions. However, rather 
than asking survey respondents to select a plan (and thereby reject all other plans), the survey asked 
respondents to rank the desirability of the presented alternatives. Thus, the resulting dependent 
variable was a continuous variable, and Tripathi and Siddiqui used OLS analysis to assess the demand 
determinants. 
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Table 2 
Model Notations 
Term Notation Description 
Decision makers N Number of decision makers 
Decision maker n An individual making a decision to select a choice 
alternative in a choice set 
Choice situation tn A specific choice situation faced by decision maker 
(n), t=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
Choice set Jn All the choices in a choice situation faced by a 
decision maker (n) 
Choice alternative jn A specific choice in a choice set faced by decision 
maker (n) 
Choice attribute  xjn A specific (observed and unobserved) attribute of a 
choice alternative (j) faced by decision maker (n)  
Observed choice attribute zjn A specific observed attribute of a choice alternative 
(j) faced by decision maker (n) 
Decision maker attribute rn All (observed and unobserved) attributes of a 
decision maker 
Observed decision maker attributes Sn Observed attributes of a decision maker 
Observed decision maker attributes sn A specific observed attribute of a decision maker 
Utility Ujn All (observed and unobserved) utility derived by 
decision maker (n) from consuming alternative (j) 
Observed utility Vjn Observed utility derived by decision maker (n) from 
consuming alternative (j) 
Choice probability Pjn Probability of decision maker (n) to selected choice 
alternative (j) 
 
Discrete choice models are probability models in that they calculate the 
probability of selecting a choice alternative j  from a set of choice alternatives J  in 
a choice situation t . In the present study, the choice model produces the probability 
of selecting one mobile service plan given a set of three alternative mobile service 
plans. Two common forms of discrete choice models are logit and probit models, 
which are fundamentally identical, differing only in the functional form that 
transforms the observed choices into probabilities (Train, 1993). 
In both logit and probit models, a decision maker n  faces a choice set nJ . 
The choice set nJ  faced by decision maker n  consists of several choice alternatives 
nj . In the present study, for example, a decision maker (i.e., the survey respondent) 
faced a choice of three alternative mobile service plans. A choice alternative nj  
differs from another choice alternative ni  in terms of their attributes jnx  and inx . 
Different decision makers might make different choices based on the decision 
maker‘s attributes nR . A researcher only rarely observes all choice attributes and 
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decision maker attributes. Therefore, in order to distinguish all attributes (observed 
and unobserved) from the attributes that are actually observed in the data, observed 
choice attributes are notated by 
jnz  and inz , whereas observed decision maker 
attributes are notated by 
ns . Hence, the probability inP  for decision maker n  to select 
choice alternative i  from a set of choice alternatives 
nJ  is a function of inz , relative 
to all other observed choice alternative attributes 
jnz  and the observed decision 
maker attributes 
ns . Train (1993) specifies the probability as a parametric function of 
the following general form: 
 
(1) ( ,  for all  in  and , , )in in jn n nP f z z j J j i s   , 
 
where f  is the function that relates the observed data to probabilities, specified by 
some vector of parameters  . 
Econometric Modeling of Discrete Choice 
The econometric modeling of discrete choice models finds its roots in utility 
theory (Train, 1993). The decision maker n  faces nJ  choices. Consumption of each 
alternative can provide the decision maker with utility. Neoclassical consumer choice 
theory postulates, among other things, that consumers are nonsatiable (i.e., more is 
always better than less) and that they always maximize their utility (see, e.g., 
Silverberg & Wing, 2000). Thus, the decision maker will select the alternative 
perceived as yielding the highest utility. In the present study, a decision maker (i.e., a 
survey respondent) chooses from among three mobile service plans and selects the 
plan that yields the highest utility for this decision maker. Following the notation in 
Table 2, the utility of choice i  faced by respondent n  is written as: 
 
(2) ( , ),  for all  in  in in n nU f x r i J , 
 
where f  is a function (Train, 1993). To maximize utility, the survey respondent 
selects mobile plan i  as the preferred plan if and only if: 
 
(3)  for all   in  ,  in jn nU U j J j i  . 
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Expressed in words, equation (3) simply states that alterative i  is the utility 
maximizing selection for decision maker n  only if its utility is higher than the utility 
derived from all other alternatives in the choice set. Equation (2) defines the utility 
for a generic choice alternative. Rewriting equation (2) for choice alternative i  and 
j  and substituting these equations into equation (3) yields the following relationship: 
 
(4)  chooses    in    if  ( , ) ( , ) for all    in  ,  n in n jn n nn i J U x r U x r j J j i  . 
 
Equation (4) implies that the selection of alternative i  is a function of the 
decision maker‘s attributes and the attributes of alternative i  relative to the attributes 
of all other choice alternatives faced by decision maker n . 
This derivation assumes that a researcher can observe all attributes of choice 
attributes inx  and all decision maker attributes nr . However, this is not realistic as 
there are choice attributes that the researcher cannot observe. Similarly, it is unlikely 
that a researcher can capture all the relevant attributes of a decision maker. This is 
simply a practical observation. Data on some relevant attributes may not be available 
or may be beyond the scope or feasibility of the study. For instance, one can argue 
that the social status of a mobile phone is a relevant mobile service plan attribute. 
However, the social status of a mobile phone (e.g., iPhone 4) can be measured 
relative only to other mobile phones. This, in turn, requires that the survey 
respondents be familiar with the mobile phones in the choice set and know the social 
perception of these mobile phones. Similarly, the decision makers‘ traveling habits 
might affect the plan decision. However, this might be beyond the scope of the 
survey unless the focus is to examine whether the purchasing decisions of the survey 
respondents differ by traveling habits. To account for this practical limitation, a 
researcher must separate the utility function specified in equation (2) into an 
observed component and an unobserved component. Following Train (1993), 
separating the utility inU  into an observed component inV  and an unobserved 
component ine  yields: 
 
(5) ( , ) ( , )in in n in n inU U x r V z s e   , 
 
where V  is the observed utility derived from choice alternative i  faced by decision 
maker n , inz  are the observed choice attributes, and ns  are the observed decision 
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maker attributes. The unobserved component 
ine  contains all the characteristics of 
the choice alternative i  and the decision maker n  that the data do not capture. 
The observed utility V  is a parametric function, specified by a parameter 
vector  , which relates the observed choice and decision maker attributes to the 
observed utility. Hence, equation (5) is rewritten as: 
 
(6) ( , ) ( , , )in in n in n inU U x r V z s e   . 
 
Substituting equation (6) into the general form of a discrete choice model, as 
specified in equation (1), yields: 
 
(7) Pr( ,  for all    in ,  ).in in in jn jn nP V e V e j J j i      
 
Rearranging yields: 
 
(8) Pr( ,  for all    in ,  ).in jn in in jn nP e e V V j J j i      
 
As pointed out by Train (1993), the right-hand side of equation (8) states that 
the probability of selecting choice alternative i  is equal to the probability that the 
difference of the unobserved utility components is smaller than the difference of the 
observed utility. By definition, the observed utility is known (i.e., observed). The 
unobserved utility component, however, is a random variable. A random variable 
takes on a continuum of values, each with some probability. It follows a specific 
probability distribution with a certain mean and standard deviation. In the case of a 
logit model, the error term is assumed to be distributed independently and identically 
following the Extreme Value (Weibull) distribution. The difference between two 
random variables is also a random variable. Specifically, the difference between the 
two extreme value distributed error terms is a random variable with a logit 
distribution, thus the name logit model. Figure 1 shows the cumulative logit 
distribution. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative Logit Distribution 
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Figure 1. The cumulative distribution function describes the probability that a 
random variable X with a given probability distribution will be found at a value less 
than or equal to x. 
 
 
Thus, the probability of decision maker n  selecting alternative i  over 
alternative j  is equal to the cumulative logistic probability that the difference in the 
unobserved utility component is smaller than the difference in the observed utility 
component for all choice alternatives in the choice set. For instance, assume that the 
difference in the observed utility V  between alternative i  and alternative j  equals 
2.9. The probability that the difference in error terms is less than 2.9 (when the 
difference is distributed following a logistic curve) equals 95%. Hence, there is a 
95% probability that alternative i  is preferred over alternative j . Therefore, for 
alternative i  to be selected over all other alternatives in the choice set J , the actual 
probability of selecting alternative i  is a joint cumulative distribution. Based on this 
observation, McFadden (1974) derived the following probability of decision maker 
n  to select alternative i : 
 
(9) ,  for all  in .
in in
jn jn
n n
V x
in nV x
j J j J
e e
P i J
e e


 
 
 
 
 
The numerator of this ratio reflects the desirability of alternative i  faced by 
decision maker n , whereas the denominator is the sum of the utility obtained from 
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all choice alternatives. Thus, the ratio forces each choice probability between zero 
and unity and ensures that all of the choice probabilities add up to unity. 
With the logit probability defined, the only remaining issue is how 
inV  is 
estimated. Equation (6) defines 
inV  a parametric function. Therefore, in order to 
estimate the observed utility, the parameter vector   needs to be estimated. A basic 
aspect of choice analysis is that the researcher only observes the selection of the 
choice with the highest perceived utility. For instance, by having a survey respondent 
select the most preferred mobile service plan from a choice set of three plans, the 
researcher can only observe that one plan is preferred over two other plans. The 
researcher does not observe an actual utility value. Thus, a regression analysis of the 
representative utility on a number of alternative and respondent-specific attributes is 
not possible. Instead, one needs to resort to maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
to estimate  . The concept behind MLE is to select the parameter vector   that 
maximizes the probability of getting the result (i.e., plan selections) observed 
through the survey. 
To illustrate the concept of MLE, consider a coin toss. If tossing a coin 10 
times results in four heads and six tails, the binomial probability of arriving at this 
exact result is: 
 
(10) 
4 6 4 6
10 10!
Pr(4 heads, 6 tails) (1 ) (1 )
4 4!6!
P P P P
 
    
 
, 
 
where P  is the probability of a head (Amemiya, 1993). The MLE estimates the P  
that maximizes the probability of obtaining four heads and six tails. Specifically, the 
MLE maximizes the expression 
4 6(1 )P P , which is referred to as the likelihood 
function. Thus, the MLE maximizes the likelihood function. 
Estimating the MLE for the parameter vector   is not much different than 
obtaining an estimate for the probability of a head in a coin toss. Much like a coin 
toss, the researcher treats a decision in a binomial qualitative choice model as a 
single draw from a Bernoulli distribution (Train, 1993). There are two observed 
outcomes under a Bernoulli distribution—a one if the decision maker chooses 
alternative i  and a zero otherwise (Greene, 2008). If there were only two choice 
alternatives and if the researcher observed that alternative i  was chosen four times, 
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then the probability of selecting alternative i  is identical to the probability of getting 
heads in a coin toss, as shown in equation (10). Consequently, the likelihood function 
would also be identical. Where a multinomial qualitative choice model deviates from 
a simple coin toss is in the number of choice alternatives. A coin toss can have only 
two possible outcomes (i.e., heads or tails), whereas a choice set often consists of 
more than two choice alternatives and thus yields more than two possible outcomes. 
Additionally, a choice model involves numerous decision makers, who assumingly 
make independent purchase decisions. 
Per Train (1993), the probability of one decision maker n  selecting 
alternative i  equals: 
 
(11) 
1 if decision maker  chose alternative 
, where 
0 otherwise                                             
in
n
in in
i J
n i
P
 


  

 
 
and inP equals the probability of decision maker n selecting alternative i . The 
expression 
ni J
  is the product operator. Equation (11) is the product of the marginal 
or choice probabilities. 
To illustrate this equation, consider the probability of selecting one of two 
available mobile service plans (Plan A and Plan B). In this example, the expression 
in equation (11) is the probability of decision maker n  selecting mobile service Plan 
A over mobile service Plan B, given that the decision maker selects Plan A. It is the 
mathematical product 
ni J
  of the probability of selecting Plan A and the probability 
of selecting Plan B. Raising the selected alternative by the power of one and the 
nonselected alternative by the power of zero yields the conditional binomial 
probability of the selected Plan A. 
Expanding this expression beyond one decision maker, the probability of all 
decision makers making the choice that the researcher observed in the sample is 
simply the mathematical product   of the expression in equation (11) over all 
decision makers N : 
 
(12) ( ) inin
n N i J
L P

 
 . 
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Equation (12) is the likelihood of all decision makers N  selecting alternative 
i  from choice set J . As shown in equation (1), the probability of decision maker n  
selecting alternative i  is, among other things, a function of the parameter vector  . 
Hence, ( )L   is the joint probability function, or likelihood function, of the 
parameter vector  . Specifically, the likelihood function for   assigns a probability 
to each value of   that the sampled decision makers would make the decisions that 
they actually did. Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000) described the joint likelihood 
function as the probability of having observed the particular decisions, given a set of 
parameters. The parameter vector that yields the highest probability is the maximum 
likelihood estimator of  . Hence, in order to estimate the parameter vector  , the 
maximum likelihood function is maximized. 
As described by Train (1993) and Louviere et al. (2000), instead of 
maximizing the likelihood function directly, it is often easier to maximize the log-
likelihood function. The log-likelihood function ( )LL   of equation (12) is: 
 
(13) ( ) log ,in in
n N i J
LL P 
 
  
 
where 
i J
  is the sum over all alternatives and 
n N
  is the sum over all decision 
makers. 
Because in  is zero for the nonselected alternatives, the log-likelihood 
function is simply the log of the probability of the selected alternatives summed over 
all decision makers. As shown in Figure 2, the log-likelihood is a function that 
reaches its maximum when it gets as close as possible to zero. This is because the 
likelihood function is a probability, which is maximized as it approaches unity. The 
log of one, however, is zero. 
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Figure 2. Log-likelihood Function 
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Figure 2. Illustrated here is the log-likelihood function for a hypothetical choice 
scenario of three decision makers facing three choice alternatives. 
 
 
A useful statistical tool in evaluating the goodness of fit of the maximized 
log-likelihood function is the likelihood ratio (LR) index used to determine how well 
the models fit the data. Analogous to an 2R  in a regression model, the LR index 
compares the model with the parameter estimates against the same model where 
these parameters are zero. Train (1993) defines the LR index   as: 
 
(14) 
*( )
1 ,
(0)
LL
LL

    
 
where 
*( )LL   is the value of the log-likelihood function evaluated at the maximum 
likelihood estimators of the parameter vector and (0)LL  is the value of the log-
likelihood function evaluated at the point where all parameters are assumed to be 
zero. In essence, the likelihood ratio evaluates the percentage improvement of the 
maximum likelihood estimator over a world with no information. In a world of 
perfect information, 
*( ) 0LL    and the index is one. In a world of no information, 
*( ) (0)LL LL   and the index is zero. Louviere et al. (2000) found a likelihood ratio 
index for MNL models of between 0.2 and 0.4 to be indicative of an excellent fit. 
Thus far, the discussion about the derivation and evaluation of the logit model 
has been restricted to individual decision making. It produced the probability of a 
group of individuals N  selecting an alternative i . However, most studies, including 
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this one, are interested in market behavior, not individual behavior. Because market 
behavior is a direct consequence of individual behavior, individual probabilities 
provide information about market behavior. Therefore, the researcher calculates 
market behavior by taking the simple average of a random and representative sample 
of the market participants. If there is doubt that the sample is random, the researcher 
can weight individual market decisions to arrive at the market average. Alternatively, 
the researcher can forecast market behavior by forecasting the probability of an 
average decision maker. As noted by Train (1993), however, although common, this 
method yields inconsistent results due to the nonlinearity of the cumulative 
probability function. 
In contrast to these desirable features of the logit model, Train (1993) also 
discussed a distinct flaw of the model—the independence of irrelevant alternatives, 
or IIA. The IIA problem is the logit model‘s inability to distinguish between 
irrelevant alternatives. Louviere et al. (2000) define IIA as ―the ratio of the 
probabilities of choosing one alternative over another (given that both alternatives 
have a non-zero probability of choice) is unaffected by the presence or absence of 
any additional alternatives in the choice set‖ (p. 44). 
The classical example to illustrate the IIA problem is the red bus/blue bus 
example. In this example, a decision maker selects first between traveling by car or a 
blue bus. Assuming that both travel options have the same representative utility V , 
the probability of selecting the car is 0.5. Assume now that the choice set includes a 
red bus so that the traveler must decide whether to take the car, a blue bus, or a red 
bus. Common sense would predict that the mere difference in bus color would not 
influence the decision maker‘s selection. However, the addition of this third 
(irrelevant) alternative alters the logit probabilities. It reduces the probability of 
selecting the car to 0.333 , thereby potentially producing unrealistic probability 
results. 
The IIA property of the logit model also could be a potential limitation to the 
present mobile demand survey. Remember that the survey respondents must select 
from among three mobile service plans. If a survey respondent is indifferent between 
two plans (i.e., one of the plans is irrelevant), then a logit model would produce 
inaccurate probabilities for this respondent. To avoid this potential problem, the 
survey data were evaluated using an advanced form of the logit model, the mixed 
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logit model. Among other desirable features, the mixed logit model remedies the IIA 
problem.10 
Exploded Logit Modeling 
The exploded logit model (also called the logit with ranked choices) is 
identical in all aspects to the standard logit model discussed thus far with the 
exception of its treatment of the underlying data. A standard logit model relies on 
one observation from each decision maker. It only uses the alternative that the 
decision maker actually selects. The exploded logit model, on the other hand, uses 
the rankings of some or all of the available choices. Consequently, the exploded logit 
model uses several choice decisions per decision maker whereas the non-exploded 
logit model relies only on the decision of the most preferred choice alternative. 
For instance, consider a decision maker who must select from among four 
cars to purchase, Cars A, B, C, and D. The decision maker selects Car A with a 
second choice of Car B followed by Car C. Car D is the least preferred car. A 
standard logit model relies only on the fact that the decision maker selected Car A. It 
ignores the rejection of Cars B, C, and D, in particular the fact that the decision 
maker values Car B over Car C and both Cars B and C over Car D, the least 
preferred car. This is valuable information that further explains the decision maker‘s 
preferences. The exploded logit model makes use of this additional information. 
Obviously, without structuring the survey accordingly, the researcher does not know 
whether Car A was preferred to Car C, and so on. Hence, in order to use an exploded 
logit model, the researcher has to structure the survey in one of two ways. The first 
way to extract ranked data is to ask the decision maker to rank Cars A through D 
according to desirability (i.e., 1 = most desirable to 4 = least desirable). This is the 
simultaneous method of obtaining the rankings. The sequential way is to ask the 
decision maker to select the top pick of the alternative cars, then to ask for the second 
pick, and finally the third pick. The first pick reveals that the decision maker prefers 
Car A rather than Cars, B, C, and D. The second pick reveals that the decision maker 
prefers, say Car B, rather than Cars C and D. Finally, the third pick demonstrates the 
decision maker‘s preference of Car C over Car D. Either method extracts the ranking 
of the alternatives. 
                                              
10
 Note that conditional on a given set of preference parameters for an individual, the IIA property 
continues to hold. 
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The ranking provides the researcher with additional data points, which, in 
turn, allows for more accurate parameter estimates (Beggs, Cardell, & Hausman, 
1981). For example, if there are 200 respondents to a survey, the standard logit 
model will have 200 observations. The exploded logit model, however, ―explodes‖ 
these data and has three observations for each respondent, resulting in 600 (3 x 200 = 
600) observations. Train (2009) showed that the researcher could treat the ranking of 
J  alternatives as though the decision maker had 1J   independent choices. The 
model treats the rankings of each survey respondent as an individual (pseudo) 
observation. The researcher can then use a standard logit model to fit the ranked, or 
exploded, data. As shown by Beggs et al. (1981), the logit probability for an 
exploded logit model (as shown in equation (9) for the case of the standard logit 
model) is the joint probability of the particular ranking: 
 
(15) 1 2 3
1
Pr( ...  for ) /hn mn
H H
V V
n n n Hn
m hh
U U U U H J e e

 
       
 
 , 
 
where H is the number of selections made. To illustrate this equation, the probability 
of the ranking of the four Cars, A, B, C, and D is: 
 
(16) 
A, B, C, D B, C, D C, D
Pr(ranking A, B, C, D)
= .
An Bn Cn
nj nj nj
x x x
x x x
j j j
e e e
e e e
  
  
    
 
 
As stated by Train (2009), this particular expression is unique to the logit model and 
does not apply to other models, such as the probit model. Practically, the expression 
implies that the exploded logit model treats the ranked data as if they were 
H independent observations from decision maker n . 
Although the exploded logit model is desirable in that it allows the extraction 
of information about alternatives other than the first choice, it does not address the 
IIA problem discussed above. The exploded logit model also introduces a new 
assumption that may not be realistic. Specifically, by treating each survey 
respondent‘s rankings as individual observations, it assumes that 1J   observations 
from one respondent are identical to 1J   observations from 1J   respondents. In 
order to remedy this potential problem as well as the IIA problem, there is the mixed 
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logit model or more specifically the exploded mixed logit model. This is the subject 
of the next two sections. 
Mixed Logit Modeling 
The mixed logit model is a highly flexible derivative of the standard logit 
model (Train, 2009). The flexibility of this model is a direct consequence of relaxing 
the assumption that the parameters   are point estimates. In lieu, the mixed logit 
model assumes that the parameters are random variables, each with a certain 
probability distribution, mean, and standard deviation. Researchers also refer to 
mixed logit models as random parameter logit (RPL) models. Their first application 
was around 1980 (see, e.g., Boyd & Mellan, 1980; Cardell & Dunbar, 1980). 
The mixed logit model follows the same building blocks as the standard logit 
model. Thus far, the parameter vector consists of nonrandom values that do not vary 
by decision maker. The implication of this is that the observed utility inV  varies only 
by the attributes of the choice alternative and the decision maker. The relationship by 
which these attributes relate to the observed utility remains constant. Practically, this 
assumes that all decision makers have the same preferences. By making the 
parameter estimates random values, the researcher relaxes this constraint, thereby 
allowing for respondent-specific parameters n . Hence, in contrast to equation (6), 
the utility expression for a mixed logit model is: 
 
(17) ( , ) ( , , )in in n in n n inU U x r V z s e   . 
 
As in the standard logit model, ine  is independent and an identically 
distributed (iid) Extreme Value (Weibull). However, given that the parameter vector 
n  varies by survey respondent, it is distributed with density ( )f  . Consequently, 
the analogous relationship shown for the standard logit model in equation (9) 
becomes: 
 
(18) ,  for all  in 
n in
n jn
n
x
in nx
j J
e
P i J
e





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where ( , )f b W  , and b is the mean vector for all   and W is the covariance 
matrix of all  . Because n  is not known, the probability inP  is the integral of n  
over all its possible values (Train, 2009): 
 
(19) ( ) ( , ) ( ) .
in
jn
n
x
in in x
j J
e
P L f b W d f d
e


    

 
   
 
 
 

 
 
Train (2009) found that the most common distributions selected for the 
parameter vector are normal and lognormal distributions, thus he recommends the 
lognormal distribution in instances where the coefficient is known to have the same 
sign for each survey respondent. Other distributions in use are the triangular 
distribution and the uniform distribution (see, e.g., Hensher & Greene, 2003; Revelt 
& Train, 2000; Train, 2001). 
Mixed Exploded Logit Modeling 
An exploded logit model also can be applied to the mixed logit model, 
yielding the mixed exploded logit model. Because the mixed logit model allows for 
respondent-specific-parameter estimates, the pseudo-observations created by the 
ranking now are correlated (Train, 2009). This correlation is a significant 
improvement over the standard exploded logit model as it allows the researcher to 
take into account that pseudo-observations are not entirely new observations but 
observations from the same survey respondent. Therefore, the mixed exploded logit 
model incorporates the fact that survey respondents have different preferences, and it 
accounts for the correlation in unobserved factors over repeated choices by each 
respondent. Train (2009) also demonstrated that the mixed logit model allows for the 
relaxation of the IIA.11 
Model Specification 
The objective of this study is to identify the demand drivers of mobile 
demand when services are bundled. Although regression analysis could potentially 
be used for this type of analysis (see, e.g., Tripathi & Siddiqui, 2009), a discrete 
                                              
11
 The mixed logit is not the only remedy to the IIA problem. For instance, Burda, Harding and 
Hausman (2008) estimated the preference parameters non-parametrically, allowed for correlation 
among the parameters, and relaxed the IIA assumption. 
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choice model replicates more closely the subscriber‘s purchase decision. A key 
consideration in this decision is the fact that purchase decisions are binary and 
thereby noncontinuous. The theoretical discussion above highlights a number of 
discrete model candidates. Among them are logit and probit models. Logit models 
contain a number of desirable features, particularly when the standard logit model is 
extended. For instance, extending the standard logit model to use exploded data is 
straightforward for logit models as researchers can treat the pseudo-observations as 
new observations. This is not the case for probit models (Train, 2009). Hence, the 
model for this study is a logit model. More specifically, it is an MNL model as the 
decision makers face more than two choice alternatives. However, the MNL model is 
not the optimal model for this study because the model requires extension in several 
dimensions. 
First, in order to address the IIA problem and the fact that decision makers for 
mobile service plans do not all have the same preferences, a mixed logit model yields 
potentially more accurate probability estimates. Second, using an exploded version 
of the logit model can be more efficient as it requires information from less decision 
makers. For studies such as this one where survey data are required, using multiple 
observations from the same decision maker optimizes both time and resources. Thus, 
an appropriate model for this study is a mixed exploded logit model. Given the three 
choices faced by the decision maker, the best model for this study is a multinomial 
mixed exploded logit model. A final consideration in this model is the specific 
distribution for the stochastic parameter vector  . Statistical software typically 
limits the number of available distributions to normal, lognormal, exponential, and 
triangular. Each type of distribution requires a set of starting values in order to 
maximize the log-likelihood function. Practical tests show that lognormal, 
exponential, and triangular distributions require highly accurate starting values for 
the existing software to be able to maximize the log-likelihood function. Thus, the 
study started with normal distributed variables, which has one clear disadvantage. 
Depending on the sizes of the standard deviation and the mean of parameter  , a 
mixed logit model with normal distributed variables might produce parameter 
estimates that contradict economic theory. For instance, assume a normal distributed 
price coefficient with a mean of −0.2 and a standard deviation of 0.2. In this 
example, the mixed logit model forecasts positive price coefficients for some 22% of 
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the draws. Some mixed logit software reports the percentage of draws that have 
opposite signs instead of the mean as the ―share<0.‖ In the example above, the 
share<0 is 78%, indicating that 22% is above zero. A lognormal distribution is left-
bound at zero. Hence, its share<0 is necessarily zero, thus the problem of forecasting 
coefficients with signs that are opposite to its mean is avoided. Consequently, 
relative to normal distributed parameters, lognormal distributed parameters promise 
to produce more accurate coefficients and thus probability forecasts. 
Before specifying the theoretical model for this study, the number of choice 
alternatives, choice situations, and number of decision makers were decided upon 
and then defined. As explained later, the data for this model come from a consumer 
survey. In this survey, respondents ranked three hypothetical mobile service plans 
(Plan 1, Plan 2, and Plan 3). Each plan represented a choice alternative, denominated 
by nj . The subscript indicates that choice situations differed over the decision 
makers; that is, not all decision makers faced the same three choice alternatives. 
Hence, the number of choice alternatives faced by the decision maker (the survey 
respondent) was three. The three choice alternatives considered together represent a 
choice situation, denominated by nt . In a choice situation, the decision maker ranked 
the desirability of the three choice alternatives from high to low. In reality, there are 
many more mobile service plans from which to choose. Setting the number of choice 
alternatives at three assumes that mobile subscribers narrow their selection to three 
plans before making a decision. It also takes into account that given the complexity 
of mobile service plans consumers might not be capable of comparing more than 
three plans at once. This assumption seems to be consistent with the findings of U.S. 
mobile service providers. For instance, on its website, Verizon Wireless offers 
potential subscribers a choice of three voice plans and three data plans. 
Each survey respondents faced six different and independent choice 
situations. That is, survey respondents made six independent trade-off exercises, each 
with three choice alternatives. Limiting the number of choice situations to six also 
took into consideration survey respondent fatigue that might occur if there were too 
many choice situations offered. The number of completed surveys was set at 500. 
With three choice alternatives, the respondent made ranking decisions per choice 
situation. In the first ranking decision, the respondent faced all three choice 
alternatives and decided which among the three was most desirable based on its 
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relative attribute levels. In the second ranking decision, the respondent indicated 
which of the remaining two alternatives was least desirable. With six choice 
situations, this provides 2 x 6 x 500 = 6,000 observations. Consensus does not seem 
to exist among researchers as to the number of required observations for a study. 
This is particularly the case for discrete choice models. A rule of thumb offered by 
Draper and Smith (1998) and Ryan (2009) suggests that the number of observations 
should be at least 10 times the number of independent variables. As explained below, 
there is a maximum of 10 choice attributes and a maximum of nine 
sociodemographic variables providing 29 potential independent variables. This 
requires a minimum of 290 observations. Hence, 6,000 observations are sufficient 
and allow for data stratification. 
Based on these considerations, the fundamental question underlying this 
model is, Given three mobile service plans, what is the probability that a consumer 
will select a particular plan? Mathematically, the expression for the selected model 
is: 
 
(20) 
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The matrix itnq  consists of observed survey respondent characteristics ns  and 
observed mobile service plan characteristics itnz . The respondent characteristics ns  
serve two distinct purposes. The first purpose is to ensure that the selected sample 
represents the average U.S. consumer. As such, it includes current consumption 
patterns to compare the responses to publicly and commercially available benchmark 
data. Second, sociodemographic variables are a subset of the respondent 
characteristics. Although the relevant literature provides no clear guidance as to 
whether sociodemographic variables should be included, collecting them provides 
the flexibility to test their significance (or lack thereof). In the present survey, the 
information collected from the survey respondents ns  included: 
 Whether the respondent had a mobile phone at the time of the survey 
 Whether the respondent had ever been financially responsible for a mobile 
phone service account 
 The number of minutes included in the respondent‘s current monthly voice 
plan 
 50 
 
 Whether the respondent subscribed to a monthly data plan that allowed access 
to the Internet and the ability to send emails via the mobile phone 
 Whether the respondent subscribed to a plan that contained an SMS 
allowance 
 Whether the respondent used the mobile phone to send and receive emails 
 The approximate monthly mobile phone service expenditure 
 Whether the respondent had a fixed-line phone in the main residence 
 Age 
 The state of residency 
 Whether the respondent lived in a metropolitan area, suburban community, 
small town, or farming area 
 The highest level of education completed 
 Employment status 
 Gender 
 Marital status 
 Number of children 
 Annual income from all sources before taxes 
Also consistent with the economic literature, the present survey collected all 
relevant price and non-price attributes. In contrast to the literature, the survey 
included price and non-price attributes for all mobile plan components rather than 
only voice or voice and SMS. The mobile service plan attributes itnz  contained the 
following price and non-price attributes:12 
 Price of the mobile phone (phone_price): price of the mobile phone 
 Monthly recurring charge (mrc): fixed-plan price component per month 
 Voice minutes (v_allowance): total number of voice minutes included in the 
monthly charge 
 Data allowance (d_allowance): total number of kilobytes of downloads and 
uploads included in the monthly charge 
 Data download speed (download): speed in seconds that a file can be 
downloaded from the Internet (the higher the speed, the faster the download)13 
 Fee for excess minutes (v_over): per-minute charge for each minute in excess 
of the monthly voice allowance 
 Fee for excess date usage (d_over): per-kilobyte charge for each kilobyte of 
data in excess of the monthly data allowance 
                                              
12
 The variable names are provided in parentheses and italicized throughout the study. 
13
 As reference point, standard dial-up service provides a speed of 56 kilobits per second (kbps), 
digital subscriber line (DSL) between 3,000–7,100 kbps, and coaxial cable Internet access between 
8,000 and 20,000 kbps. 
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 SMS fee (text): charge for each text message sent and received 
 Type of phone (phone_type): a Smartphone (e.g., iPhone, Blackberry) or a 
regular non-Smartphone 
 Length of contract (term_length): contract length in months with an ETF of 
$150 
Table 3 is an example of a choice set faced by a respondent. 
 
Table 3 
Illustrative Choice Set 
 
 
As Table 3 illustrates, each plan has identical attributes, but the attribute 
levels differ among the plans. For instance, Plan 1‘s monthly charge is $120 and Plan 
2‘s $50. Decision makers decide based on the relative value placed on each attribute. 
For example, a low mobile phone price is more important than the length of the term 
contract for some subscribers. For others, they prefer paying more for the mobile 
phone and being free to switch service providers at any time. As decision makers 
base their decisions on the level of the various attributes, setting them is of utmost 
importance. The setting of attributes within and among choice alternatives is the 
topic of the next chapter. 
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Experimental Survey Design 
With the model specified, the attention focused on how to obtain the data to 
populate the model. The theoretical model discussed above can be estimated using 
either revealed-preference (RP) or stated-preference (SP) data. RP data are actual 
market data (Louviere et al., 2000). RP data in this study would consist of actual 
mobile subscriber choices. Specifically, the observations in an RP database would 
consist of actual subscriber accounts. The columns would consist of the specific plan 
attributes and the account holder‘s personal information. The advantage of RP data is 
its high reliability as the data are the result of actual market transactions (Louviere et 
al., 2000). SP data, on the other hand, are the result of an experiment, specifically a 
consumer survey. As indicated by the name, the resulting data are not actual 
(revealed) choices but responses to hypothetical choice situations. SP data in this 
study would consist of asking survey respondents which mobile plan they would 
select if offered a plan with a set of specific attributes. Another name for SP data is 
stated-choice (SC) data. 
There are various trade-offs between RP and SP data. The main advantage of 
RP data is that subscribers actually made those choices and accepted the 
consequences (e.g., they are paying for the selected mobile service plan). In practice, 
however, RP data present a number of difficulties and complexities. First, RP data 
provides information on the actual choices made; however, no data are available on 
the other choices offered, if any, or on the conditions under which the respondents 
made their choices. Second, mobile service providers (as well as most other firms) 
are reluctant to supply their subscriber data (which are contained in billing databases) 
for third-party studies. Although mobile service providers frequently study 
subscriber behavior, these studies are typically confidential as they could provide 
valuable insights to competitors if revealed. Third, and related to the first point, RP 
data are embedded within highly complex billing systems, consisting of several 
terabytes of data and thousands of tables. For this particular study, several North 
American mobile service providers declined the request to provide data. A fourth 
practical disadvantage of RP data is that the data contain much ―noise.‖ That is, 
subscribers make purchase decisions based on a wide number of decision factors 
with a change in service attributes being only one factor. Fifth, given the competitive 
environment of the U.S. mobile sector, price variations are minimal as mobile service 
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providers are price takers and thus cannot widely experiment with changes in service 
plan offerings. The implication of this lack of variation is that a choice model cannot 
evaluate the interaction between demand determinants and sufficient information 
does not exist on how consumers react to attribute changes (Louviere et al., 2000). 
Finally, even if there are changes in attributes, these might be across all plans, 
thereby making it difficult to isolate statistically the impact. 
The fundamental disadvantage of SP data is that survey respondents make 
choices without actually having to accept the consequences of their choices. This 
raises the question of whether consumers in the real world would behave as they 
claim they would in an experiment. On the other hand, SP data allow researchers to 
control the experiment, deciding the number of choice alternatives and attributes 
upon which respondents make their decisions. 
In light of these considerations, this study uses a combination of RP and SP 
data. The objective of this hybrid approach is to maximize the advantages of RP and 
SP data and minimize their respective disadvantages (Louviere et al., 2000). 
Practically, the combination simply required a survey consisting of an RP and an SP 
section. In the RP section, the survey respondents provided information about their 
actual consumption patterns. This included questions such as the size of the average 
monthly mobile phone bill, the type of services (e.g., voice, SMS, MMS) used, and 
whether they purchased fixed-line service. The SP section of the survey came from 
an SP experiment (i.e., a trade-off exercise). SP experiments generate SP data by 
asking survey respondents to state their most preferred choice or to rank the choices 
by preference from a set of carefully drafted choice alternatives. Experimental design 
refers to the methods by which the choice alternatives and choice sets are drafted. 
First proposed by Louviere and Woodworth (1983) and Hensher (1983), SP 
experiments are widely used in many different fields but most applications are in 
economics and marketing. 
The fundamental objective of SP experiments, and thus experimental design, 
is to determine the impact that different product or service attributes have on an 
outcome, such as the purchase of the product or service (Louviere et al., 2000). In 
this study, the objective is to determine the impact that several mobile service plan 
attributes have on the probability inP  that plan i  is selected by decision maker n . 
Specifically, analysts vary these attributes over a number of choice situations and 
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survey respondents in order to ascertain the impact that the attributes have on the 
probability 
inP . 
The design of SP experiments has a direct impact on the accuracy of the 
probability estimate inP . In designing an SP experiment, the analyst must decide the 
number of choice alternatives 
nJ  faced by each decision maker n , the number of 
choice situations 
nT , the number of attributes jnZ , the number of attribute levels, and 
the levels for each attribute in the survey. As explained previously, the present choice 
experiment has three choice alternatives repeated in six choice situations. A choice 
alternative is a mobile service plan. A shown above, 10 attributes describe each plan. 
The number of attribute levels, in particular the distribution of these levels across the 
SP experiment, further influence the accuracy of the probability estimate inP . 
Consider, for example, a scenario where only two mobile plans with MRCs of $120 
and $100 per month are included in a survey. The resulting responses to such a 
survey would likely be meaningless in terms of MRCs because there is insufficient 
variation in this particular plan attribute. Alternatively, consider a survey that 
includes only very inexpensive options for mobile phones (e.g., free or $25) and only 
very expensive options for the MRC (e.g., $120, $100, and $90). Such a survey 
would likely overestimate the respondents‘ sensitivity to price changes in the MRC 
and underestimate the sensitivity relative to mobile phones. Thus, the levels of the 
attributes as well as their distribution across the experiment are a critical aspect of 
experimental design. 
The economic literature provides only general guidelines on how to 
determine the number of attributes and attribute levels. For instance, Churchill 
(1995) found that attributes must be important to decision makers in making their 
purchase decisions. To determine what constitutes an important attribute, Churchill 
listed expert opinions, focus groups, and surveys but found that any other 
explanatory research technique also could be valid. The present survey draws its 
attributes from market observation. Specifically, U.S. mobile service providers list 
their service bundle choices on their corporate websites. Service bundles differ in a 
number of aspects, such as MRC and the price of the mobile phone. Given the high 
level of competition in the U.S. mobile sector, the attributes by which the service 
plans differ provide a good indication as to what matters to U.S. consumers when 
purchasing a mobile service plan. Additionally, the U.S. Congress and the FCC have 
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highlighted various mobile service plan attributes that allegedly affect a mobile 
service provider‘s market share. These attributes include the pricing of SMS and the 
length of the term contract. Hence, it is also reasonable to include those attributes 
even if only to test the hypothesis that they are statistically significant. Based on 
these considerations, the present SP experiment relies on the 10 mobile service plan 
attributes 
inZ  listed above. 
With respect to the attribute levels, Churchill (1995) found that attribute 
ranges should extend beyond what researchers typically observe in the market; 
however, they should not be so excessive as to make them unrealistic. Similarly, 
Bliemer and Rose (2009) found that a wide range of attribute levels yields parameter 
estimates with smaller standard errors. 
For the present SP experiment, attribute levels observed in the actual market 
served as the starting point with the observed ranges expanded by increasing the 
upper limits, decreasing the lower limits, or both. For instance, mobile phone prices 
typically range from $0 to $300. To measure the decision makers‘ sensitivity to 
changes in the mobile phone price, the upper limit of this range was expanded to 
include hypothetical mobile phone prices of $400 and $500. Some attributes, such as 
the type of mobile phone, are dummy variables and take on either a one or a zero. 
Others, such as the MRC, can take on seven different dollar amounts. Table 4 
presents the attributes and attribute levels for this study. 
 
Table 4 
Design Matrix Attribute Levels 
Attribute 
Price 
of 
mobile 
phone 
Monthly 
charge 
Voice 
minute 
allowance 
Data 
allowance 
Data 
download 
speed 
Fee for 
excess 
minutes 
Fee for 
excess 
data 
usage 
SMS fee 
Type of 
phone 
Length 
of 
contract 
Attribute 
unit 
($) 
($ per 
month) 
(min per 
month) 
(kb per 
month) 
(kbps) 
($ per 
min) 
($ per 
kb) 
(per 
message) 
(dummy) (months) 
Values 
begin 
$0 $20 400 0 250 $0 $0 $0 1 0 
 $50 $40 800 50 500 $0.10 $0.10 $0.05 0 6 
 $100 $60 1,200 200 1,000 $0.15 $0.15 $0.10  12 
 $200 $80 1,600 500 1,500 $0.20 $0.20 $0.20  18 
 $300 $100 2,000 1,000 2,000 $0.25 $0.25 $0.25  24 
 $400 $120 3,000 5,000 3,000 $0.30 $0.30 $0.30  30 
Values 
end 
$500 $160 9,999 9,999 6,000 $0.40 $0.40 $0.40  36 
 
The attribute levels for an SP survey are contained in the design matrix 
shown in Appendix B. Each column in the design matrix represents the attribute 
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levels for each attribute in a given choice situation. The total number of columns is 
equal to the product of choice alternatives (i.e., service plans) and choice attributes. 
In the design matrix for this survey, there are 10 choice attributes and three choice 
alternatives, resulting in 30 columns. Each row is a set containing three different 
mobile service plans (i.e., choice situations). The total number of rows is equal to the 
total number of unique conjoint exercises in the SP experiment. Depending on the 
specific experimental design, analysts can elect to use unique trade-off exercises for 
all choice situations and decision makers or repeat a certain number of choice 
situations across survey respondents. If unique experiments are used, the number of 
rows in the design matrix is equal to the product of the number of decision makers 
and the number of choice situations. With 500 decision makers and six choice 
situations each, this would yield 3,000 rows. For reasons discussed below, the 
present SP experiment uses only 42 unique choice situations. With six choice 
situations per survey, this yields seven unique surveys. The resulting design matrix 
has a dimension of 30 x 42 and is included in Appendix B. The first column of this 
matrix, entitled ―Survey,‖ lists which of the seven unique surveys the particular 
choice situation (row) belongs. The second column, entitled ―Game,‖ lists the 
number of the choice situation. For instance, the row where Survey=3 and Game=6 
contains the attribute levels for the sixth choice situation faced by all survey 
respondents that received the third unique survey. 
In deriving the design matrix, attribute levels are typically not presented in 
their actual units. Rather, they are coded according to the attribute levels L  as 0, 1, 
2, 3, … 1L  (Louviere et al., 2000). For instance, the price of the mobile phone in 
Table 4 has seven levels; therefore, a free phone would be coded ―0,‖ a $50 phone 
would be coded ―1,‖ and so on. The specific distribution of attributes across this 
matrix can have a material impact on the model outputs and the statistical power of 
the experiment, particularly when small numbers of observations are involved (Rose 
& Bliemer, 2010). 
The literature on SP design discusses two main streams for determining the 
attribute levels in the SP design matrix or, more specifically, the correlation between 
the attributes. One method is the orthogonal experimental design method (see 
Louviere et al., 2000). However, recent research has raised several concerns as to 
whether orthogonal design is the most accurate method for nonlinear models, such as 
the logit model (e.g., Huber & Zwerina, 1996; Kanninen, 2002; Kessels, Goos, & 
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Vandebroek, 2006; Sandor & Wedel, 2001, 2002, 2005). Because of these concerns, 
a different method known as efficient or optimal design was recently developed. The 
following sections provide an overview of orthogonal design and experimental 
design and explain why the efficient design method is more appropriate for nonlinear 
models, including the present study. 
Orthogonal Design 
In designing an SP experiment, a researcher could include all possible 
combinations of attribute levels in the attribute matrix and present the resulting 
survey to each decision maker. This full factorial design would allow the researcher 
to obtain a specific response from each decision maker for each combination of 
attribute levels thereby ruling out the possibility of biasing the study results through 
the administration of a subset of these combinations. It further provides the 
researcher with full information on the effects of a change in the attributes on the 
dependent variable (i.e., the probability of decision maker n  purchasing mobile 
service plan j ). However, implementing a full factorial design is highly challenging 
to the decision making of the survey respondent and only practical for the simplest of 
SP experiments due to the large number of possible combinations and thereby the 
large number of choice situations that would need to be presented to survey 
respondents. Per Louviere et al. (2000), equation (21) calculates the number of 
choice situations T  for a full factorial design: 
 
(21) 
1 1
jZJ
ff Z J
jz
j z
T l l 
 
  , 
 
where jzl  is the number of attribute levels for attribute z  in choice alternative j . For 
instance, in an SP experiment with three choice alternatives ( 3J  ), three attributes 
( 3Z  ), and three attribute levels for each of the attributes ( 3l  ), there are 
3 33 19,683   choice situations in the full factorial design. Full factorial design for 
this hypothetical SP experiment would imply that all survey respondents would need 
to state their preferences in all 19,683 choice situations. In the present study, there 
are three choice alternatives ( 3J  ), 10 attributes ( 10Z  ) of which nine have seven 
attribute levels ( 7l  ), and one attribute with two attribute levels ( 2)l  . Using the 
same equation as above, this yields over 525 sextillion choice situations that would 
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be faced by all 500 decision makers n . Clearly, this is not practical, which shows 
that full factorial design is practical only for surveys with very few alternatives, 
attributes, and attribute levels. 
Given the practical limitation of full factorial design, researchers have opted 
to present only a subset of all possible choice situations to each survey respondent, 
that is, fractional factorial design. Various methods exist from which a researcher can 
select the subset. A commonly used method is to select randomly a number of choice 
situations from the full factorial design and present this subset to survey respondents. 
Another method is to divide the number of choice situations in the full factorial 
design by the number of survey respondents and administer the choice situations in 
sequential blocks. In contrast to these two random selection methods, statistical 
design theorists have developed a number of other design methods, each aimed at 
producing accurate parameter estimates with the least number of observations. One 
such method is the orthogonal method. Similar to the random selection and 
sequential methods described, the orthogonal method also selects from the full 
factorial design method. However, it does so efficiently (instead of randomly), where 
efficiency is assessed through a particular statistical property (i.e., D-optimality). The 
objective of the orthogonal method is to produce parameter estimates with the 
smallest standard errors. A design matrix is orthogonal if the sum of the inner 
product of any two columns of the orthogonal coded matrix is zero (Louviere et al., 
2000). 
Finding its roots in operations engineering, fractional factorial design 
investigates a system‘s input-output relationship. It has a direct application to the 
present study that is investigating the impact that a set of attributes (input) has on the 
probability of a mobile service plan being selected (output). Starting with the full 
factorial design, fractional factorial design focuses only on the subset of 
combinations (often referred to as ―runs‖) with the most desirable statistical 
properties, a process referred to as screening where the resulting design is called the 
screening design (DeVeaux, 2001). To select the subset that yields the most desirable 
statistical properties, the analyst creates an effect matrix from the full factorial 
matrix. The effect matrix breaks the full factorial matrix into main effects and 
interaction effects using contrast coding with pluses and minuses (+/−). An effect is 
the response of a change in attribute levels on the dependent variable (Box, Hunter, 
& Hunter, 2005). Main effects measure the impact that one attribute has on the 
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dependent variable, whereas cross effects measure the combined effect of two or 
more attributes on the dependent variable (DeVeaux, 2001). To arrive at the 
fractional factorial design, the analyst determines how many of the combinations can 
reasonably be observed in a survey. Using the effect matrix, the analyst then can 
examine the type of effects (main effect or interaction) observed with the subset of 
combinations (Louviere et al., 2000). Alternatively, the analyst can select a subset of 
combinations and transform the selection into orthogonal codes (−1 for low values 
and +1 for high values) such that each column of combinations sums to zero and the 
inner products are also zero (Louviere et al., 2000). Appendix C illustrates this 
concept with an example. 
The use of orthogonal SP design was primarily justified by its property to 
maximize the D-efficiency of linear models (e.g., Kuhfeld, Tobias, & Garratt, 1994; 
Lusk & Norwood, 2005). Statistical efficiencies are measures of design ―goodness‖ 
indicating the precision of the parameter estimates for a fixed sample size (Rose & 
Bliemer, 2010). Among these efficiency measures is ―D-efficiency,‖ which measures 
the size of the standard error. Specifically, it measures the size of the determinant of 
the asymptotic variance covariance (AVC) matrix for a single respondent or the so-
called D-error. A design with a lower D-error indicates a higher level of precision. 
Hence, with a higher level of statistical efficiency, more precise estimates can be 
obtained with a given sample size. Alternatively, a smaller sample size provides 
equally precise estimates. A design with the lowest D-error is D-optimal. In practice, 
however, D-optimal designs are often difficult to find. Furthermore, as the D-error 
declines asymptotically with the sample size, increasing the sample size for a single 
respondent yields decreasing marginal returns. Specifically, the standard error 
decreases at a rate of 1/ N , where N is the sample size (Rose & Bliemer, 2010).  
Figure 3 demonstrates that by selecting a D-optimal design over a nonoptimal 
design the researcher can achieve a lower standard error with the same number of 
observations or obtain the same level of accuracy with fewer observations (thereby 
saving money because fewer respondents need to be surveyed). 
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Figure 3. Asymptotic Standard Error 
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Figure 3. This figure illustrates the standard errors of two designs. The first design, 
SE1, is the default design, whereas the second design, SE2, is D-optimal. 
 
 
Given the decreasing marginal returns from D-optimization, instead of 
minimizing the D-error generating a low D-error is often sufficient. A design that 
yields a low D-error is D-efficient, defined as: 
 
(22) 
1/
100
D-efficiency ,
K
C
  
 
where C  is the AVC of the parameter vector   (Rose & Bliemer, 2006). K is the 
number of attributes in the design and serves to normalize the efficiency measure by 
number of attributes. Thus, the smaller the determinant of the AVC is, the higher the 
D-efficiency. Consider a linear model of the following form: 
 
(23) Y Z e  , 
 
where Z  is the matrix of observed attributes,   is the parameter vector, and e  is the 
error term. For linear models (and linear models only), the AVC is: 
 
(24)  
12 ' ,AVC Z Z

  
 
where 'Z  is the transpose of the matrix of observed attributes Z  and 
2  is the model 
variance (Ruud, 2000). Thus, D-efficiency equals: 
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(25) 
1/
2 1
100
( ' )
linear K
D efficiency
Z Z 
  . 
 
Multiplying and dividing the AVC for linear models by the number of 
observations F  yields: 
 
(26) 
12
2 1 '( ' )
Z Z
Z Z
F F



    
 
. 
 
Substituting equation (26) into equation (25) produces the following 
relationship: 
 
(27) linear 1/ 1/1/2 1 2 1
100 100
D-efficiency
( ' ) ( ' )
K KK
Z Z Z Z
F F F F
 
 
 
   
   
   
. 
 
The expression 
1/
2
K
F
 
 
 
 is simply a scalar, which is composed of the 
standard deviation of the model variance and the number of observations. The 
economic literature discussing D-efficiency for linear designs simplifies the 
expression in equation (27) by removing this scalar (see, e.g., Kuhfeld et al., 1994; 
Rose & Bliemer, 2010). The simplification seems justified. Removing F  from the 
expression makes D-efficiency a relative measure, whereas removing 
2  still 
maintains the proportional relationship with the model‘s AVC. Simplifying yields: 
 
(28) 
1/
1
100
D-efficiency .
'
K
Z Z
F


 
 
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Hence, D-efficiency for linear models implies minimizing the determinant of 
the AVC, which, in turn, minimizes the standard error. Under orthogonal design, the 
independent variables are uncorrelated. Hence, 
1
'Z Z
V
F

 
  
 
 is an identity matrix 
with unit diagonal elements and zero off-diagonal elements. Thus: 
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(29) linear+orthogonal 1/ 1/ 1/1
100 100 100 100
D-efficiency 100.
1 1
K K K
II 
      
 
As noted by Rose and Bliemer (2010), under orthogonal design, D-efficiency 
yields a value of (approximately) 100%. This result, in turn, implies that for linear 
models orthogonal design is D-efficient. 
Efficient Design 
In the mid-1990s, scholars started to question the efficiency of orthogonal 
design for SP experiments (e.g., Bunch, Louviere, & Anderson, 1996; Huber & 
Zwerina, 1996; Kanninen, 2002; Kessels et al., 2006; Sandor & Wedel, 2001, 2002, 
2005). For instance, Bunch et al. (1996) compared a variety of SP design alternatives 
for logit models and pointed out that traditional conjoint methods employed linear 
models. Along the lines explained above, these models were statistically efficient and 
supported by a large economic literature. Bunch et al., however, noted that these 
desired properties did not extend to nonlinear applications, such as logit models. This 
can be demonstrated by substituting V  in equation (22) with the AVC for a 
nonlinear model estimated by maximum likelihood. For such models, the AVC is the 
second derivative of the log-likelihood function with respect to the parameter vector 
 : 
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where LL is the log-likelihood function (Ruud, 2000). D-efficiency for such models 
equals: 
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Equation (31), however, reveals that the efficient survey design for nonlinear 
models estimated by maximum likelihood, such as logit models, depends on the true 
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parameter vector  . This creates a ―chicken-or-egg‖ problem because the purpose of 
the conjoint study is to estimate the vector  ; yet, in order to estimate this vector, 
the true parameter values   must be known. The literature refers to the a priori 
knowledge required by such models as non-zero priors (see, e.g., Rose & Bliemer, 
2010). The practical implications of the non-zero prior requirement seem to be 
straightforward in that orthogonal design might still yield D-efficient results if no 
information on priors is available. More often than not, however, some information is 
available, thereby rendering orthogonal design possibly not D-efficient. For instance, 
as explained in the literature, prior information is available from pilot studies (e.g., 
Rose, Bliemer, Hensher, & Collins, 2008). In these instances, D-efficiency is 
frequently indexed with a ―p,‖ indicating non-zero priors. If no information is 
available, D-efficiency is indexed with a ―0,‖ indicating zero priors (e.g., Burgess & 
Street, 2005). Finally, instead of assuming fixed non-zero priors, ˆ  can take on the 
form of a random variable. This Bayesian approach is typically indexed with a ―b‖ 
(e.g., Bliemer, Rose, & Hess, 2006; Sandor & Wedel, 2001). 
Another obstacle with using nonorthogonal design for nonlinear models is the 
complexity of the AVC and thereby D-optimality. As detailed by Bunch et al. 
(1996), a closed form of D-efficiency for nonlinear models does not seem to exist. 
Specifically, Bunch et al. used the information matrix for a logit model as a proxy for 
the model‘s AVC and expressed it in relative terms (comparing one default design, d, 
to an alternative design). They defined the following form: 
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where N indicates the number of observations, dnP  is the logit probability of 
observation n  in the default design, anP  is the logit probability of observation n  in 
the alternative design,   is the parameter estimates, and z  is the choice attributes. 
From equation (32), Bunch et al. derived a relative D-efficiency measure for a logit 
model (comparing two designs at a time) taking on the following form: 
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where 0  is the parameter estimate priors and *  and   are two comparative 
designs. 
Several other researchers have attempted to define D-efficiency for 
nonorthogonal linear and nonlinear models. For instance, Chaloner and Larntz 
(1989) attempted to define D-efficiency for logistic regressions. Atkinson (1988) 
used a paired comparison design. However, as pointed out by Bunch et al. (1996), 
practical applications of efficiency measures for these models are still missing. 
Bunch et al. also noted that the lack of practical solutions, rather than the theoretical 
concepts, for measuring nonorthogonal D-efficiency might explain why orthogonal 
design remains the prevalent method even for nonlinear models. 
Given the mathematical complexity of D-optimality for nonlinear models, 
researchers have proposed a number of methods that attain D-efficiency instead (e.g., 
Huber & Zwerina, 1996; Kuhfeld et al., 1994; Rose et al., 2008). Specifically, Rose 
et al. (2008) proposed a Monte Carlo simulation-based method. In this method, the 
analyst populates the design matrix randomly. Using parameter priors from a 
properly specified pilot model, the analyst calculates the choice probabilities for this 
particular design and then constructs the AVC matrix. To evaluate the statistical 
efficiency of this initial design, the initial D-error is calculated. This is simply the 
determinant of the AVC matrix from the initial design. In a next step, Rose et al. 
proposed a design change (i.e., changing one or more attributes in the SP design 
matrix) and then recalculating the D-error. If the D-error of the second run is smaller 
than the D-error of the initial run, the second design is retained; if not, it is rejected. 
This looping procedure is repeated R  times up to the point where the researcher is 
satisfied with the D-error of the design. 
Ideally, the simulation should evaluate all combinations of attribute levels 
and retain the combination that yields the lowest D-error. This requires a full 
factorial design from which N  choice situations can be sampled. However, in all but 
the simplest SP surveys, this requires the evaluation of an enormous number of 
designs, making it practically infeasible. A number of ―smart‖ methods have been 
proposed on how to change the SP matrix design for each round. For instance, Cook 
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and Nachtsheim (1980) proposed the modified Fedorov algorithm. This method starts 
with a full factorial design (for simple SP problems) or a fractional factorial design 
(for more complex problems) and between iterations replaces entire rows in the 
design matrix. The algorithm selects from a candidate set of possible design rows 
from either the full factorial matrix or the fractional factorial matrix. The fractional 
factorial matrix is selected in such a way that attribute levels are distributed 
approximately equally across the design matrix. For instance, if there are three 
attribute levels for the price of a mobile phone, the Fedorov method selects a 
fractional factorial candidate matrix that ensures that each of these three levels 
appear approximately an equal amount. The Monte Carlo simulation then evaluates 
all designs in the candidate set and selects the set with the lowest D-error. 
Huber and Zwerina (1996) and Sandor and Wedel (2001) proposed the ―RSC 
algorithm,‖ which stands for relabeling, swapping, and cycling. The RSC method 
encompasses three methods in one. Instead of replacing rows in consecutive designs 
(as done in the Fedorov method), this algorithm replaces attributes. The RSC method 
replaces these attributes in three ways. First, relabeling refers to replacing a column 
in the design matrix. As discussed above and shown in Appendix B, a column in the 
design matrix is the vector of attribute levels for one attribute. The relabeling option 
in the RSC method replaces an entire attribute column by switching attribute levels. 
For instance, a column in the design matrix for the present study is the price of the 
mobile phone for the first choice (i.e., plan1.phone_price). The RSC method would 
replace this column by substituting all mobile phone prices of $100 with free mobile 
phones. Swapping is a similar concept, but it involves changing only a subset of 
attribute levels. Finally, cycling refers to changing all attribute levels for each choice 
situation by replacing them with the next higher or lower value. The RSC method 
can be used simultaneously or in sequence. 
To complete the discussion on efficient design, it is important to note that the 
economic literature discusses design evaluation measures other than D-efficiency. 
One of these alternative measures is A-efficiency that, as implied by its name, 
minimizes the A-error. Whereas D-efficiency minimizes the determinant of the 
AVC, in contrast, A-efficiency minimizes the trace of the AVC, which is the sum of 
the elements on the main diagonal of the AVC. Specifically as shown by Rose and 
Bliemer (2005) and Kuhfeld et al. (1994): 
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where  , jnz  is the trace of a nonlinear model‘s AVC. As found by Scarpa and 
Rose (2008), relative to D-efficiency A-efficiency is less commonly used by 
researchers and is less discussed in the economic literature. One possible cause, as 
found by Scarpa and Rose, is that unlike D-efficiency A-efficiency only considers 
the elements on the AVC‘s main diagonal thereby ignoring off-diagonal elements. 
As discussed above, the off-diagonal elements play an important role in determining 
efficiency. The reason why orthogonal design is D-efficient is that the off-diagonal 
elements are zero. 
Another alternative efficiency measure is the C-error criterion. This less-
known efficiency measure minimizes the variance of the ratio of two parameters. 
Scarpa and Rose (2008) define the C-error as: 
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where v and w are two different parameters in the choice model. To minimize the C-
error, the sum of the 1J   attribute parameters must be minimized. A Monte Carlo 
simulation such as the simulation described above for the D-efficiency design can be 
applied. 
A more recent alternative efficiency measure is S-efficiency. Introduced by 
Bliemer and Rose (2005), S-efficiency minimizes the sample size required for the 
experiment and improves the accuracy of parameters with a high standard error. The 
distinguishing factor between D-efficiency and S-efficiency is that D-efficiency 
minimizes the overall standard error (i.e., the determinant of the AVC), whereas S-
efficiency examines the t-ratios of each estimated parameter and seeks to improve 
parameters with high t-ratios while minimizing the sample size. Bliemer and Rose 
defined the t-ratios as the ratios of the non-zero priors and their corresponding 
standard error. They derived the lower bound for a statistically significant parameter 
estimate for that parameter as: 
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where 
1se  is the standard error for the first alternative and 
*
k  is the non-zero prior of 
parameter w. With different parameters having different lower bounds, S-optimality 
seeks the minimum number of observations where all individual parameters are 
statistically significant. Hence, although D-efficiency minimizes the D-error, S-
efficiency minimizes the sample size. Stated differently, a D-efficient design might 
require more observations than an S-efficient design, but, on the other hand, an S-
efficient design might result in an overall lower level of accuracy. 
Two other alternative design metrics are G-optimality and V-optimality. 
These metrics are optimality measures not efficiency measures. Efficiency measures 
minimize a design‘s AVC, whereas optimality measures seek to minimize the 
average prediction variance (Kessels et al., 2006). However, as noted by Kessels et 
al. (2006), G-optimality and V-optimality have not been applied yet in the 
experiment choice context. Thus, they are not discussed further. 
The economic literature and practitioners seem to favor D-efficiency as the 
preferred efficiency measure for efficient design. Specifically, Bunch et al. (1996) 
found D-efficiency particularly useful for logit models. Similarly, Rose and Bliemer 
(2009) found D-efficiency to be the most commonly used method. The principal 
advantages of D-efficiency are that it accounts for both model variance and 
covariance and that it is normalized by the number of attributes. Based on these 
considerations, the present study uses D-efficiency as its relevant efficiency measure 
for its design matrix. Because D-optimality cannot be shown for logit models due to 
its nonlinearity, the design matrix for this study uses efficient design instead of 
orthogonal design. 
Implementing Efficient Design 
To implement the design choices discussed above, various software packages 
are available. Among them are SAS by SAS Institute Inc., Ngene by ChoiceMetrics, 
DOE++ by Reliasoft, and SPC by BPI Consulting. Any of these software packages, 
as well as several more, can produce the selected design options. In this study, Ngene 
1.0.2 was used to estimate the design matrix. Ngene is dedicated experimental design 
software that is relatively easy to use. Other software packages, such as SAS, are 
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much broader in their capabilities and applications; therefore, they require a deeper 
understanding of their programming commands. 
Ngene requires a number of critical input parameters to design a D-optimal 
matrix. The first input requires defining the number and names of the choice 
alternatives (alts). There are three choice alternatives labeled Plan1, Plan2, and 
Plan3. 
Next, the number of rows in the design matrix is specified. Because a row is a 
unique choice situation, the number of rows in the design matrix is the number of 
unique choice situations. A researcher can opt to administer unique choice situations 
to each survey respondent. Given 500 survey responses and six choice situations 
each, this would require a minimum of 3,000 rows. Realistically, the number of 
unique choice situations needs to exceed this number because it is highly likely that 
not all potential survey respondents will reply to the survey. Considering surveys not 
completed, this survey started with 800 unique surveys. For this number of surveys, 
4,800 design matrix rows were required, resulting in a matrix with a dimension of 30 
by 4,800. However, current computing power cannot handle designs of this 
magnitude. Therefore, the practical implication is that instead of surveying consumer 
responses to unique choice situations, the study incorporated a set of choice 
situations. This design choice is consistent with the relevant literature (e.g., Rose & 
Bliemer, 2009; Scarpa & Rose, 2008). With repeating choice situations, the design 
matrix in theory could consist of six rows only defined as one block, implying that 
all respondents would select from the same six choice situations. However, such a 
design would not allow for attribute balance because each attribute level only has a 
one-seventh (14%) chance of being included in the design. With all attributes having 
seven or fewer levels, a design of seven blocks with each block containing six choice 
situations is the minimum number of rows to attain attribute balance. To test whether 
specifying the design matrix beyond this minimum level would yield lower D-errors, 
designs with more than 42 rows were tested. These tests showed no material 
reduction in the D-error, although they added significant time to each run. Hence, the 
specification of the design matrix was 42 rows over seven blocks. Ngene randomly 
assigns block numbers to each of the 42 choice situations. Combining the block 
numbers, in turn, generates seven unique SP surveys, each consisting of six choice 
situations. The surveys are labeled sequentially from one to seven. 
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Ngene allows the researcher to select from several efficiency measures, 
including D-, A-, B-, and S-efficiency (ChoiceMetrics, 2010). The efficiency 
measures vary depending on the type of model, including logit and error-component 
(EC) models. For the reasons discussed above, the model for this study is a logit 
model and the design objective is D-efficiency. Although Ngene employs a Monte 
Carlo simulation to generate the D-efficient design, it allows users to select from 
several replacement algorithms. Specifically, Ngene is capable of optimizing 
according to the Fedorov method, the RSC method, modified Fedorov methods, and 
the Nelder-Mead method (ChoiceMetrics, 2010). Each of these methods draws from 
the full factorial design matrix and differs only in how it replaces attributes between 
iterations. With a large level of iterations, the choice of algorithm seems to be 
secondary. In addition, no literature exists that discusses the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of these methods. Therefore, this study uses the swapping method in 
the RSC procedures, which is also the default method in Ngene. 
In designing the survey, the analyst must pay particular attention not to create 
choice situations that are either dominant or nonsensical. A dominant alternative is a 
choice alternative that is superior to the other two alternatives in the choice situation 
in one or more attributes and inferior in none. As such, it provides no information 
about the decision maker‘s preferences. D-optimality removes dominant alternatives 
through the process of minimizing the AVC. Specifically, dominant alternatives have 
a very high choice probability, whereas all other alternatives have a small 
probability. This leads to large differences in the model‘s covariances, which in turn 
yields high values for the determinant of the AVC. In minimizing the determinant of 
the AVC, D-optimality achieves probability (utility) balance, thereby removing 
dominant alternatives. D-optimality, however, has no way to ascertain whether a 
choice alternative makes sense to the decision maker. Ngene allows the user to 
condition the matrix design, thereby ensuring that nonsensical alternatives are not 
included. Conditioning consists of coding specific attribute level combinations that 
Ngene is to ignore. For the present survey, there were the following four conditions: 
(1) If the monthly voice minute allowance (v_allowance) is unlimited, then the 
plan‘s voice overage charges (v_over) must also be zero. 
(2) If the monthly data allowance (d_allowance) is unlimited, then the plan‘s data 
overage charges (d_over) must also be zero. 
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(3) If the monthly voice minute allowance (v_allowance) is limited, then the plan‘s 
voice overage charges (v_over) cannot be zero. 
(4) If the monthly data allowance (d_allowance) is limited, then the plan‘s data 
overage charges (d_over) cannot be zero. 
Next, Ngene requires the specification of the model. This step is critical as 
Ngene optimizes the design matrix based on a specific model. This creates a 
challenge for the analyst because the model‘s final specification is subject to the 
statistical significance (or absence thereof) of the attributes and its various interaction 
terms. Similarly, Ngene optimizes the design based on parameter estimate priors. The 
model specification and the parameter priors are necessary as D-efficiency 
minimizes the determinant of the AVC. The AVC is a function of the model‘s 
specification and in nonlinear models is a function of the parameter priors. This 
chicken-or-egg problem poses a challenge as differences between the parameter 
priors and the final parameters stand to nullify at least some of the promised benefits 
from D-optimization. As discussed below, one can measure this inadvertent loss of 
efficiency by comparing the D-error of the design matrix under the model‘s final 
specification and parameter estimates to the D-error of the original design and the 
parameter priors. 
The parameter priors for this model are the result of a pilot study. In the pilot 
study, 25 coworkers responded to six choice situations each. At two observations per 
choice situations, this resulted in 300 observations. Stata (statistical software from 
StataCorp) labels these observations ―Group Observations‖ indicating that there are 
300 groups of unique choice observations. Each group consists of multiple 
observations. Specifically, in selecting the most preferred mobile plan, the decision 
maker selects one plan and rejects two plans. This generates three model 
observations in the exploded logit model, one for each mobile plan. The dependent 
binary dummy variable (select) indicates the decision maker‘s first choice of plans 
and the two rejected. Similarly, indicating which of the rejected two mobile plans is 
the least preferred plan generates two observations. Hence, the group observations 
total is 300, 150 of which contain three observations each, whereas the remaining 
150 contain two observations each. This results in 750 model observations. It is 
important to note that when referring to ―exploded data‖ the reference is to 
increasing the number of observations from one observation per choice situation 
(generating 150 choice observations) to two observations per choice situation 
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(generating 300 choice observations). The latter step of increasing the number of 
observations from 300 to 750 is merely a consequence of the method used to fit the 
logit model to the 300 observations. The additional 450 observations do not generate 
additional information about the decision makers‘ preferences. Table 5 summarizes 
the results of the fitted pilot model. 
 
Table 5 
Exploded Logit Model for Pilot Data 
Number of obs: 750      
Number of groups: 300      
Obs per group       
min: 2      
avg: 2.5      
max: 3      
Log likelihood: -199.98      
LR chi2(10): 137.56      
Prob > chi2: 0      
select Coef. Std. Err z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
phone_price -0.0021 0.0005 -4.38 0.00 -0.0030 -0.0012 
mrc -0.0167 0.0021 -7.76 0.00 -0.0209 -0.0125 
v_allowance (per 100) 0.0066 0.0042 1.58 0.12 -0.0016 0.0148 
d_allowance (per 100) 0.0112 0.0038 2.98 0.00 0.0038 0.0186 
download (per 100) 0.0034 0.0048 0.71 0.48 -0.0060 0.0128 
v_over -0.0838 0.7544 -0.11 0.91 -1.5623 1.3948 
d_over -0.3807 0.7668 -0.50 0.62 -1.8836 1.1223 
text -1.6333 0.6137 -2.66 0.01 -2.8362 -0.4305 
phone_type 1.0785 0.1869 5.77 0.00 0.7122 1.4449 
term_length -0.0032 0.0072 -0.45 0.65 -0.0173 0.0109 
 
The pilot coefficients serve only as starting values for the D-optimization 
routine. Accordingly, it would be premature to examine their significance levels, 
measured in the z-statistic, and possibly respecify the model. The pilot coefficients, 
however, have the expected signs. 
In the absence of any information of statistically significant interaction terms, 
the initial model, including the parameter priors from the pilot study, takes the 
following form: 
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(37) 
(Plan)=
b1[-0.0020992] phone_price[0, 50, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500] + 
b2[-0.0166683] mrc[20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 160] + 
b3[0.0000659] v_allowance[50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, 2000, 99999] + 
b4[0.0001119]
U



d_allowance[0, 50, 200, 500, 1000, 5000, 99999] + 
b5[0.000034] download[250, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 3000, 6000] + 
b6[-0.0837528] v_over[0, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4] + 
b7[-0.3806611] d_over[0, 0



 .1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4] + 
b8[-1.63345] text[0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4] + 
b9[1.078538] phone_type[0, 1] + 
b10[-0.0032271] term_length[0, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36]



 
 
where b1-b10 are the model parameters, the number in the brackets following the 
parameter name are the parameter priors, and the numbers in the brackets following 
the independent variable names are the attribute levels. Appendix D presents the 
resulting Ngene optimization code for this study. 
Per the recommendation from ChoiceMetrics, the number of Monte Carlo 
iterations was not limited. Rather, the optimization routine ran until it produced no 
incremental improvement for a prolonged period. As shown in Table 6, the routine 
ran 1,479,737 iterations. At approximately 30 seconds per 1,000 iterations, this took 
approximately 12 hours of run time. Of the total 396,541 iterations, approximately 
27% improved the D-error statistic, thus they were retained. Overall, the 
optimization routine reduced the D-error by 40%. Several alternative optimizations 
yielded similar improvements. 
 
Table 6 
Ngene Optimization Results 
Statistics Value 
D-error start 0.00022523557 
D-error end 0.00013464514 
Total iterations 1,479,737 
Last iteration with improvement 396,541 
Improvement (%) 40% 
 
Appendix E displays the resulting logit model choice probabilities. These are 
the estimated probabilities for a certain choice alternative (mobile plan) in the design 
to be selected. The more balanced the probabilities for choice alternatives within a 
choice situation are, the more balanced the overall design. Appendix E illustrates that 
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there are still a few unbalanced choice situations although they are approximately D-
optimal. For instance, choice situation 31 forecasts the probability for Plan 1 at 1%, 
Plan 2 at 41%, and Plan 3 at 58%, whereas other choice situations are balanced. For 
instance, choice situation 24 forecasts the probabilities at 32%, 43%, and 25% for 
Plan 1, Plan 2, and Plan 3, respectively. 
Survey Administration 
With the theoretical model specified, the survey developed, and the design 
matrix D-optimized, the next step was to decide on the proper data collection 
method. Several online and offline primary data collection methods were available. 
Among the offline methods were focus groups, mail surveys, mall intercepts, and 
phone interviews. Online primary research methods included online panel surveys, 
discussion groups, and click data. Each method has advantages and disadvantages 
(Mohammed, Fisher, Jaworksi, & Cahill, 2002). 
In selecting the proper data collection method, researchers aim to minimize 
sampling biases, costs, and turnaround and to maximize data quality (Mohammed et 
al., 2002). Sampling biases arise when the sampled population is not representative 
of the general population. Online data collection methods require a survey 
respondent to have an Internet connection, a computing device to connect to the 
Internet, and to be Internet literate. Conversely, offline data collection methods 
require survey respondents to have listed phone numbers and to allow research firms 
to contact them (i.e., not be listed on the FCC‘s Do Not Call Registry). Even focus 
groups and mail surveys potentially have biases because they might attract responses 
from individuals with relatively more free time thus distorting the survey. No method 
of data collection is entirely unbiased (Postoaca, 2006). Hence, researchers seek to 
minimize sampling biases and specifically test for such biases after the survey. Costs 
can vary significantly among research methods with offline methods generally being 
more costly than online methods (Mohammed et al., 2002). Turnaround time, or 
completion speed, is another key consideration in selecting a data method (Postoaca, 
2006). Postoaca (2006) estimated that online surveys require 25% to 50% less time 
to complete than offline surveys. In terms of quality, Postoaca found that both online 
and offline methods can yield high quality data. Postoaca, however, cautioned that 
online panels with less than two surveys per year on average are prone to poor 
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quality. Mohammed et al. (2002) found that online methods yield higher data quality 
than offline methods as the latter requires manual data entry. 
The present SP survey lends itself well to an online data collection method 
and a panel survey in particular. At approximately $8 per completed online survey 
compared to $40 to $60 per completed offline survey, the online survey is 
considerably less expensive. Further, there are potential biases present in both 
methods. Therefore, because online surveys significantly minimize turnaround time, 
are less expensive, and do not have any more biases than offline surveys, the relative 
advantages of an online method outweigh its relative disadvantages. The choice of 
online panels seems consistent with the general trend of market research. Callegaro 
and Disogra (2008) found that market, social, psychological, and medical research is 
increasingly using online panels. Specifically, Comley (2007) found that one-third of 
all market research conducted in the United States used online panels as the data 
collection method. Comley also observed similar trends in Europe. 
In panel surveys, pre-recruited panel members respond to a set of surveys 
each year. Research firms recruit these panels, typically by offering some form of 
compensation for the completed survey. There are two general types of online 
panels, probability panels and volunteer panels (Callegaro & Disogra, 2008). 
Probability panels consist of individuals recruited using some form of randomization. 
A common method to recruit probability panels is through random-digit-dial (RDD) 
telephone sampling (Callegaro & Disogra, 2008). Volunteer panels are opt-in panels 
consisting of members who voluntarily join the panel. There are no generally 
accepted metrics to evaluate the quality of online panels (Callegaro & Disogra, 
2008). Chang and Krosnick (2009) compared the sample representativeness and 
response quality of three data collection methods: RDD telephone surveys, opt-in 
panels, and probability panels. Chang and Krosnick found that probability panels 
generated the most accurate response data out of the three methods. The data from 
the telephone surveys were least biased; however, they contained the largest 
measurement error. The data from the opt-in surveys were the most biased data, 
although the data yielded the most accurate self-reports. Self-reports are survey 
questions that ask the respondent to describe actual behavior. As such, they are a 
measure of data accuracy. 
Link and Mokdad (2005), on the other hand, found that offline surveys 
generate more accurate data than online surveys. Windle and Rolfe (2011) also 
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compared online and offline data collection methods and noted that Internet surveys 
are increasingly gaining in popularity because they are quicker and less costly. In 
contrast to the findings of Chang and Krosnik (2009), Link and Mokdad (2005) and 
Windle and Rolfe (2011) concluded that there were no differences between the 
methods when forecasting the dependent variable (maximum willingness to pay). 
Windle and Rolfe did find that there were differences in the sample‘s 
sociodemographic composition and the survey respondents‘ attitudes. Hence, 
although the economic literature offers some guidance as to the increasing popularity 
of online data collection methods, online and offline methods seem to perform 
differently depending on the specific circumstances of the study. 
In selecting an online panel for the present SP survey, the focus was on 
experience, panel size, and panel reputation. SurveySavvy™, an online survey 
company established by Luth Research met all three criteria. With over 3.5 million 
members, it is one of the largest global online communities (Luth Research, n.d.). 
Introduced in 1999, SurveySavvy™ is an experienced company that conducts 
numerous surveys throughout the year. It also has a reputation of being of the highest 
quality. SurveySavvy™ is a hybrid panel, consisting of both opt-in and invited 
members. Hence, it could potentially be subject to sample biases. However, with 3.5 
million members, the chance of a selection bias is minimal. Nevertheless, the 
resulting data were subjected to various tests prior to fitting a logit model to the data. 
Luth Research coded the D-optimized design matrix shown in Appendix B, 
the survey shown in Appendix F, and administered the survey to the members of 
SurveySavvy™. Prior to collecting the data, Luth Research conducted a soft launch. 
In this test run, 44 surveys completed by the online panel were examined for errors. 
The review revealed that the screening question needed to be moved to the beginning 
of the survey. Specifically, the population of interest for this study consists of 
individuals 18 years of age or older. The original survey screened for age at the end 
of the survey. Placing screening questions at the end of the survey increases the risk 
of false self-reports as respondents might report an incorrect age after completing the 
survey. Therefore, the screening question was moved to the beginning and the survey 
was terminated when a respondent entered an age of 17 years or less. The soft launch 
also revealed that at least one survey respondent completed the survey within a very 
short time (i.e., 92 seconds). This raised the concern that survey responses with short 
completion times might not be accurate because the respondents might not have 
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carefully considered the questions. Thus, based on the minimum completion time 
from the pilot study, all surveys completed in less than 3.5 minutes were removed 
from the final dataset. With these two modifications, the data collection proceeded to 
the full launch. 
The full data collection launch generated 653 survey responses. Of these, 164 
surveys were eliminated due to either incomplete responses or completion times of 
less than 3.5 minutes. The remaining 489 completed surveys form the database for 
this study.14 With seven unique SP surveys, D-optimality of the database is preserved 
if the responses are equally distributed across these surveys. Table 7 shows an 
approximately equal distribution across surveys. Hence, D-optimality is preserved. 
 
Table 7 
Response Distribution by Survey 
Survey number Frequency 
1 72 
2 71 
3 68 
4 70 
5 70 
6 69 
7 69 
Total 489 
 
                                              
14
 If despite the incomplete responses and/or short completion times, the dropped survey responses 
provided accurate information on the respondents‘ decision-making and if the preferences of these 
eliminated observations differ from the observations of the remaining respondents, removing the 
observations could potentially introduce a sample selection bias. At a minimum, the removal limits the 
sample to respondents that did complete all questions and required longer than 3.5 minutes. 
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Survey Results Analysis 
This section presents the results of the D-optimized SP survey. The survey 
results and the fitted model form the statistical base of any inferences drawn from 
this study. Inferences are only as accurate as the statistical base. Hence, in order to 
ensure valid inferences, the survey data must be unbiased and of high quality and the 
econometric model must fit the data optimally. The descriptive statistics of the 
survey results and the estimation results are the subjects of this section. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The SP survey for this study consisted of three sections: RP, SP, and 
sociodemographic. In the RP section, the survey respondents provided information 
about their actual consumption patterns. The SP section recorded the survey 
respondents‘ ranked preferences of three mobile service plans in six different choice 
situations. The sociodemographic section collected personal information about the 
survey respondents. The sociodemographic data and RP data were jointly tested for 
quality and potential biases by examining the sample characteristics. The SP data 
from the survey responses were analyzed separately. 
Sample characteristics. Table 8 presents various descriptive statistics for 
the survey sample. For each of the 19 survey questions in the SP and 
sociodemographic sections, Table 8 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum 
value, maximum value, median, skewness, kurtosis, the 25th percentile, and the 75th 
percentile. The number of observations (489) is the number of completed and valid 
surveys. For Q4–Q9, the number of observations is 417. The difference is due to 28 
respondents who indicated that they did use a mobile phone at the time of the survey 
and 44 survey respondents who indicated that they were not financially responsible 
for their mobile service plan.
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Table 8 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Min Max Median Skew. Kurtosis 25% 75% Attribute levels 
Q1: Age 489 44.43 15.45 18 82 42 0.31 2.11 31 55  
Q2: Wireless 489 1.06 0.23 1 2 1 3.81 15.53 1 1 Yes=1, No=2 
Q3: Fin. responsibility 489 1.13 0.33 1 2 1 2.24 6.03 1 1 Yes=1, No=2 
Q4: Plan minutes 417 3.93 2.01 1 8 4 0.31 1.85 2 6 
<400 = 1, 400-699=2, 700-899=3, 900-1399=4, 1400-2099=5, Unlim=6, Prepaid=7, Don't 
know=8 
Q5: Data plan 
subscription 
417 1.58 0.49 1 2 2 (0.34) 1.11 1 2 Yes=1, No=2 
Q6: SMS plan 
subscription 
417 1.54 0.50 1 2 2 (0.15) 1.02 1 2 Yes=1, No=2 
Q7: Mobile Internet 
usage 
417 1.60 0.49 1 2 2 (0.41) 1.17 1 2 Yes=1, No=2 
Q8: Mobile email usage 417 1.62 0.49 1 2 2 (0.48) 1.23 1 2 Yes=1, No=2 
Q9: Monthly expenses 417 2.13 1.00 1 5 2 0.72 2.90 1 3 <$50=1, $50-$99=2, $100-$149=3, >$150=4, Don't know=5 
Q10: Term contract 417 1.32 0.51 1 3 2 1.23 3.45 1 2 Yes=1, No=2, Don't know =3 
Q11: Landline subscriber 489 1.28 0.45 1 2 1 0.98 1.96 1 2 Yes=1, No=2 
Q12: State of residence 489 25.45 16.00 1 51 24 0.04 1.46 10 43  
Q13: Residence density 489 2.30 0.84 1 4 2 0.01 2.29 2 3 Metropolitan=1, Suburban=2, Small town=3, Farming =4 
Q14: Education 489 3.18 1.03 1 5 3 0.03 1.77 2 4 <High school =1, High school=2, Vocational =3, College = 4, Post-graduate = 5 
Q15: Employment status 489 1.90 0.92 1 3 2 (0.15) 1.02 1 3 Full-time = 1, Part-time = 2, Not employed = 3 
Q16: Gender 489 1.53 0.50 1 2 2 (0.41) 1.17 1 2 Male = 1, Female = 2 
Q17 Marital status 489 1.79 0.75 1 4 2 (0.48) 1.23 1 2 Single = 1, Married = 2, Partnered = 3, Other = 4 
Q18: Number of children 489 1.56 0.93 1 4 2 0.72 2.90 1 2 Zero = 1, One = 2, Two = 3, More than three = 4 
Q19: Annual income 489 2.34 1.11 1 6 1 1.23 3.45 1 3 <$30K=1, $30K-$49K=2, $50K-$74K=3, $75K-$149K=4, >$150K=5, No answer=6 
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To ensure that the survey respondents accurately represented U.S. consumers, 
the sample statistics were compared to the various population statistics. This 
examination took on four stages. In the first stage, the sample demographics were 
compared to data from the U.S. Census Bureau and other benchmarks. In the second 
stage, the sample‘s subscription levels (e.g., data plan, SMS, and landline 
subscriptions) were compared to similar metrics for the average U.S. consumer. The 
third stage examined the survey respondents‘ use of mobile phone service (e.g., 
mobile Internet and email usage) and compared it to similar metrics for the average 
U.S. subscriber. In the fourth stage, monthly consumptions (e.g., monthly 
expenditure and plan minutes) were benchmarked against the consumption patterns 
of the U.S. consumers. The objective of the first examination stage was to ensure that 
the survey sample represented the U.S. consumers in terms of sociodemographic 
attributes. The remaining stages served to ensure that in addition to 
sociodemographic attributes, the sample‘s mobile phone plan consumption 
appropriately mirrored U.S. consumers‘ consumption patterns. The 
sociodemographic variables for the first data examination stage included the 
following variables: 
 Age: With a mean age of 44.42 years and a median age of 42 years, the 
sample population accurately represents the U.S. population over the age of 
18 years. According to the U.S. Bureau of Census, the mean and median age 
of the U.S. population over the age of 18 years is 45.20 years and 43 years, 
respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). The sample skewness and kurtosis is 
0.31 and 2.11, respectively, compared to same metrics for the U.S. population 
of 0.51 and 2.48. 
 Gender: Of the survey respondents, 47.03% were male and 52.97% were 
female. This compares well to the 49.27% male and 50.73% female estimated 
by the U.S. Bureau of Census (n.d.). 
 Annual income: Table 9 compares income levels among survey respondents 
to income levels earned by the U.S. population, as estimated by the U.S. 
Bureau of Census (n.d.). 
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Table 9 
Annual Household Income Comparison 
Annual household income Sample statistics Bureau of Census (est.) 
Less than $30,000 27.20% 30.15% 
$30,000 to just under $50,000 31.29% 19.45% 
$50,000 to just under $75,000 25.15% 17.90% 
$75,000 to just under $150,000 14.52% 22.15% 
$150,000 and more 0.61% 10.35% 
Decline to answer 1.23% 0.00% 
Mean income category $30K–$50K $30K–$50K 
 
Table 9 reveals that although the sample represents some income categories 
accurately others are oversampled or undersampled. In particular, the survey 
sample does not include sufficient respondents with annual household 
incomes in excess of $75,000. However, the mean income category is 
accurate. 
 State of residence: The survey sampled all 50 U.S. states and the District of 
Columbia. Indexing the states, including the District of Columbia, from 1–51 
by alphabetical order produced a sample distribution with a mean of 25.45, a 
standard deviation of 16.18, skewness of 0.0360, and kurtosis of 1.4604. The 
population counts by state, as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Census (n.d.), 
follow a distribution with a mean of 24.76, a standard deviation of 15.18, 
skewness of 0.0289, and kurtosis of 1.6110. Hence, the distribution of survey 
respondents closely mirrors the U.S. population distribution. 
 Residence density: Of the survey respondents, 18.40% indicated that they 
mainly lived in a metropolitan city, 39.06% listed their main residence in a 
suburban community of a larger city, 36.40% lived in a small town or rural 
city, and the remaining 6.13% lived in a farming area. The most recent count 
from the U.S. Bureau of Census (n.d.) found that 30.30% of the U.S. 
population lived in metropolitan cities, 49.00% lived in urban areas outside a 
city, and 20.70% lived in rural areas. A direct comparison of these counts is 
not possible as the U.S. Census Bureau uses a well-defined classification 
system based on calculated population density, whereas the survey relied on 
the interpretation of the respondents. 
 Education: Indicating their highest level of education, 1.04% had less than a 
high school education, 33.95% ended their education with graduation from 
 81 
 
high school, 19.02% terminated with vocational schooling, 37.83% had a 
college degree, and the remaining 8.18% had a post-graduate degree. The 
U.S. Bureau of Census tracks educational levels differently and does not list 
vocational schooling. Hence, a direct comparison is not possible. However, in 
its latest survey of individuals 18 years of age and older, the U.S. Bureau of 
Census (n.d.) reported that 15.72% had less than a high school education, 
52.99% ended their education with a high school degree, 22.73% had a 
college degree, and the remaining 8.75% had a post-graduate degree. Based 
on this comparison, it is possible that the level of education in the sample is 
higher than the level of education of the general U.S. population. 
 Employment status: Of the survey respondents, 47.85% worked full time, 
14.72% worked part time, and the remaining 37.42% were not gainfully 
employed. The U.S. Bureau of Census (n.d.) reported that, as of 2009, 65% of 
individuals over the age of 16 years were in the labor force. Although this 
includes two additional years relative to the survey sample (which only 
sampled individuals over the age of 18 years), this implies that 35% were not 
gainfully employed. This corresponds well with the sample observations. 
 Marital status: Of the survey respondents, 37.42% were single, 50.72% were 
married, 7.77% had a partner, and the remaining 4.09% indicated another 
relationship status. The U.S. Bureau of Census (n.d.) estimated that 50.3% of 
the U.S. population is married, 30.80% has never been married, 10.4% is 
divorced, 2.2% is separated, and 6.3% is widowed. Although a direct 
comparison to the survey sample is not possible, the percentage of survey 
respondents that were married matches the forecasts by the Bureau of Census 
well. 
 Number of children: Of the survey respondents, 67.89% had no children. 
Among the 32.11% of respondents that had children, the average number of 
children was 1.75. The U.S. Bureau of Census (n.d.) reported that 63.74% of 
households had children. Among those, the average number of children was 
1.86. The U.S. Bureau of Census defines a household as the total number of 
individuals living in a housing unit. It does not track the number of children 
by individual. Hence, a direct comparison of the percentage of the U.S. 
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population without children is not possible. However, the average family size 
in the sample matches the figure for the U.S. population well. 
This first examination stage demonstrates that the survey sample represents 
the U.S. population generally well in terms of sociodemographic variables. 
Notwithstanding, a few limitations apply. In particular, the survey sample represents 
households with incomes of less than $75,000 per annum better than households that 
exceed this level. 
The subscription level variables for the second data examination stage 
included the following variables: 
 Mobile: The mobile penetration rate in the sample is 94.27%. This is higher 
than the 88.9% mobile penetration rate reported by the FCC (2010b) and the 
93% reported by the wireless association CTIA (2011) for 2010 and slightly 
lower than the 95.9% reported by the market research firm TeleGeography 
(2011). 
 Data plan subscription: Of the survey respondents, 41.73% indicated that 
they subscribed to a mobile data plan. The market research firm Nielsen 
found that of the 28% of U.S. mobile subscribers with Smartphones (Nielsen, 
2010b) only 66% subscribed to a mobile data plan (Nielsen, 2010a). Not 
counting the mobile subscribers with non-Smartphones that subscribe to data 
plans this indicates that less than 20% of mobile subscriber have a data plan 
subscription. Conversely, it would require that approximately 15% of non-
Smartphone subscribers subscribe to a data plan. This figure is plausible 
considering that 89% of the mobile phones currently registered are capable of 
browsing the Internet (CTIA, 2011) and thereby might require a data plan. 
Furthermore, the market research firm comScore (2011, p. 5) found that 47% 
of December 2010 mobile subscribers were media users, which it defined as 
browsing the Internet. Although comScore did not report the percentage of 
these users that also subscribed to a data plan, Nielsen (2010a) estimated this 
number at 91.7%. This implies that 43.1% of U.S. mobile subscribers had a 
monthly data plan, which is consistent with the sample data. 
 SMS plan subscription: Of the survey respondents, 46.28% reported 
subscribing to an SMS plan. The FCC (2010b) cited a study by the Pew 
Research Center that found that 43% of mobile subscribers used SMS. The 
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FCC and Pew Research provided no information as to the percentage of SMS 
users that subscribed to an SMS plan. According to the Verizon Wireless 
website, there is large price difference between SMS with and without an 
SMS plan. Without a plan, a mobile subscriber pays $0.20 for each SMS sent. 
With a plan, a text message costs approximately $0.02. The FCC (2010b) 
reported average SMS revenue at $0.014 per message. This indicates that the 
large majority of the reported 43% SMS users also subscribe to an SMS plan. 
Hence, the sample seems generally consistent with the population. 
 Landline subscription: Of the survey respondents, 71.98% reported having a 
landline in their home. This implies that 28.02% live in mobile-only 
households. The FCC (2010b) reports this percentage at 21.1%. The wireless 
association CTIA (2011) estimated the figure at 26.6%. 
Based on these considerations, the sample also appropriately represents the 
U.S. consumers‘ communications subscription levels. The plan components variables 
for the third data examination stage included the following variables: 
 Mobile Internet usage: Of the survey respondents, 40.05% indicated that 
they currently used their mobile phones to access the Internet. This 
percentage is lower than the 47% found by comScore (2011). However, it is 
close to the 41.73% of survey respondents that subscribe to a data plan. 
 Mobile email usage: Of the survey respondents, 38.38% indicated that they 
currently used their mobile phones to send and receive emails. This is lower 
than the 40.05% of respondents that use their mobile phone for Internet 
browsing and lower than the 41.73% of respondents that subscribe to mobile 
data plan. This, however, is expected because mobile phones, particularly 
non-Smartphones, make sending emails difficult. comScore (2011) found that 
30.5% of mobile users used their mobile phones to send and receive emails. 
Hence, the sample is generally consistent with the population. 
 Term contract: Of the survey respondents, 69.78% reported having a term 
contract with the current provider. The FCC (2010b) found that 70.9% of 
subscriber net additions in 2010 had postpaid service. Term contracts 
typically only apply to postpaid service plans. Given the significant mobile 
phone discounts offered by mobile service providers for postpaid service 
plans, it is reasonable to assume that all, or almost all, postpaid service plans 
 84 
 
are subject to a term contract. Hence, the observed figure is in line with the 
figure reported by the FCC. 
Again, the sample data represents U.S. consumers well. Finally, the mobile 
expenditures variables for the fourth data examination stage included the following 
variables: 
 Monthly expenses: Median monthly mobile expenditures for the survey 
respondents are between $50 and $99. This is slightly higher than the $47.09 
reported by the FCC (2010b) but might be the result of the slightly higher 
plan minutes observed in the sample. 
 Plan minutes: The average plan minutes category in the sample is 3.93 
minutes, which equals 900–1,400 minutes per month. This is higher than the 
709 minutes per month found by the FCC (2010b) and higher than the 726 
minutes found by the wireless association CTIA (2011) for 2010. Hence, the 
survey sample might reflect higher volume subscribers more accurately than 
subscribers with low plan minutes per month. 
Thus, the sample performed well in all four examination stages and is deemed 
to reasonably accurately represent the U.S. consumers. 
To test the accuracy of the self-reporting, various consistency checks were 
performed. First, survey respondents who currently have prepaid mobile service 
plans should not have a term contract. Approximately 12% of the survey respondents 
stated that they currently had prepaid mobile service. Of those, none indicated that 
they were under a term contract. Specifically, 98% responded in the negative with 
the remaining 2% stating that they did not know. Second, respondents with monthly 
data plans are expected to access the Internet and/or send and receive emails. Of the 
41.73% of the respondents who stated that they currently had a data plan, 86.21% 
responded that they accessed the Internet and 80.46% used their mobile phones to 
send and receive emails. Curiously, 17 respondents indicated that they subscribed to 
a data plan, yet they did not use their mobile phone to access the Internet or send and 
receive emails. Some service providers require subscribers to purchase a data plan 
with certain mobile phones. For instance, the Apple iPhone when purchased in a 
service bundle requires subscribers to purchase a data plan. Hence, the observation is 
theoretically possible. Finally, survey respondents that did not use a mobile phone 
were not expected to respond to the questions about their consumption patterns. 
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Twenty-eight respondents did not use a mobile phone at the time of the survey. As 
expected, of those respondents, none answered any questions about their current 
consumption patterns. 
Survey responses. In this section, the data from the SP survey are 
analyzed. The objective of this review is to ensure that the survey responses are 
indicative of actual consumer choices. It further tests that the D-optimization of the 
design matrix did not create unrealistic mobile plan choices. There is no single test to 
ensure the accuracy of the survey responses. Rather, several examinations had to be 
conducted. 
The first test examined whether the survey respondents always preferred one 
mobile plan better than the remaining two choice alternatives. Although D-optimal 
design does not create any dominant or near dominant alternatives, revealed 
dominance could still occur if a choice situation is superior in one important aspect 
or inferior in an attribute that bears no weight in the purchase decision. Similarly, the 
test examined whether any choice situations were clearly inferior and thus never 
selected. There is nothing inherently wrong with the presence of inferior alternatives. 
In fact, they provide a useful test to ensure that survey respondents select rationally. 
Appendix G shows the frequency by which each choice alternative was 
accepted and rejected. The first column in Appendix G indicates which of the seven 
unique surveys the respondent answered. A respondent faced six choice situations, as 
listed in the second column of Appendix G. As discussed, the respondent answered 
two questions in the ranking exercise. In the first question, the respondent selected 
the preferred plan from three plan alternatives. In the second question, the respondent 
selected the least preferred plan from the remaining two alternatives. Hence, there 
are two rankings per choice situation. The third column in Appendix G contains 
these rankings. The three plans and the number of times each was selected and 
rejected are shown in the remaining columns of Appendix G. 
There were no mobile plans that were always accepted. Hence, there are no 
revealed dominant alternatives. However, four plan choices were never selected. 
Specifically, survey respondents never selected the third choice alternative in the first 
choice situation of the third survey. Similarly, the first plan of the fourth choice 
situation and the third plan in the sixth choice situation of the fourth survey also were 
never selected. Finally, the respondents never selected choice alternative two of the 
fourth choice situation in the fifth survey. This behavior is expected. For instance, 
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the first of these three choice alternatives had an MRC of $160 and provided only 50 
voice minutes per month. The other two choice alternatives offered lower MRCs and 
higher voice allowances. The three specific choices also had low design choice 
probabilities (shown in Appendix E) of 5%, 9%, and 3%. 
The second test examined whether the presentation order of the choice 
alternatives was correlated with the responses. For this, the selected choice 
alternatives were regressed on the order in which the respondents saw them. The 
respondents‘ choices were recorded in the variable select, and the variable plan 
indicated the position in which the choice was presented. Table 10 shows the results 
of regressing select on plan. The regression coefficient for plan is statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, the survey responses were not influenced by the order in 
which the plan alternatives were presented. 
 
Table 10 
Choice Alternative Order Regression Results—All Choice Situations 
Source SS df  MS   
     Obs 14,670 
Model 0.2526 1  0.2526 F(1, 14668) 1.0500 
Residual 3,520.55 14668  0.2400 Prob > F 0.3049 
Total 3,520.80 14669  0.2400 R-squared 0.0001 
     Adj R-sq. –  
     Root MSE 0.4899 
select Coeff. Std t P>t [95% Conf. interval] 
plan -0.0050729 0.0049446 -1.03 0.305 -0.0147651 0.0046192 
_cons 0.4101656 0.0107023 38.32 0 0.3891877 0.4311435 
 
A third test examined whether some respondents made their selection based 
on a prespecified rule that was independent from the choice alternative 
characteristics. For instance, a respondent might always select the first offered plan. 
Evidence of such behavior would indicate that the respondent did not make the trade-
off exercise. Listing the selection choices by plan number and respondent identifier 
indicated no such behavior, although short of a case-by-case analysis such behavior 
cannot entirely be ruled out. 
A fourth test involved examining the completion times for the various survey 
sections. Table 11 shows the completion times for each of the six choice situations 
and the RP and sociodemographic (non-choice) sections. As explained above, 
surveys completed in less than 3.5 minutes were removed from the dataset. Despite 
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removing these observations, Table 11 still shows minimum values for several 
choice situations and the non-choice section that appears low. However, as 
respondents might have based their decisions on a few attribute levels only (e.g., 
price), these observations should not be removed. Empiricism implies that 
respondents learn the concept of the trade-off exercise in Choice Situation 1 and 
become increasingly experienced throughout the survey. Thus, one would expect a 
negative correlation between the number of the choice situation and the completion 
time. The data weakly confirmed this expectation as beyond Choice Situation 1, 
there was a monotonic decrease in mean competition times. The exception to this 
general trend is Choice Situation 3, which required almost as much time to complete 
as Choice Situation 1. This, however, is due to the fact that one respondent was 
logged into the system for over 1,440 minutes (approximately 24 hours). In fact, 
without this observation, the mean completion time for Choice Situation 3 was 0.80 
minutes. Maximum completion times offer no insights as respondents might have 
temporarily stopped completing the survey, yet remained logged into the survey 
server. 
 
Table 11 
Survey Completion Times in Minutes 
Completion time Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Choice situation 1 489 3.55  39.88  0.25  879.65  
Choice situation 2 489 0.93  1.06  0.05  18.28  
Choice situation 3 489 3.75  65.04  0.10  1,440.08  
Choice situation 4 489 0.75  2.34  0.08  45.98  
Choice situation 5 489 0.62  0.65  0.10  7.52  
Choice situation 6 489 0.67  1.23  0.08  16.30  
Non-choice sections 489 8.96  5.95  0.08  1,173.42  
 
A significant percentage decline in completion times for the last choice 
situations might indicate the presence of respondent fatigue. This occurs when 
respondents select their plan choices based not on the attribute levels but on 
nonsystematic (e.g., pick any plan) or systematic (e.g., pick a plan in order of 
appearance) reasons. Respondent fatigue is widely discussed in the survey literature 
(see, e.g., Backor, Golde, & Nie, 2007; Bennett & Nair, 2008; Biderman, 1967; Hart, 
Rennison, & Gibson, 2005). Respondent fatigue can manifest itself in many different 
ways, and no one method exists to test for it. The completion times for Choice 
Situation 5 and Choice Situation 6 were 18% and 11%, respectively, below the time 
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for Choice Situation 4. Some decline in completion time is expected, and the 
differences in time are not necessarily indicative of respondent fatigue. However, 
repeating the regression of select on plan for only Choice Situation 5 and Choice 
Situation 6 revealed the presence of respondent fatigue. 
Table 12 shows that the order in which the survey respondents saw the plans 
was a statistically significant factor in their selection of mobile plan. Although not 
large in magnitude, the negative parameter sign indicates that the respondents 
favored the plan alternatives in descending order in which they saw them. This 
dependency is not present if all choice situations are considered. It also is not present 
for the first four choice situations. Hence, respondent fatigue seems to be limited to 
Choice Situation 5 and Choice Situation 6. This finding must be taken into 
consideration when fitting a model to the data. The order in which the mobile plans 
were presented to the survey respondents was random. Consequently, respondent 
fatigue will likely not bias the results. However, it also might not add any further 
information to the model, thus it could be removed from the dataset. 
 
Table 12 
Choice Order Regression Results—Choice Situations 5 and 6 
Source SS df MS    
     Number of obs 4890.00 
Model 2.63 1.00 2.63  F(1, 4888) 10.99 
Residual 1170.97 4888.00 0.24  Prob > F 0.00 
     R-squared 0.00 
Total 1173.60 4889.00 0.24  Adj R-squared 0.00 
     Root MSE 0.49 
select Coefficient Std. err. t P>t [95% Conf. interval] 
plan -0.03 0.01 -3.31 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 
_cons 0.46 0.02 24.64 0.00 0.42 0.49 
 
Model Fitting 
This section fits various versions of the MNL to the survey data. The analysis 
commences with a general (non-mixed) exploded logit model. The LR index along 
with several other considerations serves to compare its results to the results of a 
mixed exploded logit model. The LR index is only meaningful when comparing 
models where one model is a subset of the other model. For instance, the LR index 
increases with the number of model variables. Hence, unlike the 2R , it cannot be 
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used to compare models with different variables. The standard exploded logit model 
is a special case of the mixed exploded logit model in that the former assumes the 
parameter variances to be zero. Hence, the LR index can be used to compare the two 
models. For all other model comparisons, a likelihood-ratio test (LRT) must be used. 
This test takes the following general form (Train, 2009): 
 
(38) LRT 2( ( ) ( ))
R U
LL LL    , 
 
where ( )
R
LL   is the maximum of the log-likelihood function of the restricted model 
and ( )
U
LL   is the maximum value of the unrestricted model. The restricted model 
is the model under the null hypothesis 
0H . For instance, in order to analyze whether 
interaction terms are statistically significant, the restricted model is a model where 
the coefficients of the interaction terms under consideration are zero. The 
unrestricted model is the alternative hypothesis AH . It is a model that includes the 
interaction terms. The difference in equation (38) is chi-squared distributed with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions (Train, 2009). In this example, 
it is the number of interaction terms excluded from the restricted model. Because the 
log-likelihood function is always negative, the LRT is simply twice the difference in 
maximum values of the restricted and unrestricted model. If this value exceeds the 
critical value of the chi-square distribution with the appropriate degrees of freedom, 
then the null hypothesis is rejected (Train, 2009). 
Model fit. In the search for the best model, several models are fitted to the 
survey data. A first model (Model 1) examines core pricing variables, including the 
variables described in the theoretical model (and to which the design matrix was 
optimized to), in addition to a dummy variable that distinguishes high volume voice 
minute plans from low volume voice minute plans. While economic theory might 
suggest a negative coefficient for voice overage charges, the sample contains both 
high and low voice minute volume users. Low voice minute users by definition have 
no overage charges and therefore voice overage charges are likely irrelevant. High 
voice minute users might select plans with high monthly allowances, thereby 
avoiding overage charges. Thus, the coefficient for the voice overage charges might 
be statistically insignificant. In lieu, subscribers might place a premium on high 
volume plans, relative to low volume plans. 
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Model 2 is identical to Model 1 with the exception that it examines the 
removal of the variable for voice overage charges. With the core specifications 
settled, Model 3 relaxes the assumption of zero coefficient variances that is 
embedded in the standard logit model. Specifically, it assumes that all coefficients 
are distributed normal. A mixed exploded logit model achieves this objective, 
assuming that preference parameters are independent of each other. A drawback of 
Model 3 is that due to the symmetry of the normal distribution, a certain percentage 
of subscribers might have coefficients with signs opposite to the signs of the 
coefficients for the mean subscriber. For price coefficients, this would mean that a 
percentage of subscribers might have positive price coefficients. This is counter to 
economic theory. To remedy this potential shortfall, Model 4 examines to augment 
Model 3 by replacing the normal distribution with the lognormal distribution. This 
change in coefficient distribution ensures price coefficients to be fully negative. 
Finally, Model 5 introduces sociodemographic variables in the form of gender and 
age. 
Table 13 presents the results of Model 1. It fits the data using a general (non-
mixed) exploded logit model. This model focuses on the choice behavior of the 
average consumer. Thus, it does not consider sociodemographic variables, which 
serve to forecast beyond the mean, addressed separately. In an effort to derive the 
demand determinants, all mobile service plan attributes are included in this model. 
Furthermore, economic theory postulates that consumers consider all price attributes 
when making the purchase decision. This is particularly true for non-voice mobile 
services, such as Internet browsing and texting. In contrast to mobile voice services, 
subscribers generally do not know how to calculate their consumption of data 
services on a monthly basis. For instance, subscribers do not know the size of an 
email or an Internet browsing session. Consequently, subscribers might react 
adversely to high prices for these services, whereas subscribers understand mobile 
voice services, which they consume on a per-minute basis. Additionally, mobile 
phones typically include a counter that further informs subscribers of the length of a 
mobile voice call. The hypothesis is that subscribers purchase mobile service plans 
that include sufficiently large monthly voice allowances, thereby minimizing the 
probability of incurring voice overage charges. For instance, Consumer Reports 
(2011) found that 33% of U.S. mobile subscribers consume less than half of their 
monthly voice allowance. Thus, the expectation is that voice overage charges are 
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statistically insignificant. Furthermore, with an average monthly mobile voice 
consumption of approximately 700 minutes (FCC, 2010b; CTIA, 2011), the marginal 
utility that subscribers derive from plans that offer less minutes than this 
consumption level might differ from plans that exceed this level. To test this latter 
hypothesis, Model 1 includes a dummy variable (dummy_high) that takes the value 
of one if the monthly voice allowance exceeds 700 minutes and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 13 
Model 1: Exploded Logit 
Number of obs 14670      
Number of groups 5868      
Obs per group       
min 2.00      
average 2.50      
max 3.00      
LR chi2(10) 1018.17      
Prob > chi2 0.00      
Log likelihood -4747.94      
select Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 95% Conf. interval 
phone -0.0026 0.0001 -24.390 0.000 -0.0028 -0.0024 
mrc -0.0084 0.0004 -19.070 0.000 -0.0093 -0.0075 
voiceallow (per 100) 0.0045 0.0012 3.740 0.000 0.0021 0.0068 
dataallow (per 100) 0.0034 0.0007 4.530 0.000 0.0019 0.0048 
download (per 100) 0.0019 0.0009 2.100 0.036 0.0001 0.0036 
v_over 0.0365 0.1644 0.220 0.824 -0.2858 0.3588 
d_over -0.3083 0.1489 -2.070 0.038 -0.6001 -0.0165 
text -0.6225 0.1212 -5.140 0.000 -0.8601 -0.3849 
phone_type 0.2956 0.0351 8.420 0.000 0.2268 0.3644 
term_length -0.0097 0.0014 -7.160 0.000 -0.0124 -0.0071 
dummy_high 0.3972 0.0475 8.360 0.000 0.3041 0.4904 
 
There are 2 x 6 = 12 choice observations per survey respondent. In fitting the 
data to the logit model, Stata requires reshaping and entering of the survey data in 
the ―long format.‖ Consequently, the number of observations as reported by Stata 
and shown in Table 13 differs from the number of choice situations discussed thus 
far. In the long format, each row is a choice alternative. The variable select indicates 
whether the survey respondent selected or rejected the alternative. In selecting the 
first choice, the survey respondent faced three choice alternatives, selecting one. In 
the long format, this translates into three observations—one for each choice 
alternative faced. In the second choice, the survey respondent faced the remaining 
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two alternatives, again selecting one. This results in two additional observations. 
Hence, the long format has five observations per choice situation for a total of 
5 x 6= 30 observations per completed survey. With 489 valid surveys, this results in 
14,670 observations. In fitting the exploded logit model, Stata requires a group 
identifier that links all choice alternatives that the decision maker considered jointly. 
In selecting the most preferred mobile plan, the survey respondent compared three 
choice alternatives. In selecting the least preferred plan, the survey respondent 
compared the remaining two choice alternatives. Hence, there are two groups of 
unique decisions per choice situation—one with three observations and one with two 
observations. At 489 surveys and six choice situations each, this results in 5,868 
groups. 
Considering several diagnostic tests, this model fits the data well. The z-score 
tests the null hypothesis of the coefficient to be zero. It is the ratio of the parameter 
estimate and the corresponding standard errors (Kennedy, 2008). With the parameter 
estimate distributed normal over repeated samples, this ratio also is distributed 
normal. Table 13 lists both the z-score for each logit coefficient as well as the 
probability for the null hypothesis to be accepted. Of the 11 coefficients, eight are 
significant at the 99% confidence level and two are significant at 95%. As expected, 
at 18%, the overage charge for voice service (v_over) is statistically insignificant. 
A Hausman-McFadden test of IIA (Hausman & McFadden, 1984) indicates 
no presence of IIA. Specifically, consistent with IIA failure, the coefficient estimates 
for a two-choice conjoint exercise are larger in magnitude than the estimates for the 
full set of alternatives. Furthermore, the following Hausman-McFadden IIA test 
statistic yields a negative value: 
(39)  
' 1Hausman-McFadden IIA test ( ) ( )C A A C C A   
     , 
where A and C  are the AVC matrices for a two-choice conjoint exercise 
(eliminating choice alternative 3) and for the full set of alternatives, respectively. A  
and C  are the respective vectors of parameter estimates. If IIA holds, this test 
statistic is distributed chi-square with 11 degrees of freedom. The negative value 
indicates that the test statistic is not chi-square distributed, hence, confirming the 
absence of IIA in Model 1. 
The signs of the model coefficients correspond with economic theory. 
Specifically, the price for the mobile phone (phone) is negative, indicating a 
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downward sloping demand function for mobile phones. Similarly, the other 
statistically significant price coefficients are also negative. These include the 
monthly recurring charge (mrc), data overage charges (d_over), and SMS charges 
(text). Voice and data allowances, download speed, phone type, and the dummy 
indicating plans with high voice minutes (dummy_high) all carry positive signs. For 
these variables, an increase in attribute level translates into higher utility and, ceteris 
paribus, a decrease in price. Thus, a positive coefficient is expected. The length of 
the term contract is similar to a price, and, ceteris paribus, longer-term contracts are 
akin to a price increase. Hence, one expects a negative sign. Finally, the variable for 
voice overage charges (v_over) is statistically not different from zero and not 
considered further. This finding confirms the hypothesis that subscribers understand 
the pricing of mobile voice minutes and purchase mobile service plans with a 
sufficiently large monthly voice allowance as to avoid the relatively high overage 
charges. Consumer Reports (2011) further confirms this hypothesis in its finding that 
33% of U.S. mobile subscribers consume less than half of their monthly allowance. 
In contrast, data overage charges are statistically significantly. This implies that the 
per kilobyte pricing is not well understood by consumers as they are not aware of 
how much data allowance is consumed by a data application, such as Internet 
browsing of emailing. Table 14 summarizes the results of Model 2, which excludes 
the voice overage charge. 
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Table 14 
Model 2: Exploded Logit 
Number of obs 14670      
Number of groups 5868      
Obs per group       
min 2.00      
average 2.50      
max 3.00      
LR chi2(10) 1018.12      
Prob > chi2 0.00      
Log likelihood -4747.96      
select Coefficient Std. error z P>|z| 95% Conf. interval 
phone -0.0026 0.0001 -24.44 0.00 -0.0028 -0.0024 
mrc -0.0084 0.0004 -19.23 0.00 -0.0093 -0.0076 
voiceallow (per 100) 0.0043 0.0011 4.03 0.00 0.0022 0.0065 
dataallow (per 100) 0.0034 0.0007 4.60 0.00 0.0020 0.0048 
download (per 100) 0.0019 0.0009 2.10 0.04 0.0001 0.0036 
d_over -0.3068 0.1487 -2.06 0.04 -0.5984 -0.0153 
text -0.6228 0.1212 -5.14 0.00 -0.8603 -0.3853 
phone_type 0.2950 0.0350 8.43 0.00 0.2264 0.3636 
term_length -0.0097 0.0014 -7.20 0.00 -0.0124 -0.0071 
dummy_high 0.3991 0.0468 8.53 0.00 0.3074 0.4908 
 
Model 1 and Model 2 assumed a zero variance for all parameter estimates. 
Model 3 relaxes this assumption by fitting a mixed exploded logit model, thereby 
remedying the IIA problem and allowing for consumer-specific parameters. Unlike 
the general (non-mixed) exploded logit model, statistical software packages typically 
do not provide integrated commands for this model. Stata provides a downloadable 
add-in, mixlogit, which allows fitting mixed logit models. However, the procedure 
requires the same group specification as the standard logit model discussed above. 
Consequently, it treats the 12 decisions made by one survey respondent as if 12 
different survey respondents made them. This particular treatment might lead to 
inaccurate estimators for the parameter means and standard deviations. Hence, 
software code for Matlab by MathWorks and provided by Train (2006) is used 
instead. Table 15 presents the results of Model 3, a mixed exploded logit model with 
all parameters distributed normal. While mean coefficient estimates differ from the 
estimates in Model 2, there is no apparent drift in values and only a slight change in 
statistical significance. 
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Table 15 
Model 3: Mixed Exploded Logit—Normal 
 Mean Standard deviation 95% Conf. int.  
Variable Coeff. 
Std. 
error 
z Coeff. 
Std. 
error 
z Low High Share<0 
phone -0.0037 0.0002 -18.50 0.0028 0.0002 14.00 -0.0092 0.0018 0.91 
mrc -0.013 0.0008 -16.25 0.0122 0.0009 13.56 -0.0369 0.0109 0.86 
voiceallow 0.0082 0.0018 4.56 0.0123 0.0034 3.62 -0.0159 0.0323 0.25 
dataallow 0.0053 0.0011 4.82 0.0088 0.0017 5.18 -0.0119 0.0225 0.27 
download 0.0015 0.0013 1.15 0.0062 0.0033 1.88 -0.0107 0.0137 0.40 
d_over -0.6504 0.1983 -3.28 0.4571 0.4559 1.00 -1.5463 0.2455 0.92 
text -0.8379 0.1709 -4.90 1.3157 0.3585 3.67 -3.4167 1.7409 0.74 
phone_type 0.4629 0.0572 8.09 0.7706 0.0731 10.54 -1.0475 1.9733 0.27 
term_length -0.0125 0.0021 -5.95 0.0236 0.0029 8.14 -0.0588 0.0338 0.70 
dummy_high 0.5224 0.0672 7.77 0.6393 0.0795 8.04 -0.7306 1.7754 0.21 
log-likelihood (at convergence) -4516.84 
 
As shown in Table 15, the mixed exploded logit model estimates two 
coefficients per independent variable. The first coefficient estimates the mean value 
of the coefficient, whereas the second coefficient estimates its standard deviation. As 
the estimates themselves are random variables, the two coefficient estimates have 
standard errors and z-scores. The general (non-mixed) exploded logit model is a 
subset of the mixed exploded logit model in that the former assumes the coefficients 
for the standard deviation to be zero. Hence, the LR index compares the fit of Model 
3 relative to Model 2. The denominator of the value LR-Index is the value of the log-
likelihood function at the first iteration with all starting values set at zero. The LR 
index for Model 2 is: 
 
(40) Model2
4747.96
LR-Index 1 0.097.
5257.02

  

 
 
The LR index for Model 3 is: 
 
(41) Model3
4516.84
LR-Index 1 0.141
5257.02

  

. 
 
Because the value LR-Index for Model 3 is larger than for Model 2, Model 3 explains 
the decisions taken by the survey respondents more accurately and therefore provides 
a superior fit relative to Model 2. All the coefficients for the mean parameters in 
Model 3 carry the expected signs and with the exception of download are all 
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statistically significant. The coefficients for the standard deviations are statistically 
significant, with the exception of d_over and download. Individual univariate Wald 
tests examine the hypotheses of the download and d_over standard deviation 
coefficients to be zero. Since variance estimates are constraint to be positive, the 
testing of these hypotheses involves inequalities. An LRT with inequality constraints 
in nonlinear models is not chi-square distributed (Wolak, 1991) and thus is not the 
appropriate test. Univariate one-sided Wald tests are used instead: 
 
(42) 
2
0( )
var( )
x
x
 



 , 
 
where x  is the coefficient estimate of the standard deviation of attribute x and 0  is 
the value of the same under the null hypothesis (Enders, 2010). Since the test 
examines whether the coefficient of a particular standard deviation is zero, 0 0  . 
Thus: 
 
(43) 
2
2( 0)
,
var( ) var( )
x x
x x
 

 
 
   
 
 
 
 
which is simply the square of the z-score reported in Table 15. The univariate Wald 
statistic is chi-square distributed with one degree of freedom. With 10 possible 
individual Wald tests in Model 3, a Bonferroni correction leads to a significance 
level of the chi-square distribution of 0.005 or 0.01 for a one-sided test.15 This, in 
turn, yields a critical value of 6.635. Table 16 lists the Wald statistics for each of the 
standard deviation coefficients. 
 
                                              
15
 A Bonferroni correction adjusts the significance level of a hypothesis test by allowing individual 
comparisons while maintaining the model‘s overall error rate (Galambos, 1977). The correction 
simply divides the typical significance level of 5% by the number of individual tests.  
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Table 16 
Wald Statistics—Standard Deviation Coefficients 
Variable z-score Wald statistic 
phone 14.00 196.00 
mrc 13.56 183.75 
voiceallow 3.62 13.09 
dataallow 5.18 26.80 
download 1.88 3.53 
d_over 1.00 1.01 
text 3.67 13.47 
phone_type 10.54 111.13 
term_length 8.14 66.23 
dummy_high 8.04 64.67 
 
The table reveals that the null hypothesis (of download and d_over having standard 
deviations of zero) cannot be rejected. This finding implies that decision makers do 
not differ materially in their preferences for differences in download speeds and data 
overage charges. Practically, it means that the coefficients for these two attributes 
should remain nonstochastic. Table 17 reports the results of this modified Model 3 in 
which all variables, except download and d_over are stochastic and assume a normal 
distribution. 
 
Table 17 
Model 3-1: Mixed Exploded Logit Model—Normal 
 Mean Standard deviation  95% Conf. int.  
Variable Coeff. Std. 
error 
z Coeff. Std. 
error 
z  Low High Share<
0 
phone -0.0037 0.0002 -18.50 0.0028 0.0002 14.00  -0.0092 0.0018 0.9004 
mrc -0.0127 0.0008 -15.88 0.0122 0.0009 13.56  -0.0366 0.0112 0.8504 
voiceallow 0.0080 0.0017 4.71 0.0123 0.003 4.10  -0.0161 0.0321 0.2582 
dataallow 0.0052 0.0010 5.20 0.0055 0.0022 2.50  -0.0056 0.0160 0.1725 
text -0.7467 0.1729 -4.32 -1.5102 0.3145 -4.80  2.2133 -3.7067 0.6892 
phone_type 0.4860 0.0584 8.32 0.8177 0.0753 10.86  -1.1167 2.0887 0.2754 
term_length -0.0122 0.0021 -5.81 0.0256 0.0028 9.14  -0.0624 0.0380 0.6835 
dummy_high 0.5236 0.0682 7.68 0.7132 0.0821 8.69  -0.8743 1.9215 0.2312 
           
 Coeff. Std. 
error 
z        
download 0.0016 0.0013 1.23        
d_over -0.5985 0.1980 -3.02        
 
Finally, an LRT examines the hypothesis of nonstochastic variable download 
to be zero. A model without download is the restricted model. It forms the null 
hypothesis. Model 3-1, as shown in Table 17, is the alternative model, or unrestricted 
model. Per equation (38), the LRT for these models is: 
 
 98 
 
(44) LRT 2( 4520.50 ( 4519.68)) 1.64      . 
 
The mathematical difference in equation (44) is distributed chi-square with 
one degree of freedom. The critical value of a chi-square (1) for a 95% confidence 
level is 3.84. Because 1.64 < 3.84, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Consequently, under the model specifications of Model 3-1, removing the variable 
download provides a superior fit. 
Model 3 assumes that coefficients follow a normal distribution. Given the 
symmetry of this distribution type, model coefficients close to zero or with a 
relatively large standard deviation will necessarily result in economic theory not 
supporting the selection of some subscribers. Table 17 reports the share of the 
normal distribution that is smaller than zero. For instance, the estimated mean for the 
price coefficient of a mobile phone (phone) is −0.0037 and the estimated standard 
deviation of the same coefficient is 0.0028. The reported share below zero is 0.90, 
which implies that 90% of subscribers have negative price coefficients. Conversely, 
given the relationship between the estimated mean and standard deviation, 1 – 0.90 = 
10% of subscribers seem to prefer mobile phones that are more expensive. Similarly, 
the share of the normal distribution for the coefficient of SMS prices (text) that is 
below zero is 69%, implying that 31% of subscribers appear to prefer higher SMS 
prices. These and other similar observations are clearly unreasonable. Subscribers 
might prefer higher priced phones relative to lower priced phones if it also means 
that the higher priced phone offer more functionality or prestige. However, given the 
D-optimal design matrix, higher priced phones are not correlated with more 
functionality. 
To remedy this apparent shortfall, Model 4 fits a mixed exploded logit model 
with all parameters distributed lognormal. The lognormal distribution has positive 
values only and eliminates the possibility of a sign change within a random 
parameter estimate. In essence, it ensures that the share < 0 is always zero. To fit this 
model, all variables with negative coefficients were multiplied by −1.16 Software 
code by Train (2006) for Matlab was used to execute Model 4. A summarized 
understanding of this algorithm follows as it assists in interpreting the model‘s 
specifications and results. 
                                              
16
 The extension ―_neg‖ indicates variables such as phone_neg and mrc_neg. 
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By definition, the log of a lognormal distribution is a normal distribution. A 
lognormal distribution is typically defined by the parameters of this underlying 
normal distribution (Mood, Graybill, & Boes, 1974). Hence, the code by Train 
(2006) derives the lognormal coefficients by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
of the log value of the lognormal coefficients. These parameter estimates serve as the 
basis for the lognormal coefficients. Specifically, the algorithm draws from a 
standard normal distribution for each of the 20 coefficients specified in Model 3 and 
489 survey respondents. The algorithm multiplies the resulting matrix by a vector of 
starting values for the standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution and 
sums it with a vector of starting values for the mean for the same distribution. The 
resulting matrix is exponentiated, thereby becoming a draw from a lognormal 
distribution. Based on these values, the algorithm computes the average logit 
probabilities for each survey respondent. These average probabilities are the 
simulated approximation of the mixed logit probabilities, evaluated at the starting 
value vectors. The log-likelihood function is calculated as the sum of the logged 
average probabilities over all survey respondents. The algorithm maximizes the log-
likelihood function numerically by repeating these calculations with different mean 
and standard deviation vectors for the underlying normal distribution. The looping 
procedure ends when no further improvement in the log-likelihood function is found 
(e.g., the log-likelihood function of the lognormal model is maximized). 
In order for the model to estimate the lognormal coefficients, it is necessary 
to specify the most accurate starting values for the means and standard deviations of 
the normal distributions that give rise to the lognormal model.17 Model 3 provides 
vectors for the estimated means n  and standard deviations n  of normal distributed 
coefficients. These vectors serve as starting values for the estimated means and 
standard deviations of lognormal distributed coefficients. As explained, the simulated 
maximum likelihood estimation routine maximizes a normal distribution upon which 
it derives estimates for lognormal distributed coefficients. Thus, rather than setting 
starting values equal to the vectors n  and n , the means and standard deviations of 
the normal distribution underlying the lognormal model must be derived. Solving the 
                                              
17
 In deriving the lognormal coefficients, the software code by Train (2006) makes 100 draws per 
survey respondent maximizing the log-likelihood function of a normal distribution. The code converts 
the individual values of this underlying normal distribution by calculating the exponent values from 
which it calculates lognormal means and standard deviations. 
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equation of the mean of a lognormal distribution for the mean of the underlying 
normal distribution   yields: 
 
(45) ln( )
2
n
n

   . 
 
Similarly, solving the equation of the variance of a lognormal distribution for 
the variance of the underlying normal distribution   yields: 
 
(46) 
ln( )
3
n
  . 
 
Based on these starting values, Model 4 fits a mixed exploded logit model 
with all coefficients distributed lognormal. Following Train (2009), Table 18 
presents the estimated parameters of the underlying normal distribution of Model 4. 
These coefficients are the log values of the lognormal coefficients. As such, they 
have no direct interpretation by themselves and only serve to examine the 
specifications of the resulting lognormal coefficients. 
 
Table 18 
Model 4: Mixed Exploded Logit—Parameter Estimates 
 Mean of log-coefficients Standard deviation of log-coefficients 
  Estimate Std. error z Estimate Std. error z 
phone_neg -5.8077 0.0691 -84.0478 0.8481 0.0653 12.9877 
mrc_neg -4.7468 0.0976 -48.6352 1.1018 0.0926 11.8985 
voiceallow -6.0218 0.5553 -10.8442 2.7094 0.308 8.79675 
dataallow -6.0708 0.4371 -13.8888 1.4404 0.2851 5.05226 
download -7.6611 1.1188 -6.8476 1.7945 0.3488 5.14478 
d_over_neg -1.2328 0.7544 -1.63415 0.8723 0.5337 1.63444 
text_neg -1.1938 0.4339 -2.75133 1.5716 0.2346 6.69906 
phone_type -1.8847 0.3511 -5.36799 1.8261 0.282 6.47553 
term_length_neg -5.0726 0.2695 -18.8223 1.4567 0.1603 9.08734 
dummy_high -1.5618 0.3581 -4.36135 1.0577 0.2437 4.34017 
log likelihood (at convergence) - 4437.43  
 
With a log-likelihood at convergence of −4437.43, Model 4 is superior to 
Model 3. Interestingly, while Model 3 finds download insignificant, in Model 4, the 
variable is significant at the 95% level. The variable d_over_neg, however, remains 
statistically insignificant at 95%. A Wald test examines whether specifying the 
coefficient for d_over_neg as nonstochastic (null hypothesis) yields a model that is 
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superior to Model 4. The critical value for the chi-square distribution with one degree 
of freedom at 1% significance level is 6.635. The Wald test finds a score of 2.67 and 
thus cannot reject the null hypothesis. Hence, as in Model 3, the variable d_over 
remains nonstochastic.  
Table 19 presents the results of Model 4-1, which specifies d_over as a fixed 
coefficient variable. 
 
Table 19 
Model 4-1: Mixed Exploded Logit—Parameter Estimates 
 Mean of log coefficients Standard deviation of log coefficients 
 Estimate Std. error z Estimate Std. error z 
phone_neg -5.8280 0.0681 -85.58 0.8190 0.0765 10.71 
mrc_neg -4.8055 0.1004 -47.86 1.1618 0.0836 13.90 
voiceallow -5.8815 0.5537 -10.62 2.5982 0.2963 8.77 
dataallow -5.8697 0.3718 -15.79 1.2935 0.2873 4.50 
download -9.7343 2.2184 -4.39 2.8566 0.8833 3.23 
text_neg -1.5093 0.5571 -2.71 1.9231 0.3250 5.92 
phone_type -1.8609 0.3804 -4.89 1.7261 0.3083 5.60 
term_length_neg -4.8968 0.2109 -23.22 1.2797 0.1063 12.04 
dummy_high -1.3616 0.2936 -4.64 0.8014 0.2275 3.52 
       
log likelihood (at convergence) -4,448.87    
 
Table 20 presents the estimated medians, means, and standard deviations that 
result from this underlying normal distribution. 
 
Table 20 
Model 4-1: Mixed Exploded Logit—Lognormal 
Variable Distribution Median Mean Std. dev. 
phone Lognormal -0.0029 -0.0041  0.0040  
mrc Lognormal -0.0082 -0.0161  0.0268  
voiceallow Lognormal 0.0028 0.0773  1.1046  
dataallow Lognormal 0.0028 0.0064  0.0128  
download Lognormal 0.0001 0.0034  0.0774  
text Lognormal -0.2211 -1.4140  6.4312  
phone_type Lognormal 0.1555 0.6856  2.5155  
term_length Lognormal -0.0075 -0.0169  0.0323  
dummy_high Lognormal 0.2563 0.3535  0.3324  
  Coefficient Std. error z 
d_over Fixed 0.4242 0.191 2.22 
 
Consistent with the existing literature, the standard errors of the underlying 
normal distribution serve to examine the specifications of the lognormal model (e.g., 
Revelt & Train, 1998; Train 2009). Further, given the asymmetry of the lognormal 
distribution, the standard deviations offer only a general indication of the data 
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spread.18 A large standard deviation relative to its mean indicates that subscribers 
have different opinions about the value of certain mobile plan attributes. For 
instance, subscribers seem to have diverging views on the value of the monthly voice 
allowance, the price of SMS, and the type of phone offered. 
Addressing respondent fatigue. Table 12 revealed respondent fatigue 
for Choice Situation 5 and Choice Situation 6. For these choice situations, the order 
in which the survey presented the mobile plans contributed in a statistically 
significant manner with regard to the probability of a respondent selecting a choice 
alternative. With a random presentation of mobile service plans, this finding should 
theoretically not bias the results. Model 4-2 removes Choice Situation 5 and Choice 
Situation 6 and fits the remaining data with the specifications of Model 4-1. As in 
Model 4-1, all coefficients are distributed lognormal, with the exception of d_over, 
which is nonstochastic.  
 
Table 21 and  
Table 22 present the results of this derivative of Model 4-1. 
 
Table 21 
Model 4-2: Mixed Exploded Logit—Parameter Estimates 
 Mean of log coefficients Standard deviation of log coefficients 
 Estimate Std. error z Coefficient Std. error z 
phone_neg -5.8565 0.0838 -69.89 0.9738 0.094 10.36 
mrc_neg -4.5873 0.0987 -46.48 0.9313 0.0924 10.08 
voiceallow -6.9949 0.8954 -7.81 3.4166 0.5483 6.23 
dataallow -5.4206 0.2992 -18.12 -0.1433 0.7548 -0.19 
download -5.4841 0.4074 -13.46 0.0573 1.3231 0.04 
text_neg -0.4245 0.2931 -1.45 1.2262 0.1661 7.38 
phone_type -1.1215 0.2419 -4.64 1.2571 0.2281 5.51 
term_length_neg -4.9017 0.3167 -15.48 1.4897 0.1849 8.06 
dummy_high -2.3256 0.7346 -3.17 1.8456 0.4915 3.76 
       
log likelihood (at convergence) -2,975.79    
 
 
                                              
18
 Importantly, the standard deviations are not indicative of the accuracy of the estimators. The 
accuracy of the estimators is measured in the standard error shown in Table 18. 
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Table 22 
Model 4-2: Mixed Exploded Logit—Lognormal 
Variable Distribution Median Mean Std. dev. 
phone Lognormal -0.0029 -0.0046 0.0058 
mrc Lognormal -0.0102 -0.0157 0.0183 
voiceallow Lognormal 0.0009 0.3642 17.5625 
dataallow Lognormal 0.0044 0.0045 0.0006 
download Lognormal 0.0042 0.0042 0.0002 
text Lognormal -0.6541 -1.4134 2.9259 
phone_type Lognormal 0.3258 0.7147 1.3501 
term_length Lognormal -0.0074 -0.0227 0.067 
dummy_high Lognormal 0.0977 0.5226 2.1873 
  Coefficient Std. error z 
     
d_over Fixed 0.5464 0.2688 2.03 
 
A Hausman specification test examines the null hypothesis of Model 4-2 and 
Model 4-1 to produce both consistent estimators. If the Hausman specification test 
accepts the null hypothesis, Model 4-2 and Model 4-1 produce identical results. If so, 
removing Choice Situations 5 and 6 does not improve the fitted model. Under the 
alternative hypothesis, only Model 4-2 is consistent. If the Hausman specification 
test rejects the null hypothesis, Model 4-1 estimates are inconsistent, and removing 
Choice Situations 5 and 6 improves the fitted model. Following Hausman (1978), the 
Hausman test statistic is: 
 
(47) ' 14 2 4 1 4 2 4 14 2 4 1( ) ( ) ( )M M M MM Mm AVC AVC   

        , 
 
where 4 2MAVC   and 4 1MAVC   are the asymptotic covariance matrices of Model 4-2 
and Model 4-1, respectively. This statistic is chi-square distributed with k  degrees of 
freedom. With 10 independent variables and two coefficients each (mean and 
standard deviation) for the present models, k = 20. The null hypothesis is rejected 
when the Hausman test statistic exceeds the critical value of 31.4. Calculating m  for 
Model 4-2 and Model 4-1 produces a Hausman test statistic of 4.14, thereby 
accepting the null hypothesis. Thus, the removal of Choice Situations 5 and 6 is not 
necessary to produce consistent estimators and Model 4-1 remains. 
Considering sociodemographic differences. Thus far, the fitted 
models focused on the attributes of the hypothetical choices only. The standard 
deviations of Model 4-1 indicated that with the exception of d_over, survey 
respondents differed in their reactions to changes in attribute levels. This raises the 
question whether sociodemographic differences explain these taste variations and 
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whether adding these variables to Model 4-1 would improve further the model fit. By 
adding sociodemographic variables, the standard and mixed exploded logit models 
reflect potential sociodemographic differences in the selection of a mobile service 
plan. However, the sociodemographic information for a respondent n  does not vary 
across choice alternatives. Thus, 
inV  also does not vary, provided there is no new 
information for the logit model specified in equation (9), 
inP  in particular. 
Consequently, if entered as standalone independent variables, the logit model omits 
them. In order to consider sociodemographic variables in logit models, these 
variables must be interacted with the main effect variables, thereby creating the 
required variation across alternatives (Train, 2009). By interacting the 
sociodemographic variables with choice attributes, the z-statistic does not provide 
information as to the significance, or lack thereof, of the sociodemographic variables. 
Instead, it only provides information on the interaction term. Hence, in order to 
examine whether the sociodemographic variables are statistically significant, 
hypothesis testing is required. 
As discussed in the literature review section, the existing literature provides 
little guidance as to which sociodemographic variables should be included in the 
model, if any. Although different in significant aspects, the present study is most 
similar to Iimi (2005) and Tripathi & Siddiqui (2009). Neither of these studies found 
sociodemographic variables to be statistically significant. The latter study, however, 
reported different coefficient estimates by age and gender. As shown in Table 1, age 
and gender appear to be the most frequently considered sociodemographic variables 
in the literature. Income is also frequently considered, but only in studies that 
examine aggregate levels of mobile demand, such a cross-country comparison (e.g., 
Garbacz & Thompson, 2007). Importantly, income has not been considered in 
studies where the consumer is the unit of analysis. Thus, Model 5 adds age and 
gender as fixed coefficient variables to Model 4-1. The variable age is interacted 
with phone and divided by 10,000. The variable gender is interacted with mrc and 
divided by 1,000.19 Table 23 and Table 24 present the parameter estimates and 
lognormal medians, means, and standard deviations for Model 5. 
 
                                              
19
 The divisions are necessary in order to generate absolute starting values (and thus logit 
coefficients) larger than 0.1. At starting values smaller than 0.1, the Matlab code is unable to 
maximize the log-likelihood function. 
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Table 23 
Model 5: Mixed Exploded Logit—Parameter Estimates 
 Mean of log of coefficients Standard deviation of log-coefficients 
 Estimate Std. error z Estimate Std. error z 
phone_neg -5.7965 0.0679 -85.37 0.82 0.0662 12.39 
mrc_neg -4.6687 0.1265 -36.91 1.0516 0.1017 10.34 
voiceallow -6.0014 0.5472 -10.97 2.6886 0.3008 8.94 
dataallow -6.0589 0.4379 -13.84 1.4302 0.2844 5.03 
download -7.9043 1.2902 -6.13 1.8707 0.387 4.83 
d_over_neg -0.8453 0.9434 -0.90 0.2329 3.6754 0.06 
text_neg -1.1783 0.4404 -2.68 1.538 0.2447 6.29 
phone_type -1.8838 0.3539 -5.32 1.8195 0.2897 6.28 
term_length_neg -5.0683 0.2681 -18.90 1.4503 0.1603 9.05 
dummy_high -1.5656 0.361 -4.34 1.0414 0.2504 4.16 
log likelihood (at convergence) -4428.73 
 
Table 24 
Model 5: Mixed Exploded Logit—Lognormal 
Variable Distribution Median Mean Std. dev. 
phone Lognormal -0.0030 -0.0042 0.0041 
mrc Lognormal -0.0094 -0.0162 0.0225 
voiceallow Lognormal 0.0025 0.1065 2.1191 
dataallow Lognormal 0.0023 0.0064 0.0163 
download Lognormal 0.0004 0.0021 0.0106 
d_over Lognormal -0.4294 -0.4413 0.1043 
text Lognormal -0.3078 -0.9897 2.8644 
phone_type Lognormal 0.1520 0.7825 3.5619 
term_length Lognormal -0.0063 -0.0181 0.0475 
dummy_high Lognormal 0.2090 0.3599 0.5193 
  Coefficient Std. error z 
age_interaction Fixed -0.4450 0.1085 4.10 
gender_interaction Fixed 1.1306 1.2703 0.89 
 
The LRT score that compares Model 4 (restricted) to Model 5 (unrestricted) 
is 50.60, clearly exceeding the critical value of 5.99, thereby rejecting the null 
hypothesis that these socioeconomic variables have coefficients of zero. A univariate 
one-sided Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis of d_over being nonstochastic. 
Hence, Model 5-1 respecifies Model 5 by defining d_over as a fixed coefficient 
variable. Table 25 and Table 26 present the parameter estimates and lognormal 
medians, means, and standard deviations for Model 5-1. Appendix H contains the 
covariance matrix for Model 5-1. 
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Table 25 
Model 5-1: Mixed Exploded Logit—Parameter Estimates 
 Mean of log of coefficients Standard deviation of log-coefficients 
 Estimate Std. error z Estimate Std. error z 
phone_neg -5.7816 0.0674 -85.78 0.8043 0.0715 11.25 
mrc_neg -4.6736 0.1262 -37.03 1.0518 0.0967 10.88 
voiceallow -5.9611 0.5215 -11.43 2.6188 0.3043 8.61 
dataallow -6.1022 0.5578 -10.94 1.4831 0.4493 3.30 
download -8.0862 1.4286 -5.66 1.9329 0.4253 4.54 
text_neg -1.3937 0.5098 -2.73 1.7141 0.2827 6.06 
phone_type -1.8069 0.3046 -5.93 1.7144 0.2283 7.51 
term_length_neg -5.1307 0.2957 -17.35 1.5041 0.1881 8.00 
dummy_high -1.4487 0.3150 -4.60 0.9079 0.2642 3.44 
       
log likelihood (at convergence) -4,427.584 
 
Table 26 
Model 5-1: Mixed Exploded Logit—Lognormal 
Variable Distribution Median Mean Std. dev. 
phone Lognormal -0.0031 -0.0043 0.0040 
mrc Lognormal -0.0093 -0.0161 0.0224 
voiceallow Lognormal 0.0026 0.0913 1.6604 
dataallow Lognormal 0.0022 0.0067 0.0183 
download Lognormal 0.0003 0.0020 0.0110 
text Lognormal -0.2482 -1.0786 4.1441 
phone_type Lognormal 0.1642 0.6997 2.6406 
term_length Lognormal -0.0059 -0.0182 0.0505 
dummy_high Lognormal 0.2349 0.3553 0.4044 
  Coefficient Std. error z 
age_int Fixed -0.4479 0.1085 -4.13 
gender_int Fixed 1.0965 1.2696 0.86 
d_over Fixed -0.4371 0.196 -2.23 
 
The LRT rejects removing gender_int, which shows a low z-score in its 
parameter estimate. Consequently, adding the sociodemographic variables to Model 
4 further improves the model fit. This finding also provides some resolution to the 
relevant literature as it provides direct proof of the relevancy of sociodemographic 
variables. 
The age interaction term (age_int) is calculated as follows: 
 
(48) 
( )
age_int
10000
n in
n
age age phone 
 , 
 
where age  is the mean age of the survey respondents. Hence, age_int measures the 
sensitivity on phone for each year a respondent‘s age differs from the mean age. 
Specifically, the coefficient of −0.4479 indicates that for each year of age, the 
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coefficient for phone decreases by 0.4479 /10000 0.00004479   , approximately 
1%. For instance, a consumer 50-years old has a phone coefficient of 
0.0043 ((0.4479 /10000) (54 44.4)) 0.00473      , which is 10% higher than at the 
age of 44.4 years. Alternatively, a person 20-years old has a phone coefficient of 
0.0043 ((0.4479 /10000) (20 44.4)) 0.00321      , which is 25% lower than at the 
age of 44.4 years. 
The interpretation of the gender interaction term is straightforward. Gender is 
a dummy variable with ―0‖ indicating man, and ―1‖ indicating woman. The variable 
is interacted with mrc and divided by 1,000. The resulting coefficient of 1.0965 
indicates that the coefficient for mrc for men and women is −0.0161 and 
0.0161 (1.0965 /1000) 0.0150    , respectively. Stated differently, the survey 
indicates that women are 7% less sensitive to mrc than men are. 
D-optimality of fitted model. A compelling aspect of this study was the 
application of efficient design to telecommunication services. As demonstrated with 
the significant reduction in D-error through the efficient design routine, D-efficient 
design has the potential of significantly improving the accuracy of the parameter 
forecasts. A core requirement of D-efficient design is prior knowledge of the ultimate 
model‘s specification, including its parameter values. In most instances, however, 
prior knowledge of the model specification and/or coefficients is not available. In 
fact, if it were, it might render a subsequent study redundant. This, in turn, raises the 
question whether the gains from optimization are robust to deviations in model 
specifications. 
Table 5 provides the specifications of the ex-ante model upon which Ngene 
optimized the design matrix for the SP survey. Table 6 lists the D-error of the 
optimized design matrix for the specification of the ex-ante model at 0.0001346 at 
approximately 1.5 million iterations, which is a 40% improvement over its starting 
value. Appendix B shows the optimized design matrix for this study. 
Model 5-1 differs from the ex-ante model in two aspects. First, instead of a 
standard logit model, Model 5-1 is a mixed logit model with lognormal distributed 
coefficients. Second, the coefficients estimated by Model 5-1 differ from the pilot 
study coefficient because the pilot study produced different estimates than the actual 
survey and due to the inclusion of three additional variables in the final model (e.g., 
dummy_high, age_int, and gender_int). To test the robustness of the benefits from D-
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optimization, the D-error of the optimized design matrix is calculated using the 
specifications of Model 5-1 (rather than the pilot model). This error measure then is 
compared to the D-errors of 30 randomly created design matrices that are also 
evaluated using the specifications of Model 5-1. Rather than optimizing the attribute 
levels across the design matrix, these ―chance matrices‖ draw their attribute levels at 
random. 
Ngene allows mixed logit models in its optimization routine. However, at 
present, the software can only optimize mixed logit models for uniform and normal 
distributions. In the absence of lognormal distributions in Ngene’s optimization 
routine, the D-errors of the design matrix and the 30 chance matrices are evaluated 
under two model specifications. The first specification is Model 5-1, as presented 
above with all variables distributed lognormal. The second specification is Model 5-1 
with all variables distributed normal. Although not used, this second specification 
normalizes for any optimality loss due to differences in the coefficient distribution. 
Table 27 presents the results of this comparison. 
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Table 27 
D-Optimality Comparisons 
Design D-error 
(Model 5-1—Lognormal) 
D-error 
(Model 5-1—Normal) 
Chance1 0.1209 0.0075 
Chance2 0.0876 0.0076 
Chance3 0.0704 0.0078 
Chance4 0.0635 0.0075 
Chance5 0.0854 0.0078 
Chance6 0.0805 0.0073 
Chance7 0.0710 0.0071 
Chance8 0.0791 0.0080 
Chance9 0.0943 0.0080 
Chance10 0.0908 0.0068 
Chance11 0.1032 0.0077 
Chance12 0.1043 0.0071 
Chance13 0.0919 0.0068 
Chance14 0.0804 0.0070 
Chance15 0.0864 0.0072 
Chance16 0.0858 0.0067 
Chance17 0.0729 0.0072 
Chance18 0.0784 0.0071 
Chance19 0.0781 0.0071 
Chance20 0.0886 0.0067 
Chance21 0.0940 0.0074 
Chance22 0.0773 0.0082 
Chance23 0.0811 0.0077 
Chance24 0.0810 0.0075 
Chance25 0.0778 0.0075 
Chance26 0.0986 0.0076 
Chance27 0.0984 0.0070 
Chance28 0.0712 0.0076 
Chance29 0.0841 0.0075 
Chance30 0.1328 0.0078 
Av_chance 0.0870 0.0074 
Optimized 0.0878 0.0088 
 
The first column shows the D-error of 30 randomly drawn design matrices 
evaluated under Model 5-1 with nine of the 10 design variables distributed 
lognormal. The remaining design variable (d_over) is fixed. The second column 
shows the D-errors of the same design matrices evaluated under a derivative of 
Model 5-1. Under this derivative, instead of the lognormal distribution, the nine 
design variables are distributed normal. The average D-error value of these 
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evaluations is then compared to the D-error of the design matrix initially optimized 
under the ex-ante model. The average D-error of the chance matrices evaluated under 
the lognormal version of Model 5-1 is 0.0870. This compares to the D-error of 
0.0878 of the optimized design matrix evaluated under the same model. Similarly, as 
evaluated under normal version of Model 5-1, the average chance D-error is 0.0074 
compared to the D-error of the optimized matrix of 0.0088. The D-error for the 
optimized matrix is higher when evaluated against the average of both benchmark 
models. This indicates that for the present study the potential benefits from D-
optimization could not be retained due to differences between the pilot model and the 
final model (i.e., Model 5-1). Under the fitted model, a chance design would have 
generated equally accurate forecasts as the optimized design did. 
Notwithstanding, Table 28 illustrates that if the model specification is known 
at the survey design stage, efficient survey design stands to significantly improve the 
D-error of the design matrix and thereby the accuracy of the study. There is an 83% 
improvement in the D-error when the design matrix is optimized based on the 
specifications of Model 5-1. 
 
Table 28 
Ngene Optimization Results with Perfect Foresight 
Statistics Value 
D-error start 0.135723 
D-error end 0.022749 
Total iterations 62,257 
Last iteration with improvement 62,041 
Improvement (%) 83% 
 
Hence, for D-efficient design to be applied successfully to other studies, fundamental 
research needs to address how the potential benefits can be retained. 
Results Interpretation 
The findings of this study, summarized in Table 26, clearly demonstrate that 
subscribers consider far more than the mobile phone when selecting a mobile service 
plan. In fact, subscribers consider most, if not all, of the pertinent aspects of the 
mobile service bundle, including: 
 The price of the mobile phone where higher mobile phone prices make a 
service bundle less attractive (mean: -0.0043, standard deviation: 0.0040) 
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 The monthly recurring charge where higher monthly charges make a service 
bundle less attractive (mean: -0.0161, standard deviation: 0.0224) 
 The number of monthly voice minutes included in the mobile service plan 
where more minutes make a service bundle more attractive (mean: 0.0913, 
standard deviation: 1.6604) 
 The amount of monthly data uploads and downloads included in the mobile 
service plan with more kilobytes making a service bundle more attractive 
(mean: 0.0067, standard deviation: 0.0183) 
 The speed of data downloads where higher speeds make a service bundle 
more attractive (mean: 0.0020, standard deviation: 0.0110) 
 The charge per kilobyte of data uploads and downloads in excess of the 
monthly data upload and download allowance where higher prices make a 
service bundles less attractive (mean: -0.4371, standard deviation: n/a) 
 The charge for SMS where higher prices make a service bundle less attractive 
(mean: -1.0786, standard deviation: 4.1441) 
 The type of mobile phone offered with the service bundle with Smartphones 
being more desirable than non-Smartphones (mean: 0.6997, standard 
deviation: 2.6406) 
 The length of the term contract where a shorter term makes a service bundle 
more attractive (mean: -0.0182, standard deviation: 0.0505) 
 Whether the monthly voice minutes included in the mobile service plan offer 
more than the national average of 700 minutes per month where plans in 
excess of this level make a service bundle more attractive (mean: 0.3553, 
standard deviation: 0.4044) 
In addition, consumers place additional value on mobile plans that offer more 
voice minutes than the average consumption level of 700 minutes per month. 
Decision making differs by age and gender. For each additional year of age, 
subscribers become approximately 1% more sensitive to changes in mobile phone 
prices. Women are approximately 7% less sensitive to changes in MRCs. 
The significance of this first set of findings is that researchers and policy 
makers must examine mobile demand as part of a bundled offering instead of 
analyzing bundle components on a standalone basis, as has been the case thus far. 
Alternatively, if justifiable, researchers must ensure that other service attributes are 
constant throughout the study. For instance, in estimating the impact of term 
contracts on consumers, Mierzwinski et al. (2005) treated contract length as the 
single determinant of consumer welfare. Not surprisingly, Mierzwinski et al. found 
that consumers preferred short-term contracts or no contract at all. Based on this 
finding, Mierzwinski et al. concluded that term contracts hurt consumers. Counter to 
the empirical evidence presented herein, Mierzwinski et al. assumed that consumers 
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selected contract lengths independently from other plan attributes. Model 5-1, 
however, shows that consumers trade-off several plan attributes when selecting a 
mobile service plan and term length is only one attribute among several that affects 
consumer choice. Similarly, none of the relevant literature on mobile demand 
determinants treated demand from a service bundle perspective. 
Beyond interpreting the number of significant independent variables and the 
signs of the coefficients, independent interpretation of the coefficients provides little 
insight. Based on equation (6), the logit coefficients measure the change in utils 
based on a change in one or several independent variables. However, the change in 
utils is difficult to understand, which is counter to other regression models, such as 
OLS where a change in the dependent variable often provides direct applicability. 
Further, per equation (9), an increase in utils does not translate into a linear increase 
in the logit probability. Instead, the forecasted utils for a mobile service plan requires 
insertion into the probability equation for logit models. Based on this complexity, 
relative interpretation of the logit coefficients is required. Relative interpretation 
assesses the impact on utils of one independent variable compared to the impact on 
utils of another independent variable. It allows for a richer interpretation of core 
issues than individual coefficient analysis and provides unique practical insights. 
Table 29 presents all possible relative coefficient interpretations for Model 5-1. 
 
Table 29 
Relative Coefficient Interpretation Model 5-1 
 phone mrc voice 
allow 
data 
allow 
down 
load 
d_over text phone 
type 
term 
length 
dummy 
high 
phone 1.00 0.27 -0.05 -0.64 -2.15 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.24 0.01 
mrc 
3.74 1.00 -0.18 -2.40 -8.05 0.04 
-
0.01 -0.02 0.88 0.05 
voiceallow -21.23 -5.67 1.00 13.63 45.65 -0.21 0.08 0.13 -5.02 -0.26 
dataallow -1.56 -0.42 0.07 1.00 3.35 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.37 -0.02 
download -0.47 -0.12 0.02 0.30 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.01 
d_over 
101.65 27.15 -4.79 -65.24 
-
218.55 1.00 
-
0.41 -0.62 24.02 1.23 
text -
250.84 
-
66.99 11.81 160.99 539.30 -2.47 1.00 1.54 -59.26 -3.04 
phone_type -
162.72 
-
43.46 7.66 104.43 349.85 -1.60 0.65 1.00 -38.45 -1.97 
term_length 
4.23 1.13 -0.20 -2.72 -9.10 0.04 
-
0.02 -0.03 1.00 0.05 
dummy_high 
82.63 22.07 -3.89 -53.03 
-
177.65 0.81 
-
0.33 -0.51 19.52 1.00 
 
 113 
 
Relative coefficient interpretation reveals the subscriber‘s marginal 
willingness to pay for an attribute relative to another attribute. Not all comparisons 
are meaningful or find applicability in the marketplace. Hence, this analysis focuses 
only on a subset of the possible combinations. The core issues in strategy, policy, and 
regulation often include the price for the mobile phone and the MRC. This is not a 
coincidence as these price attributes represent the highest unit charge in a mobile 
service plan. Other price components, such as the price of an SMS, are mainly usage 
driven. Hence, the natural argument is to examine the trade-off space or util-
equivalent space relative to these price attributes. Specifically, the relative 
interpretation of mrc relative to phone is examined first. This analysis is followed by 
the relative interpretation of phone_type and phone, and term_length and phone. The 
variables voice_allow, data_allow, download, d_over, and text are evaluated relative 
mrc. 
The MRC coefficient reveals that 44-year-old male subscribers are indifferent 
between a $1 change in the MRC and a $3.74 equidirectional change in the mobile 
phone price. As the cost of a mobile phone is a one-time fee and the MRC is a 
recurring charge, this implies that such subscribers amortize their mobile phones 
over approximately four months. Over the life of a two-year contract, a total discount 
in MRC of $24 is equivalent to an upfront discount of $3.74. This implies a discount 
rate of 25.9%. This result is consistent with the previous relevant literature. For 
instance, Hausman (1979), in examining individual discount rates in the purchase 
and utilization of energy-using durables, found a discount rate of 20%. Similarly, 
Dubin and McFadden (1984) found a discount rate of 20.5% for electric appliances. 
Hausman (2002) discussed the importance of these tradeoffs in the development of 
mobile telecommunications demand. 
As illustrated in Figure 4, due to the sociodemographic interaction terms, this 
amortization period changes by age and gender. 
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Figure 4. Mobile Phone Amortization Period by Age and Gender 
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Figure 4. For male subscribers, the mobile phone amortization period decreases by 
1% for each additional year beyond the average age and increases by the same 
amount for each year below this age level. The sensitivity for female subscribers also 
varies by age, but the difference in gender offsets this curve by 7% relative to men. 
 
 
The corollary of this finding is that service providers can recover mobile 
phone discounts by increasing the MRC. However, only a fraction of the mobile 
phone discount is recoverable over any given month. For instance, for 44-year-old 
male subscribers, a maximum of 1 ÷ 3.74 = 0.27, or 27%, is recoverable over any 
given month. Hence, service providers must ensure that these subscribers remain 
with them for at least four months in order to recover the mobile phone discount. If a 
subscriber remains with the service provider for more than four months, the service 
provider stands to make a profit from the initial discount. Alternatively, with most 
U.S. mobile subscribers being contractually obligated to remain with a service 
provider for 24 months, the service provider can opt for a lesser increase in the MRC 
and recover the discount over a longer period. 
The relative interpretation of the coefficient for the mobile phone price and 
the mobile phone type finds a marginal willingness to pay for Smartphones of $163 
over non-Smartphones. This finding is generally consistent with the price differential 
between Smartphone and non-Smartphones observed in the marketplace. For 
instance, Verizon Wireless offers most of its Smartphones for $99 to $299 and its 
non-Smartphones for $0 to $99—a differential of approximately $200. As before, 
this figure is specific to 44-year-old male subscribers. Younger subscribers are 
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willing to pay more for a Smartphone than older subscribers are. For instance, an 18-
year-old subscriber is willing to pay $224 for a Smartphone, whereas the maximum 
willingness to pay for a 70-year-old subscriber is merely $128. 
Service providers commonly impose term contracts with ETFs to compensate 
for mobile phone subsidies. The relative interpretation of the mobile phone price and 
the term-length coefficients reveals that the average-aged subscribers are willing to 
pay an additional $4.23 for each month deducted from a term contract. A typical 
term contract is 24 months. This implies that average-aged subscribers are willing to 
pay an additional 24 x $4.23 = $101.52 for the mobile phone in order to avoid a term 
contract. Conversely, the average subscriber prefers a term contract of 24 months to 
paying the full retail price for a mobile phone for all mobile phones offered at a 
discount of $101 or more. For instance, Verizon Wireless offers a 32-Gigabyte (GB) 
iPhone 4 for $299 with a 24-month term contract. Without the term contract, Verizon 
Wireless sells the same phone for $750. The discount of $450 implies that 
subscribers prefer to purchase the mobile phone in conjunction with a term contract. 
Again, the sensitivity to term contracts varies by age. Eighteen-year-old subscribers 
are willing to pay $140 in order to avoid a term contract, whereas 70-year-old 
subscribers are willing to pay $80. 
Closely linked to the MRC is the number of monthly voice minutes included 
in a mobile service plan. Model 5-1 finds that male subscribers are willing to pay an 
additional $5.67 a month for each additional 100 minutes of voice usage. Female 
subscribers are willing to pay $6.08 for each additional 100 minutes of voice usage. 
Ceteris paribus, Verizon Wireless offers 450 voice minutes for $39.99 per month and 
900 voice minutes for $59.99 per month. Thus, Verizon Wireless charges $0.09 per 
minute under the first plan and $0.07 per minute under the second plan. AT&T 
Mobility and other service providers charge $0.45 per minute for each minute 
beyond the monthly voice allowance. Model 5-1 reveals a willingness to pay of 
approximately $0.06 for male and female subscribers. This is almost eight times the 
voice overage charge but consistent with the price subscribers pay on average under 
their monthly voice allowance. Consequently, subscribers are not willing to pay a 
premium for voice minutes consumed beyond their monthly voice allowance. This 
means that subscribers purchase service plans that include a sufficient number of 
voice minutes. Hence, as observed, voice overage charges do not contribute in a 
statistically significant manner to mobile service plan selection. Related to this 
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finding, male consumers are willing to pay an additional $22.07 for mobile service 
plans with a voice allowance in excess of 700 minutes. Female subscribers are 
willing to pay $23.68. This maximum willingness to pay for high-volume voice plans 
is consistent with the pricing differentials between low- and high-volume voice 
plans. For instance, Verizon Wireless and other service providers offer their 450-
minute (low) voice plans for $20 less than their 900-minute (high) voice plans. 
Model 5-1 finds that male and female subscribers are willing to pay an 
additional $0.42 and $0.45, respectively, in the MRC for each additional 100 
kilobytes (kB) of data allowance. AT&T charges subscribers without a data plan 
$2.00 per Megabyte (MB) of data (http://www.att.com). At 1,024 kB per MB, this 
translates to $0.20 per kB. Similarly, Verizon Wireless charges $0.19 per kB of data 
for pay-as-you-go data subscribers. Hence, Model 5-1 finds a maximum willingness 
to pay for additional data allowances that is higher than prices in the marketplace. 
Similarly, male subscribers are willing to pay an additional $2.71 a month for each 
$0.10 change in the per kB data overage charge. The maximum willingness to pay 
for female subscribers for the same is $2.91. Unlike voice overage charges (which 
are invoiced per minute), service providers typically invoice data overage charges in 
rather large increments. For instance, for subscribers who exceed the 75 MB data 
allowance of the $10 data plan, Verizon Wireless bills the subscriber $10 for an 
additional 75 MBs of data. This overage charge applies regardless of whether the 
subscriber exceeded the data plan allowance by one byte or the entire additional 75 
MBs. Assuming that the average subscriber who incurs a data overage charge uses 
half of this overage allowance, this implies that Verizon charges $10 ÷ (75 ÷ 2) = 
$0.27 per MB, or $0.0003 per kB. In order to avoid this data overage charge, 
subscribers would be willing to pay only a fraction of a cent increase in the MRC. 
Stated differently, male and female subscribers are not willing to increase their MRC 
to avoid data overage charges. In contrast to voice overage charges, this result 
implies that subscribers are willing to incur data overage charges. 
As found by Dippon (2010), the current download speed impediments of 3G 
mobile service are a significant deterrent of 3G take-up. Model 5-1 demonstrates that 
male subscribers are willing to pay an additional $0.12 in the MRC for each 
additional 100 kilobits per second (kbps) download speed. Female subscribers are 
willing to pay $0.13. At current mobile speeds of approximately 1,000 kbps, service 
providers that can increase their mobile download speeds from the current levels to 
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5,000 kbps, thus making them comparable to standard DSL service, can charge an 
additional (4,000 ÷ 100) x 0.12 =$4.80 in the MRC. LTE, often referred to as 4G, 
promises rates far in excess of standard DSL. Verizon Wireless recently announced 
that its 4G network delivers 5,000–12,000 kbps when downloading data 
(http://www.verizonwireless.com). If so, average subscribers are willing to pay a 
premium ranging from $4.80 to $13.20 per month to enjoy this service. 
U.S. service providers offer SMS on both a pay-per-use and a plan basis. For 
instance, AT&T Mobility, Verizon Wireless, and other service providers offer SMS 
at $0.20 per SMS sent and received. AT&T Mobility offers a $10 plan that includes 
1,000 SMSs and a $20 plan that provides unlimited SMSs. The former plan implies 
an SMS rate of $0.10 per SMS. Model 5-1 reveals that male subscribers are 
indifferent between a $0.10 change per SMS and a $6.70 equidirectional change in 
the MRC. For female subscribers, this amount is $7.19. This implies that non-plan 
subscribers (who currently pay $0.20) are willing to pay $13.40 (male) and $14.38 
(female) for an unlimited plan. Similarly, non-plan subscribers are willing to pay 
$6.70 (male) and $7.19 (female) to reduce their SMS rate to $0.10. These two 
findings indicate that AT&T‘s prices for its SMS plans are higher than the 
subscribers‘ maximum willingness to pay for this bundle component, as found by 
Model 5-1. The findings of Model 5-1 are more in line with the pricing structure of 
T-Mobile, which offers unlimited SMS for $10 a month, slightly below the indicated 
maximum willingness to pay. 
Strategy Implications 
U.S. service providers offer similar service plans. For instance, Verizon 
Wireless, AT&T Mobility, and Sprint all offer a monthly mobile service plan with 
900 voice minutes for $59.99. Additional charges such as $0.40 per minute for voice 
overage charges, an option for unlimited or almost unlimited data usage 
(Smartphones) for an additional $25.00 to $29.99, and an SMS plan with almost 
unlimited messaging at around $20 apply (see http://www.verizonwireless.com; 
http://wireless.att.com; http://www.sprint.com). Similarly, T-Mobile offers a monthly 
1,000-minute plan for $49.99 with a voice overage charge of $0.45, unlimited SMS 
for $10, and unlimited data for $30 (see http://www.t-mobile.com). The similar 
offerings, particularly among the three largest service providers (Verizon, AT&T, 
and Sprint) are indicative of market equilibrium. By deviating from this equilibrium 
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position, service providers can generate a profit, at least in the short run until other 
service providers follow suit. However, not all deviations are profitable, and some 
deviation strategies are better than other strategies. Short of trial and error, service 
providers can measure the price elasticities of demand for the various price (and even 
non-price) attributes and select the attribute changes that generate the largest demand 
response. 
Elasticities measure the impact on the dependent variable because of a change 
in one or more independent variables (Silverberg & Wing, 2000). Specifically, the 
elasticity of demand measures the impact on demand (measured in terms of market 
share) from a change in price or other product attributes levels. Following Silverberg 
and Wing (2000), the price elasticity of demand is: 
 
(49) 
1 0
1 0
0
1 0
1 0
( )
2
lim
( )
2
d
p
M M
M M
E
P P
P P
 

 
 
 

 
 
 
, 
 
where 0M  is the market share of a service provider in the default scenario and 1M  is 
the same providers‘ market share in the alternative scenario. 0P  and 1P  are the price 
or attribute levels of the service provider‘s service plan in the default scenario and in 
the alternative scenario, respectively. In the alternative scenario, the same service 
provider alters the attribute levels of one or more attribute of its service plan. If 
1dE  , demand is elastic; if 1dE  , demand is inelastic. 
Average logit probabilities generated by Model 5-1 calculate the probability 
of a subscriber selecting a specific mobile service plan. The median or mean logit 
probabilities of selecting a service plan are not equal to the logit probability of an 
average subscriber selecting the same plan (Train, 2009). Hence, the median and 
mean coefficients for Model 5-1 presented in Table 26 provide no information about 
the market shares obtained by the service providers offering these plans. Rather, 
random draws from the underlying normal distribution of the mixed logit model 
generate the probabilities that an average subscriber will select a specific service 
plan. Attributing these probabilities to the service providers yields forecasted market 
shares. Specifically, each coefficient of the standard deviation is multiplied by 
 119 
 
(0,1)  and added to the corresponding mean coefficient. The exponent of these 
values generates random coefficients for the lognormal distribution. These, in turn, 
generate logit probabilities that are averaged to calculate the average probability of 
selecting a specific plan. 
Table 30 summarizes the attribute levels of an illustrative market simulation 
with four service providers (Provider 1, Provider 2, Provider 3, and Provider 4) along 
with the average logit probabilities, or market shares. Each service provider is 
assumed to offer only the plan shown in the default scenario. The objective of this 
market simulation is to examine the market share gains and losses occurred by 
Provider 1 from deviating from the default scenario. It is noteworthy that since all 
plans in the default scenario are actual plans offered in the U.S. market place, this 
simulation is expected to approximate gains and losses incurred by a U.S. service 
provider that elects to introduce more innovative mobile service plans. 
This simulation assumes that mobile service providers tailor their strategies to 
average-aged subscribers. Given the higher price sensitivity of male subscribers 
relative to female subscribers, the simulation further assumes that mobile service 
providers target male subscribers. To illustrate the simulation concept, it assumes 
that each service provider offers only this single service plan. 
 
Table 30 
Default Scenarios and Market Shares 
 Provider 1 Provider 2 Provider 3 Provider 4 
phone 99.99 99.99 0.00 199.99 
mrc 74.99 54.99 59.99 69.99 
voiceallow (in 100s) 9.00 4.50 9.00 10.00 
dataallow (in 100s) 20.48 7.68 0.00 20.48 
download (in 100s) 14.10 8.77 7.95 8.68 
d_over 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.30 
Text 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.00 
phone_type 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
term 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 
dummy_high 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
logit probability 23.16% 29.19% 32.31% 15.34% 
 
Taking Provider 1 as an example, a first possible competitive strategy is to 
vary mobile phone prices. An increase or decrease in the current illustrative mobile 
phone price for Provider 1 results in different market shares for the service provider 
(see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Logit Probability—Provider 1 
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Figure 5. Consistent with Figure 1, Figure 5 presents Provider 1‘s market share as a 
function of its mobile phone price. A negative mobile phone price would indicate 
that Provider 1 would issue a credit to the subscriber‘s account. Thus, the subscriber 
would receive the mobile phone free in addition to getting the credit. 
 
 
Table 31 shows the underlying data for Figure 5 and calculates the elasticity 
of demand for changes in mobile phone prices. For instance, if Provider 1 decreased 
its mobile phone price from $99.99 to zero, it could potentially achieve a market 
share of 34.01%. This is a 47% increase of its market share in the default scenario 
(23.16%). Alternatively, if Provider 1 raised its price for the mobile phone from $99 
to $200, its market share would approach 15%, a decrease of 35%. The price 
elasticity of demand for Provider 1‘s service plan reveals that with a mobile phone 
price of approximately $200 and higher the service provider faces elastic demand.20 
In this range of the demand curve, the percentage of the market share change is 
greater than the percentage price decrease. Alternatively, for mobile phone prices 
below $200, Provider 1 faces inelastic demand. Practically, this finding means that if 
Provider 1 sought to decrease its mobile phone prices it should remain in the elastic 
range of the demand curve. Alternatively, if the service provider were to increase 
mobile phone prices, it could minimize the market share impact of this change by 
remaining in the inelastic range of the demand curve. 
 
                                              
20
 Unit elasticity is at $258. 
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Table 31 
Price Elasticity of Demand: Provider 1 Mobile Phone Prices 
Price Market share % Change Elasticity 
$2,000 0.00% n/a n/a 
$1,800 0.00% n/a n/a 
$1,600 0.01% n/a -17.00 
$1,400 0.03% 200.00% -7.50 
$1,200 0.09% 200.00% -6.50 
$1,000 0.26% 188.89% -5.34 
$800 0.73% 180.77% -4.27 
$600 2.07% 183.56% -3.35 
$400 5.73% 176.81% -2.35 
$200 15.00% 161.78% -1.34 
$0 34.01% 126.73% -0.39 
-$200 60.06% 76.60% 0.28 
-$400 81.30% 35.36% 0.45 
-$600 92.55% 13.84% 0.32 
-$800 97.24% 5.07% 0.17 
-$1,000 99.00% 1.81% 0.08 
-$1,200 99.64% 0.65% 0.04 
-$1,400 99.87% 0.23% 0.01 
-$1,600 99.95% 0.08% 0.01 
-$1,800 99.98% 0.03% 0.00 
-$2,000 99.99% 0.01% 0.00 
 
Alternatively, Provider 1 could change its MRC by increasing or decreasing it. 
In Table 32, Provider 1 increases and decreases its MRC from its default rate of 
$74.99. At current prices and above, the service provider faces elastic demand. In 
this range of the demand curve, the market penalizes service operators that seek to 
increase the MRC and rewards those that decrease their prices (albeit, possibly only 
in the short run). 
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Table 32 
Price Elasticity of Demand: Provider 1 MRC 
Price Market share % Change Elasticity 
$600 0.00% n/a n/a 
$500 0.01% n/a -11.00 
$400 0.07% 600.00% -6.75 
$300 0.43% 514.29% -5.04 
$200 2.72% 532.56% -3.63 
$100 15.70% 477.21% -2.11 
$0 56.16% 257.71% -0.56 
-$100 89.47% 59.31% 0.23 
-$200 98.17% 9.72% 0.14 
-$300 99.70% 1.56% 0.04 
-$400 99.95% 0.25% 0.01 
-$500 99.99% 0.04% 0.00 
 
Provider 1 could also alter its term contract requirements. Currently, AT&T, 
Verizon, and Sprint generally require 24-month contracts. Provider 1 could either 
shorten or prolong its term length. By decreasing the number of required term 
months, Provider 1 could make its service plan more attractive relative to other 
service providers, thereby gaining market share. By increasing the term length, 
Provider 1 would lose market share. However, it could offset this loss by increasing 
mobile phone subsidies. The longer contract lengths ensure that Provider 1 can 
profitably recover the larger mobile phone discount. As Table 33 shows, the price 
elasticity of demand with respect to term length is inelastic in the range of zero to 36 
months. This implies that at least as a standalone strategy decreasing the term length 
from its current 24 months is not an effective competitive strategy. In contrast, the 
inelastic region of the demand curve between 24 months and 36 months might 
provide a profit opportunity for Provider 1. 
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Table 33 
Price Elasticity of Demand: Provider 1 Term Reduction 
Term Market share % Change Elasticity 
0 31.10% n/a n/a 
1 30.74% -1.16% -0.01 
2 30.38% -1.17% -0.02 
3 30.03% -1.15% -0.03 
4 29.68% -1.17% -0.04 
5 29.33% -1.18% -0.05 
6 28.98% -1.19% -0.07 
7 28.63% -1.21% -0.08 
8 28.29% -1.19% -0.09 
9 27.95% -1.20% -0.10 
10 27.61% -1.22% -0.12 
11 27.28% -1.20% -0.13 
12 26.94% -1.25% -0.14 
13 26.61% -1.22% -0.15 
14 26.29% -1.20% -0.16 
15 25.96% -1.26% -0.18 
16 26.64% 2.62% 0.40 
17 25.32% -4.95% -0.84 
18 25.00% -1.26% -0.22 
19 24.69% -1.24% -0.23 
20 24.38% -1.26% -0.25 
21 24.07% -1.27% -0.26 
22 23.76% -1.29% -0.28 
23 23.46% -1.26% -0.29 
24 23.16% -1.28% -0.30 
25 22.86% -1.30% -0.32 
26 22.57% -1.27% -0.33 
27 22.28% -1.28% -0.34 
28 21.99% -1.30% -0.36 
29 21.70% -1.32% -0.38 
30 21.42% -1.29% -0.38 
31 21.13% -1.35% -0.42 
32 20.86% -1.28% -0.41 
33 20.58% -1.34% -0.44 
34 20.31% -1.31% -0.44 
35 20.04% -1.33% -0.46 
36 19.77% -1.35% -0.48 
 
Given Senator Kohl‘s allegation of price fixing for SMS, it is also 
informative to examine whether changes in SMS prices prove effective. In the 
default scenario, Provider 1‘s service bundle does not include a plan for SMS. Thus, 
each SMS sent and received costs the subscriber $0.20. Evaluated against the service 
bundles of other mobile services providers, which all include SMS plans in this 
illustrative default scenario and thus lower SMS rates, Table 34 examines the market 
reaction to decreases in Provider 1‘s SMS rate. 
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Table 34 
Price Elasticity of Demand: Provider 1 SMS Price Reduction 
Price Market share % change Elasticity 
$0.20 23.16% n/a n/a 
$0.15 23.89% 3.15% -0.11 
$0.10 24.64% 3.14% -0.08 
$0.05 25.40% 3.08% -0.05 
$0.00 26.18% 3.07% -0.02 
 
As before, a price decrease leads to inelastic demand responses. This finding 
is interesting from at least two perspectives. First, given that a monopolist would not 
set its price in the inelastic region of the demand curve, this finding sheds doubt on 
Senator Kohl‘s allegations. Second, it demonstrates that decreasing the SMS rate is 
not an effective competitive strategy, as subscribers do not sufficiently care about the 
level of SMS prices for it to be an effective competitive strategy. 
Although strategies that are more competitive exist, service providers might 
want to pursue, an effective strategy could also entail altering more than one service 
attribute. For instance, in Table 35, a combinational strategy for Provider 1 is 
examined. In this strategy, Provider 1 increases the term length to 36 months, 
provides a free mobile phone, and varies increases in the MRC to obtain a positive 
net effect. In the default scenario, Provider 1 has a market share of 23.16%. Offering 
free mobile phones and increasing the term length to 36 months boosts the service 
provider‘s market share by 28% to 29.65 %. At this rate, Provider 1 must bear the 
revenue loss from offering free mobile phones. If it increased the MRC by $5 per 
month over the previous scenario, it would retain a market share of 27.68%. This is 
still higher than the default market share by 20%. By increasing revenue by $5 per 
month, Provider 1 increases revenue by $5 x 36 = $180 over the subscriber‘s lifetime. 
Offsetting the mobile phone subsidy of $99.99, this yields a net revenue increase of 
$80.01 per subscriber in addition to the 4.5 points market share gain. Additionally, 
Provider 1 lowers its churn rate by contractually obligating subscribers to remain 
with the carrier for an additional 12 months beyond the original 24 months. 
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Table 35 
Combinational Competitive Strategy—Average Male Subscriber 
MRC Mobile phone Term Market share 
$74.99  $99.99  24 23.16% 
$74.99  $0  36 29.65% 
$79.99 $0  36 27.68% 
$84.99 $0  36 25.79% 
$89.99 $0  36 23.99% 
 
Given the high level of competition in the U.S. mobile market, other service 
providers are likely to follow suit, thereby cancelling the long-term benefits from 
competitive strategies. However, due to the term-length requirements, service 
providers that pioneer a profitable strategy stand to enjoy a two- to three-year first-
mover advantage. 
Policy Implications 
The study‘s findings also provide valuable information on a number of 
critical policy decisions pending before the FCC and state regulators. Most generally, 
the regulators must consider the entire service bundle when examining market 
behavior or alleged market failures. Considering individual service attributes in 
isolation yields incorrect results and thus incorrect regulation and policy. For 
instance, the FCC and U.S. Congress still discuss term contracts separate from all 
other service attributes. Policy makers, as well as several class action plaintiffs, 
accuse AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and others of harming subscribers by requiring term 
contracts with ETFs. The allegations do not consider that these service providers 
offer term contracts in conjunction with several other attributes. Similarly, 
MetroPCS, a regional service provider, currently airs advertisements in which it 
promotes its absences of ―stupid term contracts.‖ The relative evaluation of the 
coefficients for mobile phone price and the MRC has shown a marginal willingness 
to pay of $101 in terms of mobile phone prices to avoid a term contract. However, a 
closer look at MetroPCS‘ mobile phone pricing structure finds prices that exceed by 
more than $101 the prices of other service providers that demand term contracts. For 
instance, MetroPCS sells the Smartphone BlackBerry Curve 8530 for $199 without 
contract (see http://metropcs.com). AT&T Mobility sells the same handset for $0.01 
with a two-year contract (see http://www.att.com). Similarly, Verizon Wireless sells 
the handset for $79.99 (see http://www.verizonwireless.com). Hence, from a welfare 
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perspective, MetroPCS‘ offering is inferior to the offerings by these other service 
providers. Yet, due to the incorrect analysis of ETFs, MetroPCS is not subject to the 
federal investigation. The study also demonstrates that varying term lengths from 
zero months to 36 months has little impact on subscribers‘ decisions, as all changes 
within this range fall in the inelastic range of the demand curve. 
The study highlights the importance of offering spectrum that, in turn, will 
increase mobile upload and download speeds. Specifically, subscribers are willing to 
pay a premium of up to $13.20 over the current MRC in order to obtain LTE mobile 
speeds. With most unlimited data plans around $30 per month, this implies that 
subscribers are willing to increase their MRC by 45% in order to obtain LTE. The 
high willingness to pay illustrates the high priority that subscribers place on the 
increase in mobile upload and download speeds. The move to LTE could also have 
an impact on fixed-line broadband offerings. Currently, fixed-line broadband 
providers, such as Comcast, offer comparable Internet access at $34.99 per month 
(http://www.comcast.com). With consumers willing to pay $43.20 for mobile 
broadband offerings, subscribers place an $8.21 premium on mobile broadband 
relative to fixed-line broadband. Hence, fixed-line broadband providers will need to 
price their services at a differential larger than the $8.21 premium in order to 
maintain their subscriber base. 
Finally, in analyzing Senator Kohl‘s investigation of SMS prices, the study 
has shown that SMS prices might be set in the inelastic region of the demand curve. 
Such pricing behavior is inconsistent with monopoly or cartel price setting. 
Furthermore, as is the case in all other investigations, the study clearly shows that 
SMS pricing is only one attribute of the service bundle. Competition occurs at the 
service bundle level. Consequently, bundles that include discounted SMS prices 
directly compete with bundles that charge $0.20 for each additional SMS. Finally, 
the subscribers‘ marginal willingness to pay closely mirrors the U.S. service 
providers‘ pricing structures. 
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Conclusions 
The U.S. mobile sector is fiercely competitive as four nationwide service 
providers and approximately 30 regional service providers and mobile virtual 
network operators compete in a highly saturated market. Despite these conditions, or 
maybe due to these conditions, a key metric in valuing a mobile service provider is 
the number of new subscribers that it signs up. However, unlike the last decade when 
subscribers were just discovering mobile, in today‘s environment, new subscribers 
primarily originate from competitive actions, specifically, from innovative and 
competitive service offerings. This, in turn, requires that mobile service providers 
have a detailed and sophisticated understanding of mobile demand drivers. Without 
such an understanding, competitive actions become nothing more than a guessing 
game. 
Success stories, such as Apple‘s iPhone or RIM‘s Blackberry, lead the casual 
observer to believe that subscribers select mobile phone service based on the 
attractiveness and functionality of the mobile phone with little regard for monthly 
prices, minutes and data allowances, contract lengths, and other attributes. In fact, 
smaller U.S. mobile service providers have argued that Apple‘s refusal to offer the 
iPhone to them prevents them from competing. However, in the United States, 
mobile phones are generally not sold separately but as part of a larger mobile service 
bundle. This raises the question of whether the components of the bundle, other than 
the mobile phone, actually influence the subscriber‘s purchase decision and, if so, by 
how much. With the mobile phone clearly an important aspect of the bundle, what 
features of the mobile service plan shape the demand for the overall service bundle? 
Moreover, are subscribers willing to trade a less desirable mobile phone for a better 
service plan or vice versa? This study attempts to assess empirically the demand 
determinants for mobile phone service when the components are bundled for sale. 
The economic literature is replete with discussions on mobile diffusion and 
mobile demand determinants. The early literature on mobile demand focused mainly 
on FMS, the phenomenon that eventually ended fixed-line growth and caused fixed-
line service providers to divest their copper-based voice networks. Specifically, in 
the 1990s when mobile telephony was still in its infancy, researchers focused on the 
competitive impact that mobile had on fixed-line growth. The central research 
hypothesis of this stream of work was whether mobile telephony was an economic 
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substitute for POTS. With increasing coverage, free long distance, and decreasing 
service plan prices, mobile telephony became a commodity around the turn of the 
century. At that time, it also became clear that mobile services had a direct 
competitive effect on fixed services. Substitution was found initially in the demand 
for second lines, but it soon expanded to first lines as subscribers started ―cutting the 
cord‖ and abandoning their fixed lines altogether. With FMS well established, the 
literature refocused and concentrated on mobile diffusion instead. This stream of 
work studied the pace and drivers of mobile technology adoption. A central research 
question was how to forecast the saturation point of mobile demand. Many research 
papers attempted to determine mobile demand drivers and saturation points based on 
socioeconomic and demographic variables. Others looked at why countries differed 
with respect to mobile penetration. Time-series models, in particular S-curve models 
(e.g., Gompertz, 1825), feature prominently in this early research of mobile demand. 
Today, many nations have achieved 100% mobile penetration, where the 
number of people with subscriptions to a mobile service plan equals the number of 
citizens in a country. In fact, many European and Middle Eastern nations have 
exceeded 100% penetration as individuals with more than one mobile device have 
subscriptions to more than one mobile service plan. Even some poorer nations have 
over 75% mobile penetration rates as they ―leapfrog‖ technologies, bypassing a 
ubiquitous fixed-line network and introducing nationwide mobile networks instead. 
With mobile penetration approaching saturation, the recent literature examines how 
mobile service providers can continue to grow revenues in a saturated market. This 
focus is on the demand attributes of mobile telephony from a consumer perspective, 
answering the question of what attributes drive consumer demand. Some researchers 
have examined the interaction of SMS and mobile voice service, whereas others have 
examined whether the services are substitutes, thereby cannibalizing demand, or 
complements. 
The present study expands on this latest stream of the literature and examines 
consumer demand determinants for mobile phone service bundles. Specifically, it 
examines the effects and cross-effects of service bundle attributes on consumer 
demand. Although others have conducted similar studies using RP or market data for 
POTS, there does not appear to be any similar published work for mobile telephony. 
Furthermore, the present study expands on the existing body of literature in that it 
examines consumer demand in a postpaid-service bundled scenario where mobile 
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phone features and minutes-of-use or call prices are bundled with other service 
attributes, such as the number of allowed monthly voice minutes and the price of 
excess data usage. The previous literature focused on overall service demand and its 
dependency on sociodemographic variables and, at times, a few service attributes in 
a larger bundle. 
From a methodological viewpoint, the study employs a multinomial mixed 
exploded logit model based on consumer-stated-preference data obtained through an 
online survey. The design of this survey further expands the literature in that it 
employs efficient design, in particular D-efficient design. This is in contrast to the 
full factorial and fractional factorial (and mostly orthogonal) design used by the 
previous literature. The present study seems to be the first of its kind to apply 
efficient design to a mobile demand survey and possibly the first large scale 
application of D-optimal design. 
The objective of the D-optimal design is to minimize the determinant of the 
AVC matrix of the service bundle attributes. Practically, this method promises to 
yield a higher level of accuracy by producing a smaller standard error of the 
coefficient relative to nonefficient design methods with the same number of 
observations. Alternatively, D-optimal design stands to minimize the number of 
required observations to achieve a predetermined level of accuracy. The literature on 
efficient design offers a limited amount of studies that demonstrate the superiority of 
the efficient design method over traditional orthogonal methods and chance method, 
where design matrices are created at random. Efficient design optimizes the survey 
design matrix based on this perception. None of these studies addresses that final 
model specifications are likely to differ, possibly significantly, from pre-study 
perceptions. The present study offers a method by which researchers can evaluate 
whether deviations from the ex-ante model cancel the promised benefits of efficient 
design. 
A professional market research firm administered the resulting survey to a 
multimillion-member omnibus panel. Each survey respondent completed six trade-
off (conjoint) exercises representing six independent choice situations of three 
mobile service plan alternatives each. In each choice situation, the survey respondent 
indicated the most preferred and least preferred mobile service plan. In addition, the 
survey asked for demographic and socioeconomic data including, age and gender. 
Four hundred and eighty-nine panel members validly completed the survey. In 
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responding to the question of the most preferred plan, the survey respondents created 
three observations. One observation indicated which plan was most preferred. The 
other two observations were for the two plans not most preferred. In responding to 
the question of the least preferred plan, the survey respondents created two 
observations. One indicated which plan was least preferred and one for the plan that 
was not preferred the least. This resulted in five observations per choice situation per 
respondent. With six choice situations and 489 respondents, the resulting database 
consisted of 14,670 observations. 
Prior to fitting a model to the data, the data were examined for potential 
biases and other inaccuracies. This review revealed respondent fatigue in the form of 
biased responses in the last two choice situations. In these choice situations, the 
respondents‘ plan selections were a function of the presented sequence of choice 
alternatives. The data were fitted to several logit models. LR indices and LR 
hypothesis tests yielded a multinomial mixed exploded logit model with ten variables 
describing the mobile service plan attributes and two sociodemographic variables. 
The coefficients for the mobile service plan attributes are distributed lognormal. The 
coefficients for the sociodemographic variables are fixed parameters. A Hausman 
specification test accepted the null hypothesis of including the last two choice 
situations, despite its initial evidence of respondent fatigue. Testing for D-optimality 
revealed that the fitted model retained no benefits of D-optimization. This finding 
illustrates that D-optimization requires highly accurate a priori information of the 
model specification and its coefficients. However, if such information is available, it 
might question the need for conducting the study. Notwithstanding, with perfect a 
priori information, the underlying D-error of the design matrix could have been 
improved by over 80%. 
Interpreting the coefficients reveals that consumers consider most, if not all, 
of the pertinent aspects of the mobile service bundle, including mobile phone price, 
monthly recurring charge, monthly voice and data minutes included in the plan, 
mobile upload and download speeds, data overage charges, SMS prices, the type of 
mobile phone offered, and the length of the term contract. Interestingly, voice 
overage charges seem not to matter to consumers. A possible explanation of this 
finding is that consumers select mobile plans that include sufficient voice minutes, 
thereby making voice overage charges irrelevant. The significance of this first set of 
findings is that researchers must examine mobile demand as part of a bundle 
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offering, rather than individual bundle attributes, as has been considered in several 
pieces in the literature. Decision making for mobile phone plans also varies by age 
and gender. As consumers grow older, their price sensitivity increases by 
approximately 1% per year. Female consumers are less price sensitive than male 
consumers by approximately 7%. 
Relative interpretation of the coefficients for average consumers finds that: 
 Consumers amortize their mobile phones over four months. 
 Service providers must recover mobile phone discounts over at least four 
months. 
 Consumers are willing to pay $163 to upgrade from a non-Smartphone to a 
Smartphone. 
 Consumers are willing to forego a mobile phone discount of up to $101 in 
order to avoid a term contract. 
 Consumers are willing to pay approximately $0.06 for each additional voice 
minute, which is far below current voice overage charges. 
 Consumers are willing to pay $0.42 for each additional 100 kilobytes of data 
transfer or double the current data overage charges. 
 Operators with LTE can charge a premium of up to $13.20 per month in the 
MRC. 
 Consumers are willing to pay $13.40 per month for unlimited SMS, 
consistent with current pricing patterns that offer unlimited SMS plans at $10 
per month. 
U.S. service providers offer similar and often identical service plans. This 
study demonstrates how service providers can generate a profit, at least in the short 
run, by deviating from this apparent market equilibrium. Not all deviations are 
profitable, and some deviation strategies are better than other strategies. Demand 
elasticities calculate deviations from the equilibrium and reveal the percentage 
market shares potentially gained by deviating from the market equilibrium. 
Specifically: 
 Mobile phone price decreases for mobile phones prices above $200 is an 
effective competitive strategy. 
 MRC price decreases are only effective for plans prices above $75. 
 Decreasing term lengths is not an effective strategy. However, term lengths 
changes beyond 24 months still fall in the inelastic range of the demand 
curve. Hence, increasing terms lengths might be an effective strategy. 
 Decreasing SMS rates for subscribers without SMS plan is not an effective 
strategy. 
 132 
 
 Offering free mobile phones, increasing term lengths to 36 months, and 
increasing MRC by $5 might be an effective strategy. The service provider 
will gain an additional $80 per subscriber over the term period, in addition to 
gaining an additional 4.5 points in market share. 
The study‘s findings also provide valuable information on a number of 
critical policy decisions pending before the U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission and state regulators. Specifically, state and federal regulators fail to 
consider mobile phone discounts when reviewing term contracts and their associated 
ETFs. Instead, regulators consider term contracts in isolation, leading to the incorrect 
conclusion that they necessarily hurt consumer welfare. This study, however, 
demonstrates that term contracts represent only one attribute in the service bundle, 
and the FCC and state regulators must analyze all relevant attributes simultaneously 
to capture important and complex trade-offs between attributes. For instance, the 
study finds that subscribers are willing to pay $101 to avoid a term contract. 
Regional players, MetroPCS in particular, require no term contracts, calling them 
―stupid term contracts‖ in their marketing campaigns. However, a closer look at 
MetroPCS‘ mobile phone pricing structure finds prices that exceed by more than 
$101 the prices of other service providers that demand term contracts. For these 
mobile phones, and possibly others, term contracts are welfare enhancing. Curiously, 
the FCC does not review MetroPCS as it does not require term contracts. 
The study also highlights the importance of offering spectrum that, in turn, 
will increase mobile upload and download speeds. Finally, SMS prices are subject to 
a federal investigation and a consumer class action lawsuit where the plaintiffs allege 
price fixing for SMS. However, as this study demonstrates, subscribers do not 
consider SMS in isolation. Rather, they trade-off all the attributes of the service 
bundle. Further, the subscribers‘ marginal willingness to pay closely mirrors the U.S. 
service providers‘ pricing structure. 
A fundamental change is occurring in the mobile communications market. 
While traditionally used for voice communications only, technological evolution has 
expanded mobile services far beyond simple voice calling. The findings of this study 
highlight that researchers, service providers, and regulators must adapt to this 
changing environment by considering mobile communications not as a collection of 
individual services and service components, but an all-encompassing 
communications bundle. 
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Appendix A 
FMS and Mobile Diffusion Literature Summary 
Table A1 
FMS Literature Summary Overview 
Authors Year Data Country Method 
Fixed cross 
elasticity 
FMS 
finding 
Parker & Röller 1997 1984–1988 U.S. 
Nash equilibrium 
index 
n/a Indirect 
Sung, Kim, & Lee 2000 1991–1998 South Korea 
Cross price 
elasticity 
0.1–0.2 Direct 
Barros & Cadima 2001 1981–1999 Portugal Diffusion curves n/a No finding 
Rodini, Ward & Woroch 2003 2000–2001 U.S. 
Cross price 
elasticity 
0.22–0.26* Direct 
Sung & Lee 2002 1991–1998 South Korea 
Cross price 
elasticity 
0.14–0.22 Direct 
Ahn, Lee, & Kim 2004 1996–2002 South Korea Correlation n/a Direct 
Madden & Coble-Neal 2004 1995–2000 58 countries 
Cross price 
elasticity 
0.12 Direct 
Ward & Woroch 2004 1999–2001 U.S. 
Cross price 
elasticity 
0.13–0.33 Direct 
Vagliasindi, Guney, & 
Taubman 
2006 2002 26 countries Correlation n/a Direct 
* not statistically significant 
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Table A2 
Mobile Diffusion Literature Summary 
Author(s) Year Country(ies) Data Model 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Independent variable(s) Key findings 
Gruber & Verboven 2001 EU-15 nations Intro-1997 Logistic diffusion 
Mobile 
subscribers 
2G deployment, mobile growth, competition, 
GDP, teledensity 
Transition from 1G to 2G and introduction of 
competition are key drivers of diffusion. 
Gruber & Verboven 2001 140 nations 1981–1998 Logistic diffusion 
Mobile 
subscribers 
2G deployment, mobile growth, competition, 
GDP, teledensity, tech standards 
Transition from 1G to 2G, introduction of 
competition, income, teledensity, and 
standardization are key drivers of diffusion.  
Massini 2002 Italy and UK 1990–2001 
Logistic and Gompertz 
diffusion 
Mobile 
subscribers 
Potential adopters, mobile phone price, tariff, 
consumption expenditure, technological 
change 
Transition to digital and increased 
competition are key drivers of diffusion in 
both countries. Lower prices also impact 
Italy but not UK. 
Banerjee & Ros 2004 61 OECD nations 2002 Cluster analysis Not applicable Not applicable 
Technological and economic substitution 
explains country differences in fixed and 
mobile developments. 
Wareham, Levy, & Shi 2004 United States 1994–1998 
Logistic diffusion; probit 
model 
(1) Mobile 
subscribers (2G 
only); (2) mobile 
diffusion 
(1) income, geographic area; (2) income, 
education, age, household size, own home, 
married, child, profession 
Mobile diffusion is positively correlated with 
income, geographic size, and occupation. 
Some ethnic groups adopt faster than 
others, and family size is negatively 
correlated. 
Koski & Kretschmer 2005 
32 industrialized 
countries 
1991–2000 
(1) Hazard rate model for 
competitive entry; (2) 
logistic diffusion for 
diffusion; (3) 3SLS IV and 
Mills ratio for price 
Competitive entry 
dummy; mobile 
diffusion per 
capita; price 
Regulation; competition, 1G profitability, 
time, manufacturers, GDP per capita 
Technology standardization accelerates 2G 
entry and diffusion; first mover tends to set 
monopolistic prices, liberalization 
accelerates 2G diffusion. 
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Author(s) Year Country(ies) Data Model 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Independent variable(s) Key findings 
Kauffman & 
Techatassanasoontorn 
2005 
46 developed and 
developing European 
nations 
1992–1999 
Non-parametric Kaplan-
Meier estimator 
Probability of 
phase end 
GNP, teledensity, mobile penetration, analog 
mobile penetration, number of mobile 
standards, number of analog standards, 
number of service providers, standardization 
policy, licensing policy 
Drivers of mobile diffusion differ depending 
on diffusion phase. Higher digital diffusion 
and technology standards aide early 
diffusion; higher analog diffusion and GNP 
also contributes positively; higher 
competition increases diffusion during mid-
phases; higher number of analog service 
providers slows diffusion; regional licenses 
contribute to higher initial diffusion. 
Rouvinen 2006 
200 developing and 
developed nations 
2002 Gompertz diffusion 
Digital mobile 
subscribers 
Population, income, agriculture, illiteracy, 
credit, trade, freedom, PCs, teledensity, 
fixed prices, analog penetration, digital 
users, prepaid, mobile prices, mobile phone 
prices 
Developing and developed nations have 
different diffusion patterns due to late entry 
(which contributes positively to diffusion), 
large customer bases, and different network 
effects. Income does not explain differences 
in adoption and diffusion speeds are not 
significantly different. 
Dippon 2010 
47 developed and 
developing nations 
2000–2009 
Linear probability and 
binary logit models; 
logistic and Gompertz 
diffusion 
3G subscribers 
MNP, churn, prepaid, GDP, density, 
population, competition, revenue, 
penetration, teledensity, time since 3G 
allocation, MOUs, HHI, others 
Time since the allocation of 3G spectrum is 
most important determinant of 3G take-up; 
customer characteristics and demographic 
variable also impact take-up; Gompertz 
provides superior fit to logistic curve 
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Appendix B 
Study Design Matrix 
 Price of 
mobile 
phone 
 Price of 
mobile 
phone 
 Price of 
mobile 
phone 
 Monthly 
charge 
 Monthly 
charge 
 Monthly 
charge 
 Voice 
allowance per 
month 
 Voice 
allowance per 
month 
 Voice 
allowance per 
month 
 Data 
allowance 
per month 
(kilobytes) 
 Data 
allowance 
per month 
(kilobytes) 
 Data 
allowance 
per month 
(kilobytes) 
 Data download 
speed (kilobits per 
second) 
 Data download 
speed (kilobits per 
second) 
 Data download 
speed (kilobits per 
second) 
Survey Game
Choice 
situation
 plan1 
phone price 
 plan2 
phone price 
 plan3 
phone price  plan1 mrc  plan2 mrc  plan3 mrc 
 plan1 v_allow-
ance 
 plan2 v_allow-
ance 
 plan3 v_allow-
ance 
 plan1 
d_allow-ance 
 plan2 
d_allow-ance 
 plan3 
d_allow-ance  plan1 download  plan2 download  plan3 download 
1 1 9 $50 $500 $0 $120 $80 $160 50 500 500 1000 200 200 2000 1500 2000
1 2 11 $300 $100 $200 $20 $40 $80 200 200 100 1000 50 1000 3000 1500 1000
1 3 15 $400 $0 $500 $20 $20 $80 500 2000 1000 500 200 500 1500 1000 2000
1 4 25 $500 $0 $400 $120 $80 $80 1000 1000 unlim. 500 0 unlim. 6000 500 250
1 5 33 $400 $100 $200 $80 $160 $80 50 200 500 200 50 5000 6000 250 250
1 6 40 $0 $300 $300 $40 $160 $20 2000 100 100 5000 5000 0 1500 2000 3000
2 1 6 $100 $400 $100 $60 $120 $120 2000 200 200 50 5000 50 500 3000 250
2 2 13 $0 $50 $400 $80 $120 $20 50 1000 2000 0 1000 200 1000 1000 3000
2 3 20 $200 $400 $100 $120 $60 $20 2000 500 100 200 200 200 500 1500 2000
2 4 27 $400 $100 $50 $80 $100 $100 200 50 2000 5000 1000 1000 1500 1000 1500
2 5 30 $0 $500 $50 $100 $40 $20 50 2000 50 500 5000 200 250 6000 500
2 6 34 $300 $50 $500 $100 $80 $60 unlim. 50 50 unlim. 50 50 2000 500 3000
3 1 2 $100 $200 $200 $60 $100 $160 1000 2000 50 500 0 500 3000 250 250
3 2 4 $50 $400 $100 $120 $20 $120 1000 50 200 500 1000 1000 1500 250 1500
3 3 14 $0 $300 $400 $80 $60 $60 100 1000 50 200 5000 0 3000 250 1500
3 4 19 $50 $400 $100 $80 $40 $40 200 100 1000 0 50 5000 250 500 6000
3 5 21 $300 $400 $50 $100 $40 $120 200 2000 100 500 200 500 2000 500 6000
3 6 42 $100 $200 $400 $160 $60 $120 1000 100 500 50 500 5000 500 3000 500
4 1 3 $100 $500 $400 $40 $100 $40 500 1000 2000 50 200 200 3000 2000 3000
4 2 5 $300 $300 $0 $100 $20 $100 100 2000 200 50 0 200 1500 3000 1000
4 3 7 $50 $100 $300 $160 $80 $20 2000 500 100 5000 0 50 1000 1500 6000
4 4 8 $500 $0 $300 $60 $80 $60 500 500 2000 1000 500 500 500 3000 1500
4 5 10 $200 $50 $50 $40 $60 $120 100 unlim. 50 500 200 50 6000 250 500
4 6 16 $0 $50 $300 $40 $120 $120 500 100 200 50 5000 0 1000 3000 1000
5 1 17 $50 $200 $200 $160 $120 $40 200 500 100 200 50 1000 1500 1000 2000
5 2 22 $500 $0 $100 $20 $100 $100 2000 50 200 200 5000 0 500 6000 500
5 3 29 $100 $500 $500 $20 $60 $60 50 50 1000 0 unlim. 0 6000 500 250
5 4 32 $400 $400 $100 $60 $160 $60 100 50 unlim. unlim. 500 50 250 6000 6000
5 5 36 $500 $100 $300 $80 $160 $160 500 200 1000 50 500 5000 3000 1000 1000
5 6 37 $200 $0 $0 $20 $120 $60 50 100 1000 200 500 200 1000 2000 250
6 1 18 $500 $500 $50 $100 $20 $40 200 200 500 5000 0 500 6000 2000 500
6 2 23 $500 $300 $0 $20 $120 $100 500 1000 200 1000 0 50 2000 1500 1000
6 3 24 $200 $500 $0 $60 $20 $100 1000 50 500 0 200 5000 6000 1000 3000
6 4 28 $300 $200 $500 $40 $100 $160 50 unlim. 200 1000 50 500 1000 2000 6000
6 5 31 $400 $0 $200 $160 $160 $20 1000 100 50 200 unlim. 0 500 6000 500
6 6 41 $200 $50 $50 $60 $100 $80 100 200 500 0 1000 1000 3000 1500 1000
7 1 1 $100 $300 $300 $160 $40 $160 100 200 2000 0 1000 0 2000 250 3000
7 2 12 $0 $200 $500 $160 $160 $40 200 500 50 1000 1000 500 250 3000 1500
7 3 26 $400 $300 $0 $40 $80 $40 unlim. 500 100 0 500 unlim. 1000 2000 6000
7 4 35 $300 $100 $400 $120 $20 $100 2000 100 2000 5000 50 50 2000 500 2000
7 5 38 $200 $50 $500 $120 $60 $80 100 2000 500 50 500 5000 250 6000 1500
7 6 39 $50 $200 $200 $100 $40 $160 500 1000 1000 5000 0 1000 250 6000 2000  
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 Fee for 
excess 
minutes 
 Fee for 
excess data 
usage 
 Fee for 
excess data 
usage 
 Fee for 
excess data 
usage 
 SMS fee (per 
message sent 
and received) 
 SMS fee (per 
message sent 
and received) 
 SMS fee (per 
message sent 
and received) 
Type of 
phone
Type of 
phone
Type of 
phone
Length of 
contract
Length of 
contract
Length of 
contract
Survey Game
Choice 
situation
 plan3 
v_over  plan1 d_over  plan2 d_over  plan3 d_over  plan1  text  plan2 text  plan3 text 
plan1 
phone 
type
plan2 
phone 
type
plan3 
phone 
type
plan1 term 
length
plan2 term 
length
plan3 term 
length
1 1 9 $0.30 $0.30 $0.10 $0.30 $0.25 $0.40 $0.00 NS S S 12 18 36
1 2 11 $0.20 $0.40 $0.10 $0.20 $0.40 $0.00 $0.20 S NS NS 12 12 30
1 3 15 $0.20 $0.25 $0.10 $0.25 $0.30 $0.30 $0.00 S NS NS 36 12 12
1 4 25 $0.00 $0.20 $0.40 $0.00 $0.05 $0.10 $0.25 S S NS 6 24 6
1 5 33 $0.30 $0.10 $0.25 $0.20 $0.05 $0.10 $0.30 S NS S 12 24 30
1 6 40 $0.40 $0.10 $0.30 $0.40 $0.25 $0.10 $0.05 NS S S 36 30 6
2 1 6 $0.10 $0.15 $0.25 $0.15 $0.25 $0.00 $0.40 S S S 36 12 0
2 2 13 $0.40 $0.30 $0.20 $0.20 $0.00 $0.10 $0.40 S NS S 36 0 6
2 3 20 $0.40 $0.20 $0.30 $0.15 $0.30 $0.05 $0.20 S S NS 12 12 30
2 4 27 $0.25 $0.30 $0.30 $0.10 $0.20 $0.25 $0.10 NS NS S 18 18 18
2 5 30 $0.15 $0.30 $0.40 $0.10 $0.30 $0.05 $0.40 NS NS NS 30 36 0
2 6 34 $0.30 $0.00 $0.30 $0.10 $0.10 $0.25 $0.10 NS S NS 24 6 12
3 1 2 $0.25 $0.40 $0.10 $0.30 $0.10 $0.25 $0.30 NS S NS 0 36 18
3 2 4 $0.20 $0.30 $0.15 $0.25 $0.00 $0.20 $0.00 NS S NS 24 6 12
3 3 14 $0.20 $0.15 $0.15 $0.30 $0.00 $0.40 $0.00 NS S NS 18 30 18
3 4 19 $0.40 $0.10 $0.20 $0.25 $0.05 $0.25 $0.10 S NS NS 24 12 24
3 5 21 $0.15 $0.15 $0.15 $0.40 $0.20 $0.20 $0.25 NS NS S 6 18 24
3 6 42 $0.10 $0.30 $0.10 $0.30 $0.20 $0.00 $0.30 NS NS S 6 36 24
4 1 3 $0.20 $0.40 $0.20 $0.15 $0.10 $0.30 $0.40 S S NS 12 12 18
4 2 5 $0.15 $0.10 $0.15 $0.40 $0.05 $0.40 $0.05 S NS S 0 18 24
4 3 7 $0.10 $0.20 $0.30 $0.25 $0.25 $0.30 $0.05 S NS NS 36 0 30
4 4 8 $0.30 $0.25 $0.40 $0.10 $0.25 $0.05 $0.25 NS S S 30 0 36
4 5 10 $0.40 $0.10 $0.25 $0.40 $0.40 $0.00 $0.05 S NS S 24 6 0
4 6 16 $0.25 $0.40 $0.10 $0.25 $0.20 $0.30 $0.20 S S S 0 36 36
5 1 17 $0.25 $0.30 $0.15 $0.40 $0.30 $0.00 $0.30 NS S NS 24 18 0
5 2 22 $0.30 $0.40 $0.20 $0.10 $0.00 $0.40 $0.10 NS NS S 24 24 6
5 3 29 $0.30 $0.30 $0.00 $0.15 $0.40 $0.05 $0.25 NS NS NS 6 36 6
5 4 32 $0.00 $0.00 $0.20 $0.40 $0.05 $0.10 $0.30 NS NS NS 0 24 36
5 5 36 $0.15 $0.20 $0.15 $0.40 $0.10 $0.30 $0.00 NS S NS 30 6 30
5 6 37 $0.25 $0.15 $0.25 $0.25 $0.30 $0.20 $0.25 S S NS 0 24 24
6 1 18 $0.25 $0.15 $0.20 $0.15 $0.20 $0.10 $0.05 S NS S 12 6 12
6 2 23 $0.40 $0.10 $0.25 $0.30 $0.25 $0.25 $0.10 S S S 30 30 6
6 3 24 $0.15 $0.20 $0.40 $0.15 $0.40 $0.05 $0.05 S S NS 18 18 0
6 4 28 $0.30 $0.15 $0.40 $0.20 $0.00 $0.40 $0.20 NS S S 36 0 30
6 5 31 $0.20 $0.25 $0.00 $0.40 $0.30 $0.20 $0.20 NS S S 18 0 36
6 6 41 $0.20 $0.15 $0.25 $0.30 $0.00 $0.20 $0.30 S NS NS 18 30 24
7 1 1 $0.10 $0.25 $0.40 $0.20 $0.40 $0.40 $0.00 NS NS S 18 30 0
7 2 12 $0.10 $0.20 $0.10 $0.40 $0.20 $0.00 $0.40 NS S S 6 6 18
7 3 26 $0.30 $0.40 $0.30 $0.00 $0.10 $0.25 $0.20 S NS NS 0 24 36
7 4 35 $0.15 $0.25 $0.10 $0.20 $0.40 $0.05 $0.40 S NS NS 30 30 12
7 5 38 $0.40 $0.25 $0.40 $0.10 $0.10 $0.20 $0.10 NS NS S 6 36 18
7 6 39 $0.10 $0.40 $0.10 $0.15 $0.05 $0.30 $0.25 S S S 30 0 12  
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Appendix C 
Orthogonal Design Example 
Fractional factorial designs, orthogonal designs in particular, become more evident 
when demonstrated with an example. Following Louviere et al. (2000), consider an 
example with three attributes, Attribute A, B, and C. Each attribute is either zero or 
one. To measure the impact that the three attributes have independently or in 
combination, an analyst could simply run the full factorial design. Per equation (21), 
the full factorial design has 32 8  possible combinations. Table C1 presents the full 
factorial design for these three attributes, presenting all possible attribute 
combinations. Each unique combination is labeled. In addition, the last column in 
Table C1 lists the change from one combination to another, the simple effects. The 
use of the simple effects becomes clearer in the example provided below. 
 
Table C1 
Full Factorial Design Matrix 
Attribute A Attribute B Attribute C Notation Simple Effects 
0 0 0 (1)  
1 0 0 A A-(1) 
0 1 0 B  
1 1 0 AB AB-B 
0 0 1 C  
1 0 1 AC AC-C 
0 1 1 BC  
1 1 1 ABC ABC-BC 
 
Although there are eight possible attribute combinations, there are seven 
effects in this example. Specifically, each attribute has a main effect, ME(A), ME(B), 
and ME(C). There are three two-way interactions, INT(AB), INT(AC), and 
INT(BC), and one three-way interaction, INT(ABC). To arrive at a fractional 
factorial design, the analyst draws from this list of effects (instead of attribute 
combinations), thereby ensuring the representation of all effects. 
Main effects are measured by subtracting the average value of the dependent 
variable, evaluated with the attribute of interest on the high (+) side, from the 
average value of the dependent variable, evaluated with the attribute of interest on 
the low (-) side (DeVeaux, 2001). Specifically, the main effect of A, ME(A), equals: 
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(C1) 
(1)
( )
4
A AB B AC C ABC BC
ME A
      
 . 
 
Substituting the simple effects from Table C1 into equation (C1) yields: 
 
(C2) 
( 1)( 1)( 1)
( )
4
A B C
ME A
  
 . 
 
The main effects for Attribute B and Attribute C are derived in a similar 
fashion: 
 
(C3) 
( 1)( 1)( 1)
( )
4
A B C
ME B
  
 , 
 
and 
 
(C4) 
( 1)( 1)( 1)
( )
4
A B C
ME C
  
 . 
 
Interaction effects also are derived in a similar fashion. However, instead of 
examining the impact of one attribute, the interaction effect examines the combined 
impact of two or more attributes. Specifically, interaction effects are measured by the 
difference of the average value of the dependent variable with the combined 
attributes of interest on the high (+) side and the average value of the dependent 
variable with the combined attributes of interest on the low (−) side (DeVeaux, 
2001). 
In the example mentioned at the beginning of this appendix, the interaction 
effect of Attribute A and Attribute B, INT(AB), is measured as follows: 
 
(C5) ( ) ( ) ( (1)) ( )INT AB AB B ABC BC A AC C        . 
 
Substituting the single effects from Table C1 into equation (C5) yields: 
 
(C6) ( ) ( 1)( 1)( 1)INT AB A B C    . 
 
The remaining two two-way interactions and the one three-way interaction 
are derived in a similar fashion and are shown below for completeness: 
 
(C7) ( ) ( 1)( 1)( 1)INT AC A B C    , 
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(C8) ( ) ( 1)( 1)( 1)INT BC A B C    , 
 
(C9) ( ) ( 1)( 1)( 1)INT ABC A B C    . 
 
With the main and interaction effects defined, the effect matrix simply 
summarizes the attribute combinations from Table C1 that are required to be 
measured for each of the effects. A plus sign symbolizes that the level of the attribute 
is set at ―high,‖ whereas a negative sign represent the lower setting. For instance, if 
Attribute A was the price of a mobile phone and had two levels, $50 and $150, the 
plus sign would symbolize the $150 and the negative sign the $50. Table C2 presents 
the effect matrix for this example. 
 
Table C2 
Full Factorial Effect Matrix 
(1) A B AB C AC BC ABC Effect 
         
- + - + - + - + ME(A) 
- - + + - - + + ME(B) 
+ - - + + - - + INT(AB) 
- - - - + + + + ME(C) 
+ - + - - + - + INT(AC) 
+ + - - - - + + INT(BC) 
- + + - + - - + INT(ABC) 
 
To arrive at the fractional factorial design, the analyst defines the size of a 
matrix that reasonably can be administered in a survey. For instance, the analyst can 
elect to present the survey respondent with four combinations only, such as A, B, C, 
and ABC. Table C3 shows this. 
 
Table C3 
Fractional Factorial Matrix 
A B C ABC 
1 -1 -1 1 
-1 1 -1 1 
-1 -1 1 1 
-1 -1 1 1 
-1 1 -1 1 
1 -1 -1 1 
1 1 1 1 
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Scaling each of these four vectors by ABC demonstrates that each main effect 
is a transformation of a two-way interaction. Specifically: 
 
(C10) 2A A ABC A BC BC    , 
 
(C11) 2B B ABC AB C AC    , 
 
(C12) 2C C ABC ABC AB    , 
 
(C13) 2 2 2 1ABC ABC ABC A B C    . 
 
Thus, in this particular design, the main effects are ―aliased‖ with each two-
way interaction. The three-way interaction is one and thus can be ignored (Louviere 
et al., 2000). Importantly, the effect matrix sheds light on causation. It illustrates that 
if an effect of A is observed it is unclear whether this is truly an effect of A or an 
effect of BC. Hence, unless BC is insignificant, the causation of effect remains 
unclear. 
Alternatively, the analyst also can select a combination of attributes from 
Table C1 in such a way that the orthogonal codes within each of the vectors of the 
design sum to zero and the inner products of each column are also zero (i.e., 
0,  0,  0T T TA B A C B C   ). For instance, from Table C1, the following 
combination could be drawn: 
 
Table C4 
Fractional Factorial Matrix 
Attribute A Attribute B Attribute C Notation 
0 0 0 (1) 
0 1 1 BC 
1 0 1 AC 
1 1 0 AB 
 
Orthogonal coding transforms zeros to negative ones and leaves ones 
unchanged. Table C5 shows that the sum of each of the three fractional factorial 
vectors is zero and so are the inner products of each vector combination. This design 
is an orthogonal design. 
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Table C5 
Orthogonal Fractional Factorial Matrix 
Attribute A Attribute B Attribute C Product AB Product AC Product BC Notation 
-1 -1 -1 1 1 1 (1) 
-1 1 1 -1 -1 1 BC 
1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 AC 
1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 AB 
0 0 0 0 0 0  
 
In contrast, the design in Table C6 is not orthogonal even though the 
individual vectors sum to zero. 
 
Table C6 
Nonorthogonal Fractional Factorial Matrix 
Attribute A Attribute B Attribute C Product AB Product AC Product BC Notation 
-1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 B 
-1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 C 
1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 AC 
1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 AB 
0 0 0 0 0 -4  
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Appendix D 
Design Matrix Optimization Code (Ngene) 
design 
;alts = Plan1, Plan2, Plan3 
;rows =42 
;block=7 ;eff=(mnl,d) 
;alg=swap 
;cond: 
if(Plan1.V_allowance=99999, Plan1.V_over=0), 
if(Plan2.V_allowance=99999, Plan2.V_over=0), 
if(Plan3.V_allowance=99999, Plan3.V_over=0), 
if(Plan1.D_allowance=99999, Plan1.D_over=0), 
if(Plan2.D_allowance=99999, Plan2.D_over=0), 
if(Plan3.D_allowance=99999, Plan3.D_over=0), 
if(Plan1.V_allowance<>99999, Plan1.V_over<>0), 
if(Plan2.V_allowance<>99999, Plan2.V_over<>0), 
if(Plan3.V_allowance<>99999, Plan3.V_over<>0), 
if(Plan1.D_allowance<>99999, Plan1.D_over<>0), 
if(Plan2.D_allowance<>99999, Plan2.D_over<>0), 
if(Plan3.D_allowance<>99999, Plan3.D_over<>0) 
;model: 
U(Plan1)=b1[-0.0020992]*Phone_Price[0,50,100,200,300,400,500]+b2[-
0.0166683]*MRC[20,40,60,80,100,120,160]+b3[0.0000659]*V_allowance[50
,100,200,500,1000,2000,9999]+b4[0.0001119]*D_allowance[0,50,200,500,
1000,5000,9999]+b5[0.000034]*Download[250,500,1000,1500,2000,3000,60
00]+b6[-0.0837528]*V_over[0,0.1,0.15,0.2,0.25,0.3,0.4]+b7[-
0.3806611]*D_over[0,0.1,0.15,0.2,0.25,0.3,0.4]+b8[-
1.633345]*Text[0,0.05,0.1,0.2,0.25,0.3,0.4]+b9[1.078538]*Phone_type[
0,1]+b10[-0.0032271]*Term_length[0,6,12,18,24,30,36]/ 
U(Plan2)=b1*Phone_Price+b2*MRC+b3*V_allowance+b4*D_allowance+b5*Down
load+b6*V_over+b7*D_over+b8*Text+b9*Phone_type+b10*Term_length/ 
U(Plan3)=b1*Phone_Price+b2*MRC+b3*V_allowance+b4*D_allowance+b5*Down
load+b6*V_over+b7*D_over+b8*Text+b9*Phone_type+b10*Term_length 
$
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Appendix E 
Design Matrix MNL Choice Probabilities (Ngene) 
Choice Situation Plan1 Plan2 Plan3 
1 0.10 0.44 0.46 
2 0.50 0.45 0.05 
3 0.79 0.10 0.11 
4 0.13 0.75 0.12 
5 0.29 0.24 0.47 
6 0.55 0.29 0.16 
7 0.30 0.18 0.52 
8 0.07 0.60 0.33 
9 0.20 0.35 0.45 
10 0.40 0.40 0.19 
11 0.53 0.36 0.11 
12 0.11 0.35 0.54 
13 0.49 0.09 0.42 
14 0.30 0.54 0.16 
15 0.47 0.44 0.09 
16 0.67 0.24 0.09 
17 0.07 0.50 0.43 
18 0.16 0.12 0.72 
19 0.42 0.10 0.48 
20 0.17 0.42 0.40 
21 0.15 0.34 0.50 
22 0.30 0.23 0.47 
23 0.49 0.12 0.39 
24 0.32 0.43 0.25 
25 0.14 0.48 0.38 
26 0.42 0.04 0.54 
27 0.17 0.13 0.69 
28 0.40 0.52 0.08 
29 0.44 0.45 0.11 
30 0.13 0.41 0.46 
31 0.01 0.41 0.58 
32 0.55 0.03 0.41 
33 0.41 0.05 0.54 
34 0.49 0.40 0.11 
35 0.27 0.67 0.06 
36 0.32 0.44 0.24 
37 0.62 0.21 0.17 
38 0.09 0.37 0.54 
39 0.43 0.51 0.07 
40 0.36 0.08 0.56 
41 0.73 0.12 0.15 
42 0.09 0.55 0.36 
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Appendix F 
Consumer Survey Mobile Research 
Mobile Research 
March 2010 
Page 1: 
 
You have been selected to participate in a study regarding telecommunications 
services. We appreciate your participation in this survey and hope that this 
experience will be a pleasant one. Your information will be kept strictly confidential 
and only reported in aggregate. 
 
Our survey today is about the choices people make when subscribing to wireless 
telephone service for their personal use. Wireless service, also known as mobile 
service or cell phone service, is a telephone service that allows calls to be made and 
received at any location within the designated network you subscribe to. 
 
To begin the survey, simply click the ―Continue‖ button. While in the survey, click 
on the arrow at the bottom of the page to go to the next screen. 
 
Page 2: 
 
1. What is your age? (Open numeric response) [Term if less than 18] 
 
 
 
Page 3: 
 
2. Do you use a wireless/cell phone? 
 Yes ..........................................................................................................  
 No ...........................................................................................................  
 
[Skip to page 7 if answer is “no”] 
 
3. Have you ever been financially responsible for a wireless phone service account? 
 Yes ..........................................................................................................  
 No ...........................................................................................................  
 
[Skip to page 7 if answer is “no”] 
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Page 4: 
 
4. How many minutes are included in your monthly voice plan? 
 Less than 400 minutes ..............................................................................  
 Between 400 minutes and less than 700 minutes .......................................  
 Between 700 minutes and less than 900 minutes  ......................................  
 Between 900 minutes and less than 1400 minutes .....................................  
 Between 1400 minutes and less than 2100 minutes ...................................  
 I have unlimited minutes ..........................................................................  
 I have a prepaid plan ................................................................................  
 I don‘t know ............................................................................................  
 
5. Do you subscribe to a monthly data plan, allowing you to access the Internet and 
send email via your cell phone? 
 Yes ..........................................................................................................  
 No ...........................................................................................................  
 
Page 5: 
6. Do you subscribe to a plan for small message service (SMS)? 
 Yes ..........................................................................................................  
 No ...........................................................................................................  
 
7. Do you use your wireless/cell phone to access the Internet? 
 Yes ..........................................................................................................  
 No ...........................................................................................................  
 
8. Do you use your wireless/cell phone to send and receive emails? 
 Yes ..........................................................................................................  
 No ...........................................................................................................  
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Page 6: 
 
9. Approximately how much do you typically spend on wireless phone service per 
month? 
 Less than $50 ...........................................................................................  
 Between $50 and $99 ...............................................................................  
 Between $100 and $149 ...........................................................................  
 More than $150........................................................................................  
 I don‘t know ............................................................................................  
 
10. Do you subscribe to a mobile phone pan that is subject to a term contract, 
requiring you to remain with the mobile phone company for a certain number of 
months? 
Yes ..........................................................................................................  
No ...........................................................................................................  
I don‘t know ............................................................................................  
 
Page 7: 
 
Now, we would like you to imagine that you need to sign up for new wireless 
telephone service. When answering the next set of questions, please think about all 
the aspects of your life that would impact or have an effect on what choices you 
might make when selecting a new wireless telephone service. 
 
In the following, we are going to show you three different wireless telephone service 
plans, each with different service features and prices. We will then ask you which of 
the three plans is (1) most attractive and (2) least attractive to you. Even if you feel 
that there are better plans available in the marketplace, please suppose that the listed 
plans are the only plans available to you. In making your selection, please assume 
that you will be responsible for paying the bills. 
 
Please assume that the three plans are identical in all features that are not shown in 
the plans offered. 
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Page 8: 
 
The following is a glossary of terms that will be used during the following part of 
the survey: 
 
 Voice means common wireless phone calls, where only spoken words are 
exchanged. 
 Data means an exchange, upload, or download of data, such as emails, 
pictures, text messaging, and Internet browsing. 
 Price of mobile phone which is the price of the wireless mobile phone. 
 Monthly charge which includes a certain number of voice minutes and data 
up/downloads per month. 
 Voice minutes allowance which is the total number of voice minutes 
included in the monthly charge. 
 Data allowance which is the total number of kilobytes download and upload 
included in the monthly charge. 
 Data download speed, which is the speed in seconds by which a file (i.e., a 
website) can be downloaded from the Internet. The higher the number, the 
faster the download. As a reference point, standard dial-up service offers 56 
kilobits per second (Kbps). DSL offers speeds between 3000-7,100 Kbps, 
while a cable Internet access is between 8,000 and 20,000 Kbps. 
 Fee for excess minutes which is the per-minute charge for each minute in 
excess of the monthly voice allowance. 
 Fee for excess data usage which is the per kilobyte charge for each kilobyte 
of data in excess of the monthly data allowance. 
 SMS fee which is the charge for each text message sent and received. 
 Type of Phone which is either a smart phone (i.e., iPhone or Blackberry) or a 
regular ―non-smart‖ phone (i.e., a basic flip phone). 
 Length of contract which is the contract length in months. Terminating the 
contract before its expiration will result in an early termination (ETF) fee of 
$150. 
NOTE: A timer was added to track the amount of time spent on this page. 
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Page 9: 
 
NOTE: Timers were added to track the amount of time spent on each conjoint page 
and tooltips were added when rolling over the ‗?‘ icons containing the definition of 
just that specific term. 
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Page 10: 
 
Now we would like to ask you a question NOT about wireless phone service but 
landline (wireline) service. 
 
11. Do you currently have a landline phone number in your main residence? 
 Yes ..........................................................................................................  
 No ...........................................................................................................  
 
Page 11: 
 
These last few questions are for classification purposes only. 
 
12. What is the state of your main residence? (Select from pull down menu) 
[Pull down menu here] 
 
13. Is your main residence located in a: 
Metropolitan city .......................................................................................  
Suburban community of a larger city ..........................................................  
Small town or rural city..............................................................................  
Farming area..............................................................................................  
 
Page 12: 
 
14. Which of the following categories best describes the highest level of education 
you have completed? (Select one) 
Less than High school .................................................................................  
High school graduate ..................................................................................  
Vocational or technical school but no college ...............................................  
College graduate .........................................................................................  
Post-graduate degree ...................................................................................  
 
Page 13: 
 
15. Are you currently employed? 
Yes, full-time .............................................................................................  
Yes, part-time ............................................................................................  
No .............................................................................................................  
 
16. Are you: 
Male ..........................................................................................................  
Female ......................................................................................................  
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Page 14: 
 
17. Are you: 
Single ........................................................................................................  
Married .....................................................................................................  
Partnered ...................................................................................................  
Other .........................................................................................................  
Partnered ...................................................................................................  
Other .........................................................................................................  
 
18. How many children under the age of 18 do you have? 
Zero...........................................................................................................  
One ...........................................................................................................  
Two...........................................................................................................  
Three or more ............................................................................................  
 
Page 15: 
 
19. What is your household‘s total annual income from all sources before taxes? 
(Select one) 
Less than $30,000 .......................................................................................  
From 30 to just under $50,000 .....................................................................  
From 50 to just under $75,000 .....................................................................  
From 75 to just under $150,000, or ..............................................................  
$150,000 or more.......................................................................................  
Decline to answer ......................................................................................  
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Appendix G 
Survey Responses 
Survey 
Choice 
situation 
Ranking 
No. of selections No. of rejections 
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 
1 1 1 17 28 27 55 44 45 
1 1 2 30 19 23 25 25 22 
1 2 1 31 37 4 41 35 68 
1 2 2 22 28 22 19 7 46 
1 3 1 10 57 5 62 15 67 
1 3 2 41 14 17 21 1 50 
1 4 1 10 39 23 62 33 49 
1 4 2 19 20 33 43 13 16 
1 5 1 16 15 41 56 57 31 
1 5 2 26 30 16 30 27 15 
1 6 1 49 4 19 23 68 53 
1 6 2 11 25 36 12 43 17 
2 1 1 43 19 9 28 52 62 
2 1 2 18 12 41 10 40 21 
2 2 1 19 19 33 52 52 38 
2 2 2 24 32 15 28 20 23 
2 3 1 21 26 24 50 45 47 
2 3 2 25 25 21 25 20 26 
2 4 1 7 3 61 64 68 10 
2 4 2 31 33 7 33 35 3 
2 5 1 15 23 33 56 48 38 
2 5 2 33 11 27 23 37 11 
2 6 1 39 30 2 32 41 69 
2 6 2 18 30 23 14 11 46 
3 1 1 57 11 0 11 57 68 
3 1 2 9 44 15 2 13 53 
3 2 1 29 22 17 39 46 51 
3 2 2 23 9 36 16 37 15 
3 3 1 33 34 1 35 34 67 
3 3 2 27 24 17 8 10 50 
3 4 1 19 5 44 49 63 24 
3 4 2 30 19 19 19 44 5 
3 5 1 6 36 26 62 32 42 
3 5 2 35 15 18 27 17 24 
3 6 1 22 33 13 46 35 55 
3 6 2 30 12 26 16 23 29 
4 1 1 61 2 7 9 68 63 
4 1 2 5 20 45 4 48 18 
4 2 1 15 34 21 55 36 49 
4 2 2 21 13 36 34 23 13 
4 3 1 23 19 28 47 51 42 
4 3 2 11 34 25 36 17 17 
4 4 1 0 46 24 70 24 46 
4 4 2 17 15 38 53 9 8 
4 5 1 26 40 4 44 30 66 
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Survey 
Choice 
situation 
Ranking 
No. of selections No. of rejections 
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 
4 5 2 32 17 21 12 13 45 
4 6 1 62 8 0 8 62 70 
4 6 2 6 52 12 2 10 58 
5 1 1 9 28 33 61 42 37 
5 1 2 24 27 19 37 15 18 
5 2 1 20 22 28 50 48 42 
5 2 2 15 20 35 35 28 7 
5 3 1 39 14 17 31 56 53 
5 3 2 18 23 29 13 33 24 
5 4 1 18 0 52 52 70 18 
5 4 2 43 17 10 9 53 8 
5 5 1 24 29 17 46 41 53 
5 5 2 19 19 32 27 22 21 
5 6 1 18 14 38 52 56 32 
5 6 2 21 29 20 31 27 12 
6 1 1 8 2 59 61 67 10 
6 1 2 16 44 9 45 23 1 
6 2 1 35 8 26 34 61 43 
6 2 2 20 17 32 14 44 11 
6 3 1 18 17 34 51 52 35 
6 3 2 28 25 16 23 27 19 
6 4 1 18 43 8 51 26 61 
6 4 2 30 22 17 21 4 44 
6 5 1 9 38 22 60 31 47 
6 5 2 24 20 25 36 11 22 
6 6 1 29 4 36 40 65 33 
6 6 2 14 28 27 26 37 6 
7 1 1 10 25 34 59 44 35 
7 1 2 26 23 20 33 21 15 
7 2 1 19 44 6 50 25 63 
7 2 2 32 16 21 18 9 42 
7 3 1 28 13 28 41 56 41 
7 3 2 25 24 20 16 32 21 
7 4 1 29 31 9 40 38 60 
7 4 2 21 14 34 19 24 26 
7 5 1 6 49 14 63 20 55 
7 5 2 28 12 29 35 8 26 
7 6 1 21 44 4 48 25 65 
7 6 2 31 13 25 17 12 40 
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Appendix H 
Model 5-1 Variance-Covariance Matrix 
 
phone_n mrc_n v_allow d_allow download text_n phone type term_n dummy high phone_n mrc_n v_allow d_allow download text_n phone type term_n dummy high age gender d_over_n
m m m m m m m m m sd sd sd sd sd sd sd sd sd fx fx fx
phone_n m 0.0118 0.0032 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0019 -0.0065 0.0002 0.0009 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0014 0.0021 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0004
mrc_n m 0.0032 1.6118 0.0013 0 0.1118 0.0041 -0.0401 -0.0041 0.0038 -0.0009 0.0135 0.0079 -0.0022 -0.0678 -0.0058 0.0444 0.0064 -0.0017 0.0058 -0.0121 -0.0113
v_allow m 0.0004 0.0013 0.0384 0.0008 0.0001 0.0028 -0.031 -0.0221 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0029 0.0205 0.008 0 0.0012 -0.0016 0.002
d_allow m 0.0005 0 0.0008 0.0045 0.0011 -0.0001 0 -0.0031 -0.0006 0.0013 0.0005 0.0009 -0.0025 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0013 0.0013 0.001 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001
download m 0.0003 0.1118 0.0001 0.0011 0.0159 -0.0033 0.0006 -0.0078 0.0035 0.0013 0.0028 0.0038 -0.0004 -0.0092 0.0016 0.0032 0.0028 -0.001 0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0019
text_n m 0.0004 0.0041 0.0028 -0.0001 -0.0033 0.272 -0.0411 0.1386 -0.0009 -0.006 0.0038 -0.0736 0.0008 0.0019 -0.1423 0.0232 -0.036 0.0023 0.0049 -0.0034 0.0089
phone type m 0.0019 -0.0401 -0.031 0 0.0006 -0.0411 0.3111 -0.0112 0.0048 0.0206 -0.0147 0.0085 0.0011 0.0037 0.0295 -0.2305 -0.0173 -0.0026 -0.0208 0.0262 0.0059
term_n m -0.0065 -0.0041 -0.0221 -0.0031 -0.0078 0.1386 -0.0112 2.041 0.0287 -0.0375 0.0165 -0.0434 0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0624 -0.009 -0.5845 -0.0094 0.0179 -0.0017 -0.0038
dummy high m 0.0002 0.0038 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0035 -0.0009 0.0048 0.0287 0.2599 0.0017 0.0073 0.0144 0.0016 -0.0014 0.0002 0.0007 -0.007 -0.1324 0.0001 -0.0072 -0.0033
phone_n sd 0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0013 0.0013 -0.006 0.0206 -0.0375 0.0017 0.0928 0.0046 0.0049 0.0002 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0163 0.0086 -0.0002 -0.0608 -0.0014 0.004
mrc_n sd 0.0001 0.0135 -0.0008 0.0005 0.0028 0.0038 -0.0147 0.0165 0.0073 0.0046 0.0875 0.0033 0.0003 -0.0019 -0.0063 0.0246 -0.0011 -0.0039 -0.0027 -0.0482 -0.0009
v_allow sd -0.0005 0.0079 -0.0018 0.0009 0.0038 -0.0736 0.0085 -0.0434 0.0144 0.0049 0.0033 0.0993 -0.0005 -0.0024 0.0359 0.0009 0.0124 -0.0052 -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0614
d_allow sd -0.0003 -0.0022 -0.0002 -0.0025 -0.0004 0.0008 0.0011 0.0018 0.0016 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0051 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0014 0 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0006
download sd 0.0002 -0.0678 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0092 0.0019 0.0037 -0.0002 -0.0014 0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0024 0.0008 0.0094 -0.0003 -0.0051 -0.0004 0.001 -0.0011 0.0021 0.0023
text_n sd -0.0002 -0.0058 -0.0029 0.0005 0.0016 -0.1423 0.0295 -0.0624 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0063 0.0359 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0926 -0.0198 0.0154 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0075 -0.0068
phone type sd -0.0014 0.0444 0.0205 0.0013 0.0032 0.0232 -0.2305 -0.009 0.0007 -0.0163 0.0246 0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0051 -0.0198 0.2018 0.0229 0.0002 0.0185 -0.0294 -0.0084
term_n sd 0.0021 0.0064 0.008 0.0013 0.0028 -0.036 -0.0173 -0.5845 -0.007 0.0086 -0.0011 0.0124 0 -0.0004 0.0154 0.0229 0.1808 0.0023 -0.003 -0.0029 0
dummy high sd -0.0003 -0.0017 0 0.001 -0.001 0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0094 -0.1324 -0.0002 -0.0039 -0.0052 -0.0009 0.001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0023 0.0799 -0.0003 0.0058 0
age fx -0.0007 0.0058 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0049 -0.0208 0.0179 0.0001 -0.0608 -0.0027 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0004 0.0185 -0.003 -0.0003 0.0521 0.0008 -0.0044
gender fx 0.0002 -0.0121 -0.0016 0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0034 0.0262 -0.0017 -0.0072 -0.0014 -0.0482 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0021 0.0075 -0.0294 -0.0029 0.0058 0.0008 0.0354 -0.0009
d_over_n fx 0.0004 -0.0113 0.002 -0.0001 -0.0019 0.0089 0.0059 -0.0038 -0.0033 0.004 -0.0009 -0.0614 0.0006 0.0023 -0.0068 -0.0084 0 0 -0.0044 -0.0009 0.0698
  
 
 
 
